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## Prof. Kissinger's "Clever" Policy

April 27, 1971

ON THE WHOLE DISSENT BOARD there is not one general. Not even a colonel. The most we can show are a few ex-sergeants, World War II vintage, who never achieved fame as military strategists. So we just don't know whether the invasion of Laos made any sense on strictly military grounds. And to be honest, we don't much care. At the moment it looks like a fiasco; by the time you read this, it may look worse. No matter: the whole Indochina war is a disaster comprising a series of "victories."

And lies. For what should now concern us especially is the systematic deceit, from one administration in Washington to another, by means of which the war is kept going. Remember pacification. Remember strategic hamlets. Remember land reform. Remember Cambodia. And now campaigns bringing U.S. troops, on land and in the air, into two additional countries, Cambodia and Laos, are described by Nixon spokesmen as "not extending the war." In their vocabulary, what short of universal holocaust *would* "extend the war"? It makes one sick.

The main line of U.S. strategy now seems clear. Vietnamization, as the President has openly admitted, is a policy to end U.S. *ground* involvement in the war—but not U.S. military direction and participation. It is a policy designed to reduce the number of U.S. troops in Vietnam—but, again as the President said, it offers little chance to end the war. Mr. Nixon thinks, in the words of R. W. Apple, Washington correspondent of the *New Statesman*, that "*all the country cares about is American casualties, and that he can therefore bomb away all over Indo-China, so long as the casualty lists are short enough, and still be in a good position for his re-election campaign.*"

Whether, or for how long, this scheme will "work" in Vietnam itself remains a question. There is little reason to think the Thieu government has gained any greater popular support than it had, say, two years ago. And while the overall military position of the pro-Saigon forces has apparently improved, there isn't much reason to suppose that, once the U.S. withdraws its ground troops, the South Vietnamese will be able to hold their own in combat. Information reaching us from Saigon indicates that NLF cadres have been instructed to "infiltrate" or dig into positions within the South Vietnamese government, so as to prepare for a sharpened political struggle once the U.S. military presence has been reduced. Nothing in Prof. Kissinger's policy—so clever on paper—offers expectation of coping with this problem.

IN THE U.S. ITSELF the Nixon policy may "work" for a while, if only because war weariness is all but universal. Except for two or three professors up at Brandeis University, you just can't find anyone ready to defend the war publicly. Everyone, for whatever reason, wants out; everyone recognizes the futility of fighting a war that can neither be won nor lost. For a short time, the reduction of troops in Vietnam may appease public opinion even if the war itself drags on. But there is a catch: suppose the Vietnamization policy "works" at home but not in Vietnam? suppose it turns out that the Saigon regime cannot be expected to survive without a portion of military support from the U.S. larger than is now planned? Will the Nixon administration be ready to see its clever scheme foiled by something so inconsequential as the Vietnamese political reality or will it discover that ground troops are necessary there after all?

R. W. Apple, hard-headed journalist, thinks

that Mr. Nixon's scheme will meet with increasing opposition at home, whether or not it "works." He writes:

. . . large numbers of ordinary citizens are beginning to ask what business the United States has killing and maiming all those Vietnamese and Laotians and Cambodians.

When that question gets abroad in the land, as it seems to be doing, the President will be confronted with a new problem, because the killing is rendered no more palatable to us, the onlookers (even if it is less distasteful to the combatants), by being conducted through the mechanism of a bombsight at 5,000 feet.

One hopes Mr. Apple is right, but it's hard to know. Still, if you consider the gradual increase of opposition to the war over the past few years, it may well be that the sheer persistence of Washington in dragging out a hopeless policy leads to a moral and political deepening of the sentiment against it. That there

have been only a few demonstrations in the last few months by no means removes such a possibility.

Let us return to fundamentals:

- The schemes and policies by which the war is perpetuated require political deceit at home, or a "cleverness" (we pull out, they get killed) that is morally repugnant. The result can only be a serious decay of democratic convictions, a growth of cynicism and despair.

- The war itself can be brought to an end only by a political settlement. Given the relative strengths and popular support of the two sides, this can be achieved only through some sort of coalition regime in South Vietnam. No one of democratic or socialist persuasion need delude himself that the results are likely to be attractive. We need only recognize that the alternative is worse.

I. H.

Michael Harrington

## *McCarthyism, Angela Davis, & the Berrigans*

April 27, 1971

I AM NOT, I HOPE, INDULGING in that most middle-aged of pastimes, boasting of how terrible things were when I was young. And yet, it must be said that, for all the current talk of repression in American society, what is surprising is the mildness of reaction in comparison to the McCarthy period in the early fifties. There are, to be sure, murderous exceptions like the police execution of Fred Hampton; nor is the fact that the antilibertarians are being somewhat restrained in their violation of various freedoms a reason for giving them an inch. And that, as will be seen, is particularly true in the case of the kidnap-bombing charges against some Catholic radicals. But the only hope for an effective defense of civil liberties requires that the issue be placed in a rational perspective.

First of all, the historical contrast.

During the McCarthy period the Right had a heaven-sent institution: the Communist party. Membership in the Party and its front groups provided a very simple criterion of subversion, and enough people had been within its ambit to keep squadrons of public and private witch-hunters at work. In the Smith Act trials, the Communist leadership was convicted of conspiring to advocate the teaching that at some future date the government should be overthrown by force and violence. That was an outrageous and unconstitutional attack on basic freedoms—as the Supreme Court was to acknowledge when it shamefacedly and obliquely repealed the decision in the *United States v. Dennis* during the fifties. But it cost the defendants five years in jail.

In that period there were a host of blacklists:

screening longshoremen and seamen in the Port Security program; firing workers in defense industry and government in the loyalty and security program; making it impossible for some hundreds of actors, writers, and technicians to ply their trades in the movies and television; demanding special oaths of college professors and school teachers; giving bad discharges to soldiers whose allegedly disloyal associations took place before they were drafted; and so on.

In one way or another tens of thousands, and perhaps more, were affected by jail sentences, loss of jobs, or simple fright. The nation was hardly living under a fascist terror since it was still possible to fight against each of these injustices. Eventually, with a detente in the Cold War, many cases were won. But there is no question that the legitimate fear in those times was much more widespread than now.

For these days the Right no longer has a believable international Communist conspiracy which is monolithically trying to subvert every institution in American life. It cannot, therefore, quickly assemble lists of pariahs for the courts, the loyalty boards, and the private citizens who, sometimes for a fee, used to act as prosecutors, judge, and jury all on their own. And there is no catch-all doctrine, like overthrowing the government by force and violence, to provide a litmus test for redness.

There have been, to be sure, events that cry out to heaven for justice: the killings at Jackson and Kent State, the apparent police connivance in Hampton's death. But even though each of these bloody incidents is worse than anything that happened in the days of Joe McCarthy, they do not demonstrate the existence of a national and concerted movement for repression of the kind we experienced in the early fifties. It can most certainly be argued that the atmosphere of the moment, the polarization over the war and race, have inspired individual police officers or national guardsmen to callousness, brutality, and even murder. But the institutional web that gave McCarthyism such a scope and range is lacking.

Moreover, some of the current cases arise out of the use of a confrontation strategy which positively seeks an encounter with the police and, in theory at least, consciously provokes arrest and jail sentences. In the Chicago Seven trial, for instance, there was a clear intention on the part of the defendants to *épater*

the court and the square world for which it stands. The charge was brought under an unconstitutional law; the judge behaved boorishly and repressively, particularly in his contempt sentences; and the whole sorry conclusion will hopefully be reversed by the Supreme Court. But the defendants' tactics were not the invention of a conspiratorial prosecutor and they constituted at least part of the problem. And in the New Haven trials related to the murder of Alex Rackley, there is no question that Panthers cooperated in the killing of a black man. The issue is whether the crime was prompted by a government agent.

THE CASE of Angela Davis is more complicated than almost any of the others. It cannot be excluded either that she is being framed or that she knowingly purchased guns to be used in the attempt to free the prisoners. To some of her supporters it makes little difference what the truth is: if the police are out to get her, or if she indeed engaged in terrorism, she is worthy of support. I cannot agree. She is certainly entitled to a fair trial in either case, and one must be exceedingly vigilant lest there be a conspiracy to frame her. But civil libertarians and the democratic Left simply cannot proclaim themselves indifferent to the issue of terrorism—a moral and political calamity.

FINALLY, THERE IS the charge against Catholic radicals that they plotted to kidnap Henry Kissinger and to blow up the federal heating system in Washington. I just do not believe it.

My reason is simple enough (it was suggested in a *Commonweal* editorial): since the defendants say they did not do it, I believe them rather than J. Edgar Hoover. They have an admirable record of speaking openly and honestly, even when that meant prison sentences (which does not mean I approve of their tactics simply because I admire their courage; in general I share Gordon Zahn's critique). Mr. Hoover has an equally public record of exaggerating and trifling with the truth before congressional committees when the size of his appropriation is at stake. It was in the course of such an appearance that he irresponsibly—and I should think, illegally—made criminal charges against citizens before any indictment had been brought against them. How that squares with the FBI claim to be only an investigative agency is hard to understand.

So I would certainly take the Berrigans' word as against Hoover's. It could be that some of the conspirators engaged in fantasy or foolish speculation, perhaps egged on by a government provocateur. Certainly, rhetorical excess is characteristic of much of the Left these days, including some of its more recent and enthusiastic converts. But that is no crime and as the case unfolds it may well be that it is the Justice Department, or at least the FBI, which should be brought to the bar of justice.

IN ALL of these cases—most emphatically including those where I have little political sympathy for the defendants—there is an urgent need for a clear and principled civil libertarian defense. But it would be very sad indeed if the various defense committees in these cases required you to accept the politics of the accused in order to fight for their rights. I went to an

Angela Davis rally in New York because I am quite suspicious of aspects of that case and would like to help her get a fair trial—and to help any government wrongdoers get their fair trial, too, if a frameup is involved. But that meeting would have put off anyone who was opposed on principle to terrorism or who rejected the simplistic analyses of the ultra-Left, which is to say, put off the overwhelming majority of the American people.

It is possible to fight back against repression, in part because the Right has not yet created a nationwide movement as in the Joe McCarthy days. But if that is to be done—if the ultra-Left is not simply going to dissipate all of its energy in getting arrested and raising defense funds—then we must be able, in the old-fashioned way, to support the rights of those with whom we disagree, and without having to submerge our differences in a hysterical "unity."

Gordon C. Zahn

## *The Berrigans—a Catholic Pacifist's View*

*Author of German Catholics and Hitler's War, Gordon Zahn teaches at the University of Massachusetts in Boston. He has long been active in the peace movement. The article below first appeared in the Catholic World and is reprinted with the permission of both that journal and the author. It was written before the recent federal indictment of the Berrigan brothers.*

THE CATHOLIC PEACE RADICALS of my generation are increasingly troubled by the failure of Catholic peace radicals of this generation to reject violence. We are inclined to be suspicious of what seems to be a growing willingness to accept violence as a tactic. Today's Catholic antiwar agitators are apparently gravitating more and more in the direction of the New Left and forming alliances with groups like the Black Panthers, condoning if not actually en-

dorsing the often senselessly disruptive and destructive acts and rhetoric such groups tend to promote.

We have, first, the introduction of direct action tactics, which have gone beyond protest to actual attempts to disrupt the war effort or the operations of some agency or program related to the war effort. The series of raids upon offices of draft boards and prominent manufacturers of war material initiated by Rev.

Philip Berrigan, S.S.J., and his fellow members of the "Baltimore Four" on October 27, 1967, and repeated by him and an expanded group, this time including his Jesuit brother Daniel (of the "Catonsville Nine"), on May 17, 1968, marked a dramatic new turn in radical peace action. Furthermore, as the raids proliferated throughout the country—in Milwaukee, Chicago, San Francisco, New York, Washington, D.C. (against Dow Chemical instead of the Selective Service System), Indianapolis, Minneapolis-St. Paul, Boston—it became evident that this was an almost exclusively Catholic operation.

It would be a mistake to measure the impact of these raids only in terms of repeat performance ratios, the increasing numbers of persons involved, and the extent to which they succeeded in destroying draft files. Of at least equal importance were the "festivals" of support, which drew admirers and well-wishers from all over the country as the various cases came to trial. Through these mass celebrations, and the hundreds of smaller gatherings organized to meet and talk with the "criminals" while the legal proceedings against them lumbered along, it is a conservative estimate to say that tens of thousands were reached by the action and many of these were undoubtedly moved to more direct opposition to the war.

In the face of such exciting evidence of success, it is difficult to criticize the Berrigan raids. The difficulty is greatly magnified in my own case by the fact that some of my past writings have been cited in several of the trials as factors in the decision to turn to this new level of radical peace activity. At the same time it would be less than honest to ignore the fact that strongly dissenting views have been expressed within what is usually described as the peace movement and, though I certainly do not share the more condemnatory of these judgments, I do share some of their underlying misgivings. Since these misgivings reflect the differences between the two generations of peace radicals, it is perhaps in order to discuss them briefly.

One thing must be made perfectly clear, however. In no sense are these comments to be taken as an "attack" upon the Berrigans or the others who have followed their inspiring leadership. I count them and several of their followers among my most valued personal friends, and even were this not the case, I would regard

them and their commitment with awe and admiration. I have been shocked and offended by the insensitive criticisms and thoroughly unjustified condemnations directed against them by so many Catholics, including fellow priests and bishops, who seem to have a far greater capacity for indignation over the napalming of draft files than they have been able to muster over the napalming of Vietnamese civilians.

As moral witness, I would challenge the right of anyone to fault the acts of these courageous men and women, lay and religious. In the sanctuary of their individual consciences they concluded that the traditional forms of opposition to the war no longer held promise of success, that only some dramatic act of resistance and obstruction could have any impact at all upon a continuing moral evil. Once convinced of this, they decided for themselves that the prison witness has now become the only appropriate witness for the Christian who wishes to dissociate himself completely from an unjust and immoral war and the deep-seated social injustices that war is designed to perpetuate. So they acted—as, indeed, any Christian who reaches such moral convictions would be obliged to act.

THIS IS NOT TO SAY that their analysis of the situation must be accepted by everyone without question. Those of us who have not yet seen fit to join them generally do not agree that all other forms of protest and opposition have run their course. If we continue to speak and march and sign petitions, this is not to be taken as a *prima facie* confession of moral cowardice (though, in all honesty, we cannot exclude that possibility); instead it is to be read as an affirmation, possibly overly optimistic, that something can still be accomplished within and through "the system" they have rejected.

Time may well prove the Berrigans are absolutely right. It has become far more difficult to defend the potency of conventional forms of protest when we consider a president unwilling to stir from his televised football game to note the presence of a half-million American citizens marching outside to protest his policies. Add to this display of callous indifference the incredibly stupid statements periodically issued by a vice-president and other highly placed officials, and the suggestion that democratic processes have reached a final and dead end takes on new validity. When an Agnew attacks the

news media, how far are we from a Goebbels? When a Julius Hoffman displays a level of judicial temperament and decorum that would have won the admiration of Roland Freisler and his *Volksgericht*, is it really enough to send off a new flurry of telegrams to congressmen and senators?

However one may answer these troubling questions, it is clear (or should be) that the Berrigan-style peace activism presents no problem as *personal witness* and, as such, deserves the respect and the support of every committed Christian. My own problem with it is at the level of *communication*, the level at which all the differences discussed earlier become relevant to the issue. In all fairness I must add that some of the participants in these raids with whom I have discussed my misgivings object to the distinction itself, insisting that the action must be judged only as witness. Were this actually the case, however, there would have been little point in making all the elaborate arrangements to have the press—and, if possible, television cameras as well—on the scene to record the “crime.”

It is clear, too, that the very symbols employed—the pouring of blood at Baltimore, the use of home-made napalm at Catonsville and in the subsequent raids—testify to an overriding intent to make a point, to get a message across as effectively as possible. This, I submit, is communication and to that extent it can be judged as communication. And the first judgment to be made is that as communication it was astonishingly successful. The hundreds of supporters who rallied to the defendants’ support, who traveled great distances to join the trial “celebrations” heard, understood, and accepted that message. Some of them accepted it to the point of going forth to do likewise.

If this were the whole story, the operation would have to be voted a complete success. Unfortunately, there is more to be taken into account. It is evident that tremendous numbers of people, including many already engaged in peace activities, were “turned off” by what seemed to them an altogether excessive form of protest. Certainly these included those who were already committed to support the war effort and who were only too ready to take this as one more evidence of the unreasonableness of any dissent in wartime.

Much more serious a negative effect, however, was the amount of adverse reaction on the part of others who had been hitherto uncommitted. As a native Milwaukeean with continuing ties to that community I can testify to the strength of the opposition to the “Milwaukee 14” raid, including, I might add, expressions of indignant disapproval by individuals who had provided me with support and encouragement during the full period of my service as a conscientious objector to World War II.

The only real test of the raids as communication—whether more of the uncommitted were turned off or won over—is beyond our power to determine at this time. If, as I would guess, the balance was negative, they were at least a partial failure. That some lukewarm opponents of the war were fired up to the point that they assumed a more direct and active role is an argument in the Berrigans’ favor; however, this too would have to be measured against others who may have been pushed or scared away.

One final point has to be made in this connection. In weighing the relative importance of the dimensions of witness and communication, the former must be given unquestioned priority. One must always act as his conscience demands, even at the price of alienating others. A hypothetical parallel might be helpful here. Had a similar group of Catholic priests and laymen invaded some offices in Nazi Germany to remove, deface, and destroy the lists of Jews scheduled for deportation to the extermination camps, few of us would be inclined to criticize them today for their “extremism.” And this would hold true even if it could be shown that the majority of the “good” Germans of the time did not understand or were offended by their action. Here, too, one cannot be sure of just how “hypothetical” this parallel may be; time and added perspective may show that this is where the Berrigans and their fellow criminals are and where the rest of us should be.

One part of the Berrigan message did come through loud and clear to both the opponents and the supporters of their action. Whether so intended or not, the draft board raids contributed, on the one hand, to the new mood of radical dissent that takes it for granted that one is free to disregard and disobey any law with which he does not agree—and, on the other, to the conviction held by Mr. Nixon’s “silent ma-

jority" that dissent as such is an invitation to anarchy. Both positions, it should be noted, represent a distorted understanding of a perfectly valid principle of civil disobedience, namely that an immoral or unjust law is no law and not only may be, but should be, disobeyed.

The crucial difference between this formulation and that which is in the ascendancy today is that "classic" civil disobedience is specific: the offensive law or practice, or even authority, is identified and the faults are spelled out as part of the act of disobedience itself. Increasingly this standard is being abandoned in favor of highly indiscriminate and individualized rejection of all authority which is then justified in the name of a vaguely defined and romanticized revolutionary ideal. What finally results in all too many instances is a frankly unprincipled exploitation of any or every issue or grievance in the interest of creating as much civil disruption as possible.

The resulting "polarization" is then interpreted as a value in its own right and as a means for promoting further revolutionary progress. Underlying this rationale is the highly dubious assumption that a final and forced choice between revolutionaries and reactionaries will result in the victory of the former. History would seem to argue instead that in any such ultimate confrontation, the Right, rather than right, is more likely to win out. The much-scorned liberal is frequently chided for his commitment to the illusion that it is still possible to use normal political processes to gain his socially desirable ends; it would seem a far more dangerous illusion that a few strident slogans and random destructive outbursts will bring "the System" to a point of collapse. What these are far more likely to accomplish is to convert subtle repression into overt repression and with the approval, or at least the silent acquiescence, of the dominant majority.

ONE NEED NOT DENY that this nation may have reached a critical point in its history where revolution, in the sense of a total and rapid restructuring of the social order, is the only way by which it can free itself for its own and the world's good from the chains of war, militarism, racism, and economic imperialism. But if this is the situation, as I am prepared to say it is, it will require much more than the extravagant rhetoric and self-righteous posturings that pass

for a revolutionary stance in some of our more activist circles. I do not, be it noted, include the Berrigans and their raids under this description. On the contrary, they could serve as models of carefully calculated and disciplined civil disobedience. I do suggest, however, that the dramatic quality of the raids, together with the sometimes excessive emotional reactions they provoked on the part of many of the young admirers who trooped to the trial celebrations, contributed to the spread of the "anything goes, anytime" mood that is so widespread among many of the younger elements of the peace—or, to be more accurate, antiwar—movement.

The latter distinction in terms is crucial as the two massive demonstrations held on the Boston Common in October 1969 and April 1970 revealed. On the surface they seemed quite similar. The October turnout of a hundred thousand people or so was almost matched by the April rally. Both represented a broad coalition of individuals and groups opposing the war in Vietnam. But here the similarity breaks down. October's was a gloriously happy affair; the crowd's enthusiasm was evidenced in the waves of applause that greeted each speaker and punctuated his remarks; and the speakers themselves reveled in their common purpose, playing down or avoiding altogether the ideological and tactical points of difference that separated them and their organizations.

April was something else. The tone of the gathering was sullen, even bitter, as it was exposed to a seemingly endless parade of speakers who were intensely particularistic in their various separate appeals. In place of the surges of spontaneous and enthusiastic response, each speaker was greeted with scattered applause from those segments of the crowd already in his camp while the great majority listened in silence or ignored him altogether. As for the speeches themselves, they seemed designed to affront those listeners who were not already part of the speaker's following. Rational argumentation was replaced in many instances by reliance upon the rather limited stock of sex-related expletives and ritual clichés. Cue words ("pig") and slogans ("Right on!" "Power to the people!") were *de rigueur* for any speaker who wanted his full share of the scattered applause.

Perhaps the most depressing note of the whole affair was the frequency with which the representatives of one group would be openly

scornful of the objectives of another; indeed, the advocates of pacifism and nonviolence were ridiculed and repudiated, one speaker using his time to call upon the thousands ostensibly gathered there to express their desire for peace to "pick up the gun." Only at the very end of the rally when the local "tribe" of *Hair* called upon the world to "let the sun shine in" did the crowd show any sign of catching fire, but by then it was too late. Most had already drifted away, bored or offended by the speakers or, in the case of a sizable segment, on their way to the night of destructive rioting and "trashing" in Harvard Square that followed.

The difference between the two events reflects a change in mood that has its expression in the substitution of the symbol of the clenched red fist for that of the dove and the olive branch. It is easy enough to understand the reason; the October rally, for all its success as an event, had been singularly unsuccessful in affecting national policy and the great outpouring of people for the November rally in Washington had been studiously ignored. The war and its casualties continued; domestic needs grew more pressing while the nation's resources were being squandered on the battlefields of Southeast Asia.

But to understand does not necessarily mean to accept the new emphasis, and this is where the old-line pacifists, the peace radicals of yesterday, have been forced to question the wisdom and the usefulness of actions and rhetoric which introduce and exploit new animosities in the interests of what appears to be an intensified commitment to violence and destruction. They find it ever more difficult to distinguish the slogans of the New Left ("We want peace, and we will use any means to get it!") from those of the ultra-hawks as they call for the total destruction of those they define as enemy. They fear, and with good reason, that the tiger their young associates have chosen to ride is not heading down the paths of peace and fellowship among all men.

As the center of peace activism continues to move more and more in the direction of aggressive, even disruptive and destructive activism, the prospects for further fragmentation within the peace movement become more certain. Directed and disciplined civil disobedience will have less appeal as the logic of events takes hold. Once again it is helpful to turn to the

draft board raids to illustrate the point. Probably the most compelling rationale for these raids was that given to one of my classes at the university by Tony Mullaney, the Benedictine priest member of the "Milwaukee Fourteen." As he explained it, every Christian has an obligation to be what he called "a public speaker" in the sense of dedicating his life and his acts to the spread of the Christian message and to work for the removal of social evil and injustice. To this end, he had "gone the route" and tried everything: he had marched and he had preached; he had signed petitions and written letters; he had picketed and participated in mass demonstrations—and all to no avail. No one, he was forced to conclude, was listening; or, if leaders heard, they did not heed. In order to make his point, to be the "public speaker" he had to be, it became necessary, he felt, to "raise the ante." For him that meant journeying to Milwaukee, invading the draft office there, and destroying as many of its records as he could.

It is an extremely persuasive case, at least until we raise the next question: what if *that* doesn't work? And obviously it has not worked; both the war and the draft go on. Though it is possible to argue that the raised ante may have contributed to decisions to reform the draft and the proposals to abandon it altogether—and even, I suppose, to the decision to begin removing men from Vietnam—it would be difficult to establish that this was a major factor. On the other hand, there are those who would insist—and at least with as much logic—that the draft board raids can be shown to have lost their original impact so that now they can be shrugged off as little more than inconsequential nuisances.

IF SO, WHAT must the next step be? Does one move on to bombing the offices themselves, first with advance warning and then, if the war still goes on, without the warning? To my knowledge these hypothetical next steps in the sequence have not been proposed by anyone involved in or sympathetic toward the Berrigan raids. Nevertheless, I would not be at all sure that there are not some peace radicals around who might be prepared to give such proposals their assent.

Which is only to say, in effect, that even the Berrigans may be in danger of slipping into my

"sometime radical" category. In fact, they may already be there. Thus, for instance, criticism has been voiced against the practice of waiting to be arrested after the "criminal" act is performed. As the "hit-and-run and be ready to hit-and-run again" mode of operation gains favor, it is entirely possible that the burners of draft files, like the burners of draft cards before them, may find their actions rejected as examples of ego-serving, bourgeois tokenism.

There is some evidence that the Catonsville raiders are themselves split on this issue. The decision of four of them to "go underground" as fugitives after their Supreme Court appeal was denied should not be read as an attempt to evade the personal unpleasantness of spending several years in prison. Instead, the decision represents something of an ideological shift. In Dan Berrigan's words, the purpose is to "show them they can no longer lock people up on their order, any more than they can induct people into the military service on their order." This is, of course, a perfectly acceptable rationale, and one is free to hope (as I do) that the fugitives succeed in evading capture so that they may continue to work against the war. This does not alter the very significant fact, however, that it is quite a different rationale from the one originally set forth.

In the early raids, the governing rationale centered upon the principles of Christian non-violent resistance *including* the crucial spiritual dimension of accepting the penalty *because of the continued witness the penalty itself represents*. It is my recollection that some members of the Catonsville Nine, Dan Berrigan among them, were ambivalent about putting up any court defense at all lest the clarity of their witness be confused and lost. Needless to say, it is not for the "guilty bystander" who would not be called upon to serve the sentence in any case, to decide which of the two formulations is the better or in which form the witness is more effective. It is the shift itself that interests me and the fact that it has been in the direction of what is generally taken to be a more radical stance.

Whether it actually is more radical or not is the final question to be raised and discussed. How one answers the question will determine who is entitled to the peace radical designation. Returning to the personal framework I have employed here, I have not destroyed draft records

or, for that matter, draft cards (though I have violated the law by accepting draft cards that were turned in at a resistance rally). Nor have I encouraged others to do so; in fact, I have argued against the draft board raids with friends who were subsequently involved in this kind of action. If one measures radicalism by the dramatic content of an act and the degree of illegality involved, I am not (nor, I fear have I ever been) much of a radical.

If, on the other hand, we take the term to mean a firm conviction based on an informed interpretation of fundamental moral principle and a pattern of behavior that gives expression to that conviction, all is not lost. By this standard, the conscientious objector performing his alternate service is as much a "radical" as the federal prisoner whose conscience told him that this was not enough. Of course, the C.O. who does recognize a moral obligation to violate the law but accepts alternate service instead could not be so designated, though his witness should not be written off completely. By the same token, the individual who is not personally convinced that it is right and necessary to violate the law but feels impelled to follow the raucous crowd which tells him that "this is where it's at," or who is swept into his activism by the appeal of greater drama and risk, should not be classified too readily as a radical either. The radicalism, in short, lies in the moral commitment, not in the manifestation alone.

If this seems a rather inconclusive note on which to end this discussion, it is nonetheless crucial. Conformism can come in many shades and forms, and a truly radical activity is more than a matter of ego-gratification through exhibitionistic extravagance. The elements of Catholic peace radicalism, as I see them, must include the following: first and most essential, a thoroughgoing commitment to the Gospel message of peace and love; second, a conviction that the Christian must always be prepared to act according to that commitment and as his conscience instructs, regardless of the consequences he may have to suffer; third, he must do so in a spirit of charity toward those not yet aware of the pacifist implications of their faith; and, finally, he must so govern his behavior that nothing he may do will violate or contradict those principles he has set out to serve.

Some may feel that such a formulation is too "open," that it includes too wide a range of

individual witnesses under the rubric of radicalism. Nevertheless, to the extent that it insists upon the primacy of the individual conscience and incorporates fundamental Christian ideals of all-inclusive and self-sacrificing love, it is radical in the fullest and truest sense of the word. Which is only to suggest that the Cross and neither the olive branch nor the fist still holds promise of being the most radical symbol of all.

THIS FORMULATION I have offered allows all the room in the world for the courage and the creativity of the Berrigans and the other new-breed radicals who, quite rightly, have taken over the leadership of the Catholic peace move-

ment; but it does so without denying or rejecting the witness of my generation of peace radicals—or, for that matter, of men like Franziskus Stratmann of Germany and Paul Hanly Furfey and others in America who provided us with so great a measure of inspiration and support.

If, as I for one am ready and happy to acknowledge, today's radicals are more likely to succeed in finally "turning the Church around" and bringing it back to full awareness of what was its original pacifist mission, it is perhaps important that we not overlook altogether the sometime radicals who brought them to their starting point. In this sense still, if in no other, it does all go together.

Pran Chopra

## *India: Triumph for Democracy*

New Delhi, April 5, 1971

IN INDIA, we have exhausted our exclamatory diction in describing the triumph of Mrs. Gandhi in the recent elections. So I will simply say it has been the greatest ever—quantitatively as good as Nehru's, qualitatively better still. She had been in a minority in the Lok Sabha, the lower and directly elected House of India's Parliament. But she was reasonably safe, for the opposition was so badly split that it could never succeed in voting her down on the floor of the House. But she decided that this was not good enough. Against the advice of Mr. Jagjivan Ram, the president of her party, she dissolved the Lok Sabha, the first time this gamble was ever taken in India. Now she has pulled it off, brilliantly.

She has won a comfortable two-thirds majority in the new Lok Sabha, enough to amend the Constitution without the support of any other party, and she has done so against odds that had never confronted her father. Her party was no longer the omnipresent electoral machine it had been under Nehru, with a network

of influence and an office in every sizable village and town. The split in the Congress two years ago had ruined its organization, and what was left of it had gone with the splinter that took itself off as the Congress (O)—for opposition. Second, she was fighting against the backdrop of disastrous reverses suffered by her party in 1967; whereas the backdrop to Nehru's victories was the unbroken supremacy of the party ever since before India won independence. And all the rightist parties had united against her, which they never could do against Nehru; after tasting blood in 1967, they were thirsting for more. That is why many people thought that her political end was near.

But, with a few straggling results yet to come in, she won 350 seats out of 515, and with a much bigger vote per winning candidate than in any previous election. The three main rightist parties allied against her have taken only 46 seats among them. On the Left, the more extreme Communists, the CPI (Marxist), have taken 25 and the more parliamentary CPI,

which fought partly in alliance with Mrs. Gandhi's Congress (R), took 23. Most other national parties have been just about completely wiped out.

This consolidation of the vote behind the main parties is one of the three reasons, each more important than Mrs. Gandhi's fortunes, which make these elections a landmark in the evolution of Indian democracy. The vote had never been so fragmented among parties as distant observers sometimes thought it to be; there were scores of parties but three-quarters of the vote in the Lok Sabha elections was harvested by the top five or six. Even so, the rest were a confusing mass, especially the army of unattached independent members, who used to get the next highest block of votes and seats after the Congress. Now most of them are gone.

In terms of seats, the top seven parties had 420 in the dissolved Lok Sabha; in the new they have 467 out of 515. Independents and small parties, usually listed as "others," had 67 seats between them in the last House but have only 33 in this one. Some illustrious army generals, including former Chief of the Army Staff General Cariappa and Lt. General Harbaksh Singh who fought brilliantly in the 1965 war with Pakistan, are among those who fell miserably; the Sikh general fell in a predominantly Sikh constituency and lost his "deposit," a small sum of money each candidate is asked to deposit to discourage frivolous candidacies. The voter has thus reminded any army people who may have political ambitions that he regards politics as outside the military domain.

Equally important is the division of the vote between the two mainstreams of the classic parliamentary system. The overwhelming on-sidedness of the verdict has belied the expectation, strong until polling began, that the two would be more evenly balanced, creating the chance that they could alternate in power as in an ideal two-party system. But the differentiation is unmistakable and has probably come to stay.

EVERY MAJOR POLITICAL CONTROVERSY in India, before or after the split in the Congress in the summer of 1969, was built around an issue that was ideological in fact or at least in appearance. Before: the supporters of Mrs. Gandhi openly clashed with the conservative president of the

party, Mr. Nijalingappa, on the place and performance of the public sector of the economy. After: on her decision to nationalize banks, on the abolition of the special privileges and privy purses of the princes, and on social limits upon the right to property. At both times Mrs. Gandhi strongly clashed with a galaxy of older leaders of the Congress (O) and their new-found electoral allies, the main party of economic conservatism, the Swatantra party, and the main party of social conservatism and Hindu orthodoxy, the Jana Sangh. During the campaign some of them tried to keep pace with the socialistic phrases in Mrs. Gandhi's manifesto and speeches; but they were not taken seriously. On the other hand, the very moderation with which Mrs. Gandhi made her promises to the poor was taken to be an earnest token of her oft-repeated declaration that this time the Congress meant to do what it promised and therefore would promise only what it could do. The more wordy "socialism" of some of her opponents was seen as hollow, especially because of the kind of candidates fielded by them: more industrial magnates, more princes, and bigger farmers than ever before.

The picture was completed for the voter by many reports in the newspapers that a sharp division was taking place in rural India. The poorer sections and especially the depressed classes, the Harijans, were showing uncommon independence of action and defying the pressure of the traditionally strong economic and caste interests which were openly opposing Mrs. Gandhi's Congress (R). Both phenomena were new. In the past, these interests had either supported the Congress so as not to displease the established authority which had conferred many benefits upon them, or they had opposed it surreptitiously, and in each operation had carried the poorer voters, who were dependent upon them. This time they were bolder, possibly expecting a defeat of the Congress (R) because of the apparently formidable alliance conservatism had built up against it. Because of the enormous margins by which Mrs. Gandhi's candidates won, it is clear that the Congress (R) has expanded its support among the lower economic and social strata. They have voted far more heavily for it than in any previous election, more heavily than for the opposing alliance, and probably more heavily than

for the parties of the far Left—although a higher *proportion* of the latter's vote came from the poor.

This means that in the middle area of Indian politics—despite the “radical” thunder which booms out of Calcutta, the political game is mostly played in our democratic middle—there is a sharper differentiation than at any earlier time. It is mostly between the moderate Left represented by the Congress (R) and the moderate Right represented by the alliance between the Congress (O), the Swatantra party, the Jana Sangh, and the SSP, this last a splinter socialist party always moved more by its opposition to the Nehru family than by socialism. The two Communist parties are bitterly divided, with the CP (Marxists) intensely opposed to Mrs. Gandhi because it sees a threat in her mild but attractive brand of socialism, and the more moderate or Moscow CPI, which has supported Mrs. Gandhi and won most of its seats and votes in areas in which the Congress decided not to oppose it.

Accompanying the consolidation of the vote in large and reasonably well-defined aggregates is the homogeneity that India's political culture has displayed for the first time in these elections. There have been occasions before when all Indians have reacted as a single nation: during the struggle for freedom from British rule, for example, before the movement broke up into Hindus and Muslims; during the fighting with Pakistan over Kashmir in 1947 and in the much bigger clash of arms later, in 1965; during the Chinese attack in 1962. But all these were reactions to external stimuli which, being external, provoked automatic self-awareness. In the politics of elections Indian voters have shown themselves to be grouped in autonomous “cells,” each separated from the next by the dividing walls of some intensely local identity, distinguished either by caste or language or religion. Each “cell” has been a political universe in itself, responsive only to its own internal politics and to the leadership of its own elite.

THIS DESCRIPTION to some extent overstates the case; it ignores, as many sociologists and especially Americans do, that elections here have often shown large countrywide responses and swings, which account for the stable hegemony of the Congress during the first 20 years of freedom. But it also shows the true emphasis

that should be read into the sweeping success Mrs. Gandhi has had, bulldozing the dividing walls and getting the electorate to act as a single whole. For the first time the election results in all parts of the country can be interpreted in terms of the same single issue. Faced only with the question whether Mrs. Gandhi should be overthrown or returned with a stronger mandate, people have voted as though they were a single constituency. That is why these elections have been described as India's first national referendum held on an issue that was made equally comprehensible in all parts of the country. Partly, this may have happened because now for the first time parliamentary elections were not accompanied by elections to local state assemblies except in three states—West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, and Orissa—and were therefore free of the parochialism of local issues. But the main reason was the penetrating power of the dominant theme around one person.

Because the election was so unified and homogeneous, virtually every party of local identity has had a crashing downfall, except the DMK in the South, which was in a powerful local alliance with the Congress (R), and the Praja Samithi in the neighboring State of Andhra which is demanding a new state of Telengana. The Bangla Congress in West Bengal, strong in the previous State Assembly and aspiring to be the leader in the new one, has taken only five seats out of 277 in the State Assembly and none in the Lok Sabha. The BKD, a powerful combination of caste and farming classes in the Hindi belt of northern India, shook Uttar Pradesh with its power in 1969, made its leader, Mr. Charan Singh, chief minister of the state and a hopeful for the prime ministership; but it has not taken a single seat in the new Lok Sabha, and Mr. Charan Singh has been defeated. The Akali Dal, a parochial party of the Sikhs that has had an apparently unshakable grip on Punjab, has won only 10 percent of the seats in which it opposed the Congress (R). The Shiv Sena, a facsistic Maratha band that has been terrorizing all non-Maratha communities in cosmopolitan Bombay, was defeated in every constituency it contested in its debut in parliamentary politics. Parties of Muslim identity did not do too badly, but a much higher proportion of the Muslim vote went back to the Congress.

This has made the elections an enormous personal triumph for Mrs. Gandhi because she is seen as the durable leader of the new alliance she has forged between the minorities, the poor, and the democratic Left sections of the majority community. Just as the decision to call the elections and the strategy for winning them was born in her mind, the credit for the victory goes, almost undivided, to her. The controversies that had rocked the Congress had already made her a nationwide figure. But when the opposition made her deposit the major plank in their platform, she seized the chance gladly and, with great political astuteness and daring, made herself the issue without untimely modesty. Her image grew day by day, and in the last 10 days before the polling it swept her opponents out of the ring. It may seem fantastic to those more familiar with yesterday's India than today's, but she now looms larger on the scene than Nehru ever did.

Yet it would be a mistake to believe, as Indian politicians do, that this is all there was to the elections. Mrs. Gandhi was her charismatic father's daughter even in 1967, when the Congress party tumbled to shame in its first debacle in a general election. She was then an even more youthful looking, persuasive, modern, and attractive personality. But she had not, as she has since then, surrounded herself with a few simple, bold, and popular issues such as bank nationalization, abolition of the princes' privy purses, and the proposal of a law requiring the public listing of all private property. These issues are specific and clear enough to make the political convictions of the democratic Left more appealing to the people and more easily understandable. In her personal triumph there is also the triumph of certain policies.

WHAT WILL HAPPEN NEXT? Will all this jubilation turn out to be premature; will the Congress (R) hegemony and its Lok Sabha majority prove to be durable; while it endures, will Mrs. Gandhi be able to meet the obligations that are implicit in it? Answers to these questions need a little time to emerge; right now we are too close to this blinding flash to see the future very clearly. But some guesses are in order.

First of all, the hegemony. I think local issues are bound to come to the fore in future elections to state assemblies. Those parties will win them which are best able to sail in the local

winds. The Congress (R) may be able to do so as well as any other party, but only to the extent that at the state level it agrees to be a federation of state parties and confines the instincts of a party in power at the center to its work at the center. It can do so well, and in the past has done so; but to that extent it will prove to be premature to read stable centralism into the restoration of its hegemony. The new-found homogeneity can endure; whether it will depends now more upon the leaders than upon the voters. The electorate has shown that it can comprehend all-India issues and react to them as a single political culture. It is the leaders who have to raise their appeal above parochial divisions. On the whole, the chances are better than even that they will, because the leading parties have all-India ambitions even if all of them do not yet have an all-India character; they have a stake in the new homogeneous character of the Lok Sabha elections.

If they remain homogeneous, a party of the democratic Left will be able to thrive because the socioeconomic environment of the country is weighted in its favor. It must have the organization to exploit it or, failing that, a leader with such widespread personal appeal as Mrs. Gandhi's today. Given either of these assets it can hold back the tide of conservatism. That tide is much stronger than the results of these elections suggest, and is likely to grow with prosperity; the conservative parties are bound to try to organize themselves better, and they can expect to cut into the margins of the Congress (R). But power will remain with the Congress (R) for a number of years to come if Mrs. Gandhi is able to satisfy the expectations aroused by her.

There are four reasons at least why an exceptional responsibility for the future devolves upon Mrs. Gandhi. First, no prime minister ever stood so far above competing centers of power as Mrs. Gandhi does today. Second, never was popular expectation pushed up so much or with such deliberate calculation. Third, the source of the expectation is not the vague rhetoric of the usual manifestoes; this time it stems from very clear and specific commitments that were written into the strategy for winning. Fourth, the public identifies these commitments more with the Prime Minister than with anyone else.

But here again I think the chances are better

than at any time in the past. Mrs. Gandhi is a much shrewder politician than her father was; she reads the signs of the times much better, and no sign is clearer than that economic discontents must be contained and the fear overcome that there is always a conflict between distributive justice and economic growth. There

is not. There are areas and stages in which the two approaches coincide; if these are used well, people will worry about the point of divergence when they get to it. What they want to see most is sincere effort, which they have not seen for some time; given proof of the effort, they will give her time for results.

Henry Pachter

## *Willy Brandt Under Fire*

April 24, 1971

**I**N 1959, THE GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATS adopted a new program. At the same time, the British Labour party also adopted a new program. Each of the two was trying to shed the image of a Marxist workers' party and to transform itself into a people's party. While the British did not totally repudiate nationalization of the means of production, the Bad Godesberg formula was: "Free market competition wherever possible; nationalization where necessary."

A few years later the Social Democratic students in Germany began to rebel against the embourgeoisement of the party, started violent actions at several universities, and collaborated with Communists in public demonstrations. Willy Brandt had them summarily expelled from the party. He did not think that tender regard for party democracy should be allowed to bar the party forever from power.

The treatment paid off. The party came to power, or at least now shares it with the Liberals. But it had to pay a price. A new youth organization, the Socialist University League (SHB), soon broke with the party, which obviously was unable to deliver what it had promised its voters. The coalition partners so far have been slow in adopting needed educational reforms and have barred the trade unions' standing demand for a share in the management of all corporations (token participation exists in

plants of the European Steel and Coal Community). The government is paying undue consideration to objections the churches have raised against liberalization of divorce laws. And inflation progresses at the same rate as elsewhere.

Foreign policy is the only area where Chancellor Brandt has made some progress, though his *Ostpolitik* is at the mercy of any accident that might happen in the power play inside the Kremlin. He may achieve some relaxation of tensions with the Soviet bloc and a certain easing for the much-harassed population of Berlin; but it is precisely on this point that vicious attacks are being mounted against him. Having served against Hitler in the Norwegian army, he has been called a traitor to the Fatherland; having now recognized the consequences of that war—the loss of the Eastern provinces to Poland and the de facto existence of a second German state—he has been called an enemy of the nation. As a result, his chances of being reelected in 1973 have grown slimmer. In that election 5 million young voters will be going to the polls for the first time.

At such a bad moment, the party's youth is once more in rebellion. After the student exodus, the younger members formed a special group, "Jung-Sozialisten" (generally called Jusos), cautiously including comrades up to 35. Most of them are activists who plan to make

their careers through the party or at least hope to win influence that way. So far, the Jusos have succeeded extremely well: from their ranks have emerged at least two cabinet members on the federal level, many members of Parliament, and officials on the state and municipal levels. Which is not saying much, as they may be more youthful in style than in thought.

Up till recently, the Jusos were so loyal and quiet that it was said (ironically but truthfully) that one could find more revolutionaries in the youth organizations of the Christian Social party and the Liberal party than among the Jusos. But now all youth organizations have again come under the influence of militant student agitation, and the Jusos, meeting last December in Munich, formulated a new program. They wanted to return to the concept of class war, though most of them were not workers, and they demanded stronger emphasis on the final goal of socialism, though most of them admit it can be of no help in electoral campaigns. Instead, they try to develop their own kind of activism, involving communities and ordinary people in their daily lives. Especially fruitful for this kind of activity, so it seems to them, is municipal politics. They have asked for free tramway and bus transportation, and occasionally have poured concrete on to the rails in order to prevent fare increases. They have demanded day care centers and the free use of lawns in public developments for sports; they have marched through a forest belonging to Prince Bismarck and asked for its conversion into a public recreation area; they have demanded abolition of private rooms in hospitals, closer control of rents, and eventual nationalization of real estate.

SOME OF THESE DEMANDS are really picayune and lag behind proposals made by people who are not even socialists; other demands will be hard to realize without long-range planning and the development of new financial resources. They have irked especially the SPD mayors, who are the most conservative but also the best vote-getters in the Social Democratic party.

Munich's Hans Jochen Vogel got 85 percent of the votes—a third more than the Social Democratic list—and he is recognized as one of the most resourceful reformers. But recently the left wing conquered the Munich Jusos and

through them the Munich party organization. Using "midnight tactics," the students dragged party meetings out into the late hours and rammed the votes through after the workers, who have to be at their jobs in the early morning hours, had left. This tactic has been used in other cities, and has created considerable resentment among the proletarian core of the membership.

The mere fact that the Jusos adopt a demand tends, in the eyes of many SPD members and supporters, to disqualify it. Last year, *Der Spiegel* found that 56 percent of the population approved of free city transportation; after the Jusos embraced the issue, the percentage fell to 35 percent.

But it is not the ultimate aim of the Juso program that makes people angry. As long as they were merely theorizing that Germany needs something like an antitrust division or SEC, that all commercial advertising should be banned, that a woman should be entitled to seven free abortions and draw a salary during the first year of her child's life, that the big banks and industrial establishments should be nationalized, that 50 percent of industrial profits should be distributed, their party elders were content to pat them on the back. But in recent months Jusos in many cities have taken to "direct action," occupying parks and houses, and making it hard for vote-conscious mayors to protect the party's moderate image for future elections.

Experienced members who can recall the thirties also were appalled by the terrorist tactics indulged occasionally by the Jusos. And the whole party was alerted when they joined with the recently legalized Communist party (DKP) for actions and discussions. A statement on the relationship of Social Democrats to the Communist world was drawn up by Richard Lowenthal, well-known authority on Soviet affairs, and a meeting in Bonn decreed, at the suggestion of Willy Brandt, that no one could belong to the SPD unless he recognized the party's program and its organizational statutes, which exclude the toleration of Leninist cadre; further, that cooperation in action with Communists of any kind is incompatible with membership. However, to avoid a split, the decision if someone has stepped over the line is left to the individual locals. This has given Mayor Vogel a chance to recapture the Munich organization—

by a slim margin and with all city employees alerted. He clearly will not run for mayor again, but wants to take on the formidable Franz-Joseph Strauss, the champion of reaction, in the Bavarian state election. To make this possible he forced Willy Brandt and the party leadership to side with him. Left to its own devices, the party leadership would prefer to allow many flowers to grow in its garden. It knows that it owes its success in the 1969 elections mainly to the activism of the young, and it certainly would like to preserve "unity" with them, especially since the older generation of party workers is pretty much mired down in routine jobs. But how long can the SPD leadership look on without taking action while the opposition heaps one provocation on top of another?

The only winners in this squabble are likely

to be the Christian Democrats. Thoughtful socialists who remember the thirties ask themselves: must every mistake be repeated?

Willy Brandt is caught in a classical dilemma: to pursue his *Ostpolitik*, which he sincerely believes is necessary in the interest of peace, he must curb the Left; but if the militancy of the Left forces him to resort to repressive measures, he risks losing them to the Communists. Recent local elections in Berlin and in the Rhineland-Palatinate State were inconclusive except in one respect: they showed that the Liberal party (FDP) may not survive the next general election. The electorate then will be polarized between the SPD and the CDU/CSU which is becoming more and more reactionary; besides, the formidable Franz-Joseph Strauss threatens to become its leader. This is not the time to split forces on the Left.

Stanley Engelstein

## *Civil Liberties & Confrontation Politics*

*The following is an abridged text of a talk given at a recent symposium of the Brooklyn chapter of the New York Civil Liberties Union. Mr. Engelstein is editor of Civil Liberties Forum, the paper of the New York Membership Committee for Civil Liberties, a group within the NYCLU that opposes its tendency toward "politicization" in the sense the author explains below.*

LET US BEGIN by referring to the new thinking of some civil libertarians. Classic threats to civil liberties from legal and illegal government repression are easily recognized. The threat to civil liberties from nihilistic eruptions of pseudopolitical groups are also not difficult to perceive. But what is usually overlooked is the impact of the current social crisis on civil libertarians themselves and on their concept of civil liberties. In response to some imperative of

"relevance," the very essence of civil libertarianism is now in the process of redefinition. A little later I will turn to this new thinking in the NYCLU, because it too is a product of our social crisis and of the turbulence of confrontation politics. For what civil libertarians think about the nature of civil liberties is itself an important factor in the survival of those liberties.

First, however, to some aspects of confronta-

tion politics and civil liberties. Without getting lost in philosophic intricacies, we must define, at least roughly, the central terms of our topic. We need to distinguish between confrontations, demonstrations, and breaking the law. Sufficient for our purpose is to define confrontation politics which affects civil liberties as that in which authorities, institutions, or individuals are subject to a form of coercion to which they can reply only by counterforce. A group of people confronts an institution with the kind of force that prevents it from functioning. When a building is seized, which prevents a university from going about its affairs, the administration is forced to respond. If there is no force, or threat of force, then we are not talking about confrontation. For confrontation is a tactic that poses the issue of power between the confrontationists and the authority. Whether or not confrontation settles the question at issue, it always raises the large question of power and thereby forces a response of power. The more extreme the coercion and the more disruptive the action, the more extreme will be the counteracting exercise of force to restore normal function.

The key therefore to confrontationism is that it provokes a counterforce. It is not simply a question of a large demonstration or of breaking the law. If you break the law by parking on the wrong side of the street, the state can ignore you or simply give you a ticket. If you break the law by parking in the middle of a bridge to stop traffic, the state cannot ignore you; it must remove you and the car by force, and immediately. If students occupy a gymnasium by way of expressing their demands, the administration has the choice of using force to get them out or continuing university activities without the gymnasium and waiting them out. If students occupy lecture halls and administration buildings and so prevent the university from functioning, then the authorities must respond with counterforce of some kind.

Now there is nothing necessarily evil in coercion itself. Society coerces us all the time, and its coercion is embodied in its laws. In a democracy the law, loosely and simply speaking, represents the consensus of society, historically arrived at, by which people agree to limitations on themselves in relation to the state and to each other. The law forces us to go to school when we are young, to pay taxes when we work, to get married in certain registered ways, and so

forth. The law also denies me the right to walk into another man's home because that infringes on his right not to be disturbed. If some nuisance insists on invading my house, I can get the law to coerce him to leave. It has been pointed out that every man's right to swing his arms freely ends where his neighbor's nose begins. Law involves restraint and restriction, and this coercion is necessary to any social order.

IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY, this system of coercion is balanced by procedures and processes rooted in tradition or built into the law itself, whereby laws can be changed or their application challenged. If you have a society of laws with no means of redress, no system of due process, then you have despotism, whether benevolent under benign laws and leadership, or tyrannical under repressive laws. Coercion and redress, restrictions and due process are the balancing forces necessary to any civil and democratic society.

But confrontation politics, by contrast, coerces without redress, imposes its will on individuals and institutions. By its very nature, it is indifferent if not antagonistic, to the rights of due process and constitutes a grave threat to civil liberties, directly and indirectly. By directly I mean that when students prevent a professor from talking to or teaching his class, his freedom of speech is being denied. He is being coerced without redress by the arbitrary action of some individuals. You might argue that his freedom of speech on the scale of history or justice is less important than the cause of the students, whatever that might be. In that case you are waiving the civil libertarian concern for free speech in the interests of different, presumably higher, goals. We will return to this point later. For the moment it is sufficient to underline that whatever may justify this confrontation, it cannot be denied that an infringement on civil liberties is involved.

The indirect and more ominous threat confrontationism brings to civil liberties is the response it evokes from the authorities. Since confrontationism poses instantly the question of power, the outcome is guaranteed in advance, because there is no question who has the greater power and who will win in a showdown. But, while there is no real threat that existing authorities will lose their power, there is a serious danger of social chaos. Clearly, it takes very

few people to cause monumental disruption. Thus, while confrontationism cannot replace power, it can disrupt power, at least temporarily. The more integrated the society, the greater the power of disruption by a few people. This poses a dangerous dilemma for a democratic society. Since disruption is intolerable, it must be prevented in advance, and the state is driven to repressive measures that go beyond the law or to create new repressive laws that can cope with the threat to social order. The authorities who often need no encouragement to repress militant oppositionists are provided with an apparently legitimate pretext for coming down hard on all rebellious elements.

Who among us did not shudder over the recent events in Canada? The Canadian government suspended civil liberties to fight a tiny group of French-Canadian terrorists. It seems that the operation was in fact conducted reasonably within the bounds of its intentions and did not become a wide dragnet for capturing all critics of the government. However, the *New York Times* reported recently the Quebec minister of justice's urging that all Quebec's 6.1 million citizens carry identification cards with the bearer's photograph, fingerprints, and address. "The people had better get used to the idea that police must have more adequate methods of controlling crime," he told a television audience. The people of Quebec were properly alarmed. Can one imagine the reaction of an Agnew-Mitchell mentality if the provocation reached the same heights here as in Canada?

Law and order has also become a serious issue in France, where the police are consistently violating the civil liberties of New Left confrontationists. One French judge, referring to these tactics, said, "such provocation is always dangerous. It leads to passionate and disorderly repression."

WHEN SELF-STYLED REVOLUTIONARIES, by terrorism or the threat of terrorism, confront the state with disorder, then there is a grave threat to the civil liberties of the whole society. A political approach to confrontationism might make distinctions between one type of confrontation and another in relation to their supposed goals. I happen to think that even as politics, the politics of confrontation are nihilistic and self-defeating. They are presumably aimed at taking power to bring about social

change, but there is no concern for rallying masses of people without whom no real change of power in the direction of greater justice or democracy can come about.

But if one can differ about the politics of confrontationism, there should certainly be no ambiguity among civil libertarians about the response to confrontationism in its more coercive forms. But this is not the case. There is a pervasive uneasiness and ambivalence among some civil libertarians on this question. The impact of our social crisis has injected a political criterion for civil libertarian judgment and action. Not at all times nor in all cases by any means, but enough to point to a dangerous tendency. An instance of this was prompted by the ACLU report on campus disorders last year. The report dealt sympathetically with serious campus problems and legitimate student grievances; but it also reaffirmed basic civil libertarian principles on due process as it criticized student violence. It said that the fight for a just cause did not legitimate violations of due process, whereupon four NYCLU staff attorneys immediately attacked the ACLU report for "joining the repressive forces of society." The ACLU had taken a civil libertarian approach; the NYCLU attorneys had subordinated due process concerns to politics. Apparently you should not criticize violations of civil liberties if the violators are fighting the good fight and are criticized by reactionaries.

This is a crippling criterion. Would it mean, for example, that we should not criticize bombers because they are also criticized by Agnew-Mitchell? Would it not be better to criticize *all* violations of civil liberties, from our own point of view, in our own way, which is very different from that of the reactionaries? It is easy enough to differentiate our kind of criticism from that of the reactionaries. But this is not done because of a basic unwillingness to criticize soldiers of "justice" even when they are the violators of civil liberties.

Confrontationism is a reaction to the magnitude and urgency of our social crises. But it is a reaction of rage and frustration, one that can only harm the cause it proclaims. Desperation has pervaded other nonpolitical organizations and moved them into joining the political fray. Artists have formed political leagues and have produced explicitly political art, usually to the detriment of their art. Various professional or-

ganizations have passed political resolutions in the name of their societies. Civil libertarians have not been exempt from this trend. As a vice-chairman of the NYCLU said last year, "The struggle for existence by blacks, by migratory agricultural workers, and by peasants in Vietnam is so overwhelming that it doesn't leave room for Hyde Park speeches or Tom Paine leaflets." For him and other NYCLU leaders, civil libertarianism is merely one more way of fighting the battle for social and economic justice, and where there is a conflict between "justice" and civil liberties, then civil liberties may be the victim. This, in my judgment, is an utterly false choice, and one that does damage to both justice and civil liberties.

Consider another aspect of this political inflection: even when the NYCLU fights for straightforward civil libertarian goals, as it most often does, its rhetoric takes on a militantly political tone. When it fights for the due process rights of welfare clients it often writes and talks as though it were in the middle of the class struggle fighting the cause of the poor. When it defends the due process rights of draftees, or free speech rights of soldiers or conscientious objectors, it often appears as though the war itself is the issue. It makes one wonder whether the NYCLU would be as aggressive a defender of the same rights if the war were a just one, say a defense against a totalitarian invasion of the country. In general, the credibility of the NYCLU as a civil libertarian organization comes into question. Does it defend due process as part of its contribution to the antiwar movement and the struggle for justice for the poor, etc.; or does it defend due process as an intrinsic value, the cornerstone of a free society, which makes it possible for others to fight for the good society, in a democratic way?

This difference is crucial to the future of civil libertarianism and civil liberties. If civil liberties are merely an instrument in the fight for social justice, then there are two dangerous implications. The first and most immediate danger is that once the "just cause" criterion becomes the basis for civil libertarian action, then the civil liberties of your political opponents (who don't agree with your definition of the "just cause") will be ignored or violated.

This danger was implicit in the statement of the attorneys on campus disorders. The second danger of a political attitude is the narrowing of the Union's influence to those who agree with the political views of its more articulate spokesmen and the alienation of many civil libertarians who reject any kind of politicization.

The building of a large and effective civil liberties force in the country depends on uniting as many people as possible around the ideas of civil liberties rather than alienating those who disagree either with the particular politics of the NYCLU or the fact that it is political at all.

WE NEED AN ACTIVE CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM, not a passive one. Modern life has generated all kinds of new problems for civil libertarians, such as rights of welfare clients, conscientious objectors, soldiers, hospital patients, and so on. We are for the active defense of these rights. But to confuse political or economic goals with the due process rights of these people can only hurt the civil libertarian cause.

One might ask whether it is a cop-out to remain within the boundaries of civil libertarianism and not fight for social and economic justice for all. Some people think that in times like these all institutions should become involved in politics. This notion has tragic implications. There is only one kind of society where everybody and every institution must be involved in politics, where indeed a poem can be a political event and even chess strategy is not exempt from politics. That is of course a totalitarian society, of which there are not a few varieties around the world. You could not be a civil libertarian in a totalitarian society without immediately being in politics, for to fight for freedom there is a revolutionary act.

It is the distinction of a democratic state that it does not politicize all of life, that one can fight civil liberties battles, rally people from all classes and opinions behind your cause without getting involved in the political struggle. This should remain our goal. The desperate methods of the confrontationists should find no welcome in the civil liberties movement. Down that road is neither civil libertarianism nor the just society.

# The Counter Culture

## Tranquilizer or Revolutionary Ideology?

IN AN ESSAY I wrote a while back, "The Hippies as Contrameritocracy," (DISSENT, July-August 1969), I argued that the movement was essentially a response to meritocratic pressures bearing down not only upon youth but upon the society as a whole, and that it represented a first-line structural response that probably would not endure in its initial form. This argument seems to me still decidedly to the point, but I would now like to go a little further. As of the early 1970s the hippie movement has divided itself into four major cultural streams and organizational patterns: the commune, the drug culture, the music culture, and the political youth movement. While all of these could be found in some form prior to the rise of the hippies, it is the hippies who provided them with momentum, style, and legitimation, so that the hippie look came to serve as their badge of allegiance. Various writers have described this phenomenon under the generic term of "counter culture"; I have described it, with an eye toward its structural origins, as a contrameritocracy.

In some form or other, communes have always existed in the United States. There are some in Europe as well, and a number have lasted for several generations, like the Communauté Boismondeau which, with an 1848 ideology, makes watch cases as a producers' cooperative. Such groups have flourished in the U.S., in part because of our abundance of land and space, so that people have been able to "do their thing" without too much popular opposition. Popular his-

toriography presents the Pilgrims as a band of men and women whose religious principles led them to come to the New World and found a commune of their own. *Newsweek* guesses that there now may be 500 communes functioning at any one time, with a total membership of 10,000.

But the significance of this movement goes beyond these small figures. On any campus there are a number of students who experiment with "communal living," which means sharing the money and housework. During the summer and after graduation there are many who try with more or less conviction to live in a communal way in the country and share in the farm labor. The rural commune is where the hippies have retreated in order to escape being swamped by the young "pre-moral" types and exploited by individuals ready to use any kind of violence that will insure them bed, board, drugs, and sex. Communes can select their members and impose some sort of vows upon them. And if the mortality rate of communes and the turnover of members seem rather high, only in the communes do the nonviolent themes of hippie culture retain some vigor.

The hippie communes feature a persistent attempt to organize group life without overt leadership and with a minimum of sex-role differentiation. Yet rural life, because of the premium it places upon physical strength, tends to sharpen the division of labor by sex, especially if there are children around who require close watching. The girls find themselves working in the kitchen, doing the sew-

ing, and caring for the babies—while the men work in the fields, fix the fences, repair the barn, and make expeditions to the square world for canned goods, pot, and spare parts for cars. The urban communes, by contrast, find it easier to reduce, if not abolish, the sexual division of labor.

Leadership is repressed as sex was repressed by the Victorians, and just about as successfully. Commune dwellers avoid words like “directed,” “requested,” “ordered,” as Victorians avoided “thigh” and “belly.” Efforts are made to resist the crystallization of leadership, and when they are successful during the season when much hard and monotonous work is necessary, the result is often disastrous for the capacity of the commune to survive on its own. Tools are lost or broken through careless use. Weeding is not done. People disappear at harvest time. Luckily enough, there are checks from home or dividend checks, and people can go away to work for wages and return when they have accumulated enough to buy brown rice and beans for several months.

“Group marriage” also creates problems. Some girls are better looking than others, and prejudices against homeliness die hard among liberated men and even liberated women. There seems to be an irresistible tendency for the leading “nonleaders” to exercise a powerful attraction upon the more beautiful girls, a tendency that has also been observed in “encounter” and “sensitivity” training groups. Most communes have more men than women and hence some men are always left out. Luckily, commune life does not seem to raise the level of sexual desire among men. Communes frown on “play boy” types, and we know that the threshold of “sexual frustration” is determined more by the norms of the group than by any sort of “biological urge.” What seems to work best is some form of monogamy plus some 10–20 percent adultery. In the commune one would speak less of “adultery” than of “experiences” or “switching.” Some switching takes place without too much overt pain. In other cases the best way to describe what happens

is to say that a top male is replaced in the affections of one of the best-looking females by another male, with the displaced male leaving for another commune or deciding it is time to go to work outside in the flatland for the wages that will replenish the cash pool. Another common way that resolves the shortage of women is for one or two girls to be on a “promiscuous kick.” As long as they don’t try to seduce the top males away from their women, their constant state of availability will receive gratitude and amused condescension.<sup>1</sup>

Successful farming or even gardening requires a good deal of repetitive and careful work. Urban types tend, after a while, to miss the excitement and variety, or even more the *privacy*, of city life. Indeed, the commune is different from the urban hippie community in that people in the commune are forced to interact and reach some form of harmony. In standard rural life a sharp division of labor, clear-cut lines of authority, and a stress on getting the work done reduces the areas of “problematic intimacy.” But in the commune problematic intimacy is the rule rather than the exception. Some are helped by this atmosphere, some put off.

Communes may allow for greater role shifts in their members than do most other forms of small group organization. A personality in search of its identity and strong enough to face the demands of others may find in the commune greater support for the changes he is going through than he can find in his own parents. Communes that are successful in limiting the contacts of their members with the outside world can develop private cultures that are very demanding and also sometimes rather deviant. These, however, are rare. Lack of discipline is so much more frequent that it reduces the capacity of the commune to test systematically new forms of social relations. The mystery, the rich fantasies that surround communes,

<sup>1</sup> Commune dwellers would fiercely deny that they show amused condescension. New value conflicts lead to new areas of repression. Freudianism is not “in” within the commune.

from the Satanic with Manson, to the humorous as with the Hog Farm, will insure a steady supply of mass-media interest. *Time-Life* waxes sentimental over communes.

The urban-based Hare Krishna, which has an involved set of rules and real discipline, is limited in its impact by its conservatism in regard to sex roles and its Hinduist spiritual and vestimentary transvestism. Since communes have the same appeal for people with sexual hang-ups as nudist camps used to have—and with the same sedative effects—the Hare Krishna also suffer the public relations consequence of their apparent sexual frigidity.

Many communes, even those made up of dropouts from Ivy League and New York universities, attempt a pathetic imitation of Indian life: a search of roots for the rootless; an identification with those too powerless to be guilty; a put-down of the WASP majority for having chased the Red Man from his God-given territory.

Still the communes represent the *hubris* of the Puritan tradition, the attempt of men and women who feel moved by the spirit to create a perfect community, where the person can meet God face-to-face and be as unique, as true, as giving as God must be: Promethean arrogance that is the dignity and the curse of our Judeo-Puritan civilization, and shall always deserve our respect and our hope that one day we can make it work. The communes remind us that no man is free not to search for God and that in this search resides his honor even if in the end he meets but his fallible self.

#### To Our Contributors

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*And be sure to keep a carbon of all manuscripts.*

## II

THE SECOND MAJOR CULTURAL STREAM picked up and amplified by the hippie movement is the drug culture. Before the late fifties, marijuana smoking was limited to blacks, Puerto-Ricans, and Mexicans, and among whites to jazz musicians who had picked it up from black colleagues. In the Eastern colleges, only the few students who were real jazz aficionados might have some casual contact with marijuana. The radical movement, in its Communist, Trotskyite, or other varieties, was dead-set against all drugs.

In the mid-fifties a new phenomenon began: the widespread use of drugs in the treatment of mental disorders. For those not so sick, Miltown became a fashionable remedy against anxiety and tension. In many professional families, where anxiety, hypochondria, and nonconformity describe the social climate, taking tranquilizers became a fashionable exhibit of how many of the world's troubles one had to carry.

The children of these families went to college and there met with at least two currents that would help their conversion to drugs. The first was the poetry-reading fad, often against a background of jazz music, with its heroes the beat poets, Allen Ginsberg, Gregory Corso, Lawrence Ferlinghetti, Gary Snyder, Kenneth Rexroth, and Brother Antoninus, who gave recitals in colleges followed by late-hour gatherings where the "in" crowd would "turn on."

The second current was the civil rights movement, whose undeniable greatness was marred by the transformation of the Negroes into angels with black faces: a form of *ouvrièrisme*, probably inevitable, which led some to imitate the objects of compassion in their speech, their ghetto separation, their music, and even their "vices." Since blacks smoked marijuana it had to be a good thing. Heroin addiction, instead of being horrible, become a sort of secret cult—dangerous, of course, but also a curse of greatness that revealed to the initiates how many jazz musicians were addicted to it.

At the same time, one of the barriers to the diffusion of drugs, the frat culture of football games and beer busts, began to disintegrate. A new elite appeared on Eastern and California campuses; instead of claiming upper-class and old-settler connection, it claimed legitimacy on the basis of political awareness and intellectual activism. Its name-dropping related more to the *New York Review of Books* than to the Social Register. The smoking of marijuana became one of its rituals of solidarity, just as the heavy drinking of alcoholic beverages had been the ritual of the frats. Many professors who looked with disdain on the frats looked with approval, if not fondness, on the new student leaders. Whatever their antics, political or recreational, these students supported values in tune with high culture even if the search for the "golden screw" did not allow them to turn in papers on time. Although they might come from prestigious private schools and have rich parents, they did not snub their professors. Many even wanted to join the profession. The period 1957-66 saw the height of the post-Sputnik meritocratic campus, where professors attempted to impose upon adolescents from all social classes the ideals of the intellectual jock.

By 1963-64, however, the ideals of the contrameritocracy—affirming the right, nay the superiority, of dropping out, and the claim that drugs gave access to a knowledge superior to rational knowledge—all became part of the hippie "backlash," which gave the diffusion of marijuana, soon followed by other drugs, a new impulse and legitimacy. By 1964 the whole college scene (i.e., the 200 most selective establishments) was permeated with marijuana, and by 1965 LSD became widely available. In 1967 drugs had begun to infiltrate the high schools. In 1970 a questionnaire, distributed in two middle-class high schools located in the suburbs of a large midwestern metropolis, showed that only one-third of the students had never taken any drugs, one-third had had only an occasional experience with them, and one-third took drugs (overwhelmingly marijuana

or hashish) once a week or more. A tenth of the student body could be called "serious" users. Heroin users (not necessarily addicts) were rare, but 1 percent in a student body of 1,500 still makes 15 users.

The drug culture gets its organization from "dealers" who in turn secure their supplies from wholesalers. The dealer is a semibenevolent merchant who barely makes expenses *over the long run*, wholesalers being the real money-makers. The small-time dealers "turn on" frequently with their customers. Although sales promotion is not unknown, the dealer prefers to think of himself as servicing a need rather than creating it. Gifts to customers are not uncommon. The small-time dealer becomes a "taste leader" to his clients and this leadership is not necessarily limited to drugs. Clients and dealers meet in an "underground" atmosphere that seems exciting. For many personalities at loose ends the drugs provide a motivational center, a substitute identity, and an occasion to relate meaningfully to others, even if in the process they may kill a certain percentage of those who use them.

Drugs are used, of course, by members of other hippie cultures such as the communes, the music culture, and the political culture. And with time, drugs have lost much of the mystical aura with which the hippie movement had surrounded them. But, especially among some teenagers, drugs have become an end in themselves, a subject of interminable conversations, part tranquilizer, part escape, part dare, a form of Russian roulette with which the middle-class adolescent can demonstrate to himself he has "heart" without engaging in the fights and gang bangs dear to the "grease." It is a juvenile delinquency with low risks, where prosecution does not alienate you from your peers; a means of self-assertion and rebellion, yet a way of imitating older adolescents in the search for maturity. As such, it is already spreading to the junior high schools. The drug culture has its own scale of prestige where the bottom rung belongs to the marijuana experimenter and the top rung to the

users of the needle, who inject methedrine, seconal, or heroin.

Drugs were publicized heavily by the underground press until 1968. Such youth movies as *Easy Rider* and *Getting Straight* (there is a lame attempt in *Getting Straight* to oppose the heavy use of drugs by showing the "head" to be unreliable), and the rock songs have glamorized marijuana and LSD.<sup>2</sup> At the present time the irony of drug education programs (it is one way of employing excess language teachers) is that they finish the publicity job the rock songs and the movies have begun.

Drugs serve an antiestablishment function through the promise of unconditional pleasure (pleasure without having to "earn" the right to it), and through their relation to an antirationality where astrology and good or bad "vibes" replace the belief that hard work, learning, and persistence will get you where you want to go. They promote "dropping out" of structures that require postponement of gratification (college). Through instant nirvana they lure some of the young away from the Puritan establishment culture. Drugs also have an antiestablishment function through the dissonance of illegality. During Prohibition alcohol rarely had this effect, if only because it was part of a traditional male culture resonant with the aggressive toughness of the Puritan ethos and therefore lacking, even in illegality, the tone of subversion.

TO EVALUATE THE FUTURE of drug consumption in the U.S. one might look at the problems of the legalization of marijuana. The proponents of legalization find themselves caught in several cross pressures. It is difficult to press for restrictions on tobacco and pollution while advocating the legalization of a hallucinogen about which little is known as to long-range effects. One cannot

press for limits to fertilizers, pesticides, and cyclamates, and wish to generalize the unsupervised use of a drug that has a powerful and little understood impact upon the brain.

Another cross pressure is that the steady use of marijuana *does* lead frequently to further experimentation with other drugs. (A colleague of mine doing research on marijuana effects and using medical students as his subject population, noted that it was hard to find cases where marijuana smoking had not been followed by more or less broad experimentation of other drugs, so that it became difficult to distinguish between the effects of marijuana smoking and those of other drugs.) Although the great bulk of drug experimenters settles down eventually to a "Martini-type" consumption of marijuana or hashish, a certain percentage is sucked into a process of hard-drug addiction, which may last for years before death or remission occurs. Thirty years ago, 17-year-old alcoholics were practically unknown. Today middle-class drug addicts on pills or heroin or plain "pot-heads" are not uncommon, and the group most affected is that of children who participate in the antiestablishment culture centering around the school's swingy teachers. Many a potential candidate for an Ivy League college turned on as a high school junior and found in his senior year his grades slipping to the point where even graduation is in danger.

In liberal circles which dabble in depth psychology one frequently hears that "if it had not been marijuana or barbiturates it would have been something else." This sort of fatalism, based on no data whatsoever, is not very convincing. It comes from the same ideological outlook that sees in the concept of "bad company" an authoritarian or segregationist prejudice, and ignores the insight it contains. The fact is, there are times when in the necessary process of emotional disengagement from parents adolescents do become very vulnerable to outside influences, even if their upbringing has given them "good" principles. In most cases there will be

<sup>2</sup> The retort by record companies that most listeners cannot tell the meaning of the words and care only about the music neglects the fact that those who understand the words operate as translators. This is certainly one case where the medium is the message.

a return to these principles, but the experiences that the adolescent may in the process go through can sear his mind and body for life.<sup>3</sup>

Those whose interests in the legalization of marijuana comes mainly from an antagonism to the Puritan ethos must accept the fact that the illegality of drugs reinforces their antiestablishment significance. The legalization of marijuana would destroy the social influence of the benevolent dealer, as well as the dissonance of illegality which tends to promote allegiance to the counter culture. Legalization might also accentuate the pacifier aspect of drug intake and facilitate the co-opting of the drug users into the system. This seems to have been one of the major functions of drugs in relation to the lower strata of India, China, the Arab countries, and the South American Indians.

Yet the legalization of marijuana, like the legalization of pornography (already accomplished *sub rosa* by the courts), could have a strong impact as a symbol of the weakening of the Puritan ethos. But if the Puritan ethos were not mortally wounded in the process, the violent attacks upon it could lead to a fundamentalist reassertion which might crush liberalizing movements and lead to drastic changes in the personnel that mans the gates of the mass media.

Under these conditions the pros and cons of the legalization of marijuana are complex and there is not likely to be a major push in that direction, certainly not while Mr. Nixon is in the White House. Heavy drug use will

probably lose its fad appeal as it reaches the junior high schools where it can be controlled more effectively by parents. One frequently meets college freshmen who have already been "heavy" into the drug scene and are ready to leave it, now that drug use is becoming identified with the "freak" part of high school culture, rather than with college sophistication.

Marijuana and hashish will probably remain illegal as prostitution is illegal. Drug use of a heavy and prolonged nature will be the tranquilizer of the stagnant and the defeated, the novocaine of downward mobility. For some middle-class adults who follow the *New York Times Magazine* section in asserting the chicness of marijuana smoking,<sup>4</sup> it will become the equivalent of bathtub gin in the 1920s. For others it may become a middle-class equivalent of what the gin shop in Zola's *L'Assommoir* was to the working class.

### III

NOW TO THE THIRD and most creative cultural form in the hippie movement—the music culture. Reaching an apex in the Woodstock festival, it derives its organization from the musicians, the promoters, the disk jockeys, and the record industry.

This movement has its roots in several strands of American popular music. There is the folk singing strand, which had remained an antiquarian interest until it began its slow climb to popularity under the aegis of the Popular Front. Folk singing expressed the wisdom of the American folk and as such deserved the support of the progressive. This was the period when the movement took to square dancing and Pete Seeger was a major troubadour. It continued during the war in "Café Society Downtown" and "Uptown" and eventually developed its own momentum in the 1950s to culminate in the TV Hootenanny (with a little assist from

<sup>3</sup> In many suburbs, therapeutic youth centers have sprung up with batteries of phones available to give help to anxious youths whose problems range from boredom to "bad trips" to a need for an abortion. Such centers, heavily steeped in the counter culture, are often directed by a swingy psychologist or psychiatrist aided by mother types out of *Alice's Restaurant*. The bulk of the aid they give is precisely the chance to find a congenial group with a new form of self-righteousness which abates the adolescent's guilt. Here it is not a question of learning to dream in a Freudian manner so as to please the "shrink," but becoming innocent through a put-down of the establishment. It probably does help the youth in getting himself "together."

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Sam Blum, "Marijuana Clouds the Generation Gap," *New York Times Magazine*, August 23, 1970.

Tennessee Ernie Ford's "Sixteen Tons"). Joan Baez with her voice and Bob Dylan with his poetical talent were to give a new dimension to folk singing in the first half of the 1960s.

Other strands of the music culture were the rock and roll of black popular music and the blues, the latter being one of the great contributions made by the blacks to American and world culture. A synthesis between the two at the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the sixties gave us the particular Detroit sound known as "Motown." Meanwhile Elvis Presley had made a national fad out of his particular fusion of "mountain" music and rock, getting white audiences to accept a much more orgiastic and openly sexual message within the medium.

The Beatles created the new music by synthesizing the rock of Elvis Presley with Motown sound. They brought to the states their "rocker" or young British working-class style, and it caught fire immediately. One might have expected the hippies to look down their nose at the Beatles and return to the records of Ornette Coleman and Leadbelly; but they did not. On the contrary, the Beatles and the Rolling Stones became new culture heroes. Hippie musicians, combining rock, blues, and English sound (the Yard Birds, the Cream) and using Dylan-type lyrics, gave young America a music all its own, relegating jazz to the paternal generation. It was partially on the wings of the music created and played by John Mayall, Paul Butterfield, Mike Bloomfield, the Frugs, the Jefferson Airplanes, the Grateful Dead, Jimi Hendricks, the Canned Heat, and many others that the hippie movement became a mass movement, only to explode under the strains of its success, leaving the music culture to develop on its own. The musicians are also close to the drug culture, which they have popularized by their songs and example. Rock musicians (AM rock in working-class districts, FM rock in middle-class districts) have become in the high schools an alternative to the athlete as nonacademic and even antiacademic models.

There is little doubt that the youths who become either players, band followers, or aficionados of the rock culture have a strong antimeritocratic bias. Yet even for them the requirements of professionalization conflict with the cult of spontaneity. Long practice is necessary if one is to obtain proficiency. There is much competition in the music field and the rewards for excellence are enormous, both in prestige and money. The discipline of playing, and the organization of the show that accompanies the playing, stimulate self-control and self-distance. Drugs, however, are a constant temptation for an ego that is put on the block at each performance. But the instability of rock musicians, whether due to their personality types, drugs, life on the road, or the temporary allegiance to music as a career, makes such groups transitory and the quality of their music hard to sustain. Because of their talent, their unusual stability as a group, and the widespread belief that financial success had not spoiled them, the Beatles were the role models. Now that they have disbanded, there seems to be a certain exhaustion of inspiration throughout the rock movement.

Rock music has become a transmission belt for antiestablishment views, through both the lyrics and the orgiastic color of the music. It has contributed to the isolation of youth culture from adult culture by creating a much sharper break between big band music and rock than there was between ragtime and big band songs—a process symbolized by the end of the "Hit Parade" program in the late 1950s.

The music culture does not lead *per se* to political commitment. Musicians tend to be "situationists," prompt to underline and act out the absurd. They find political rhetoric boring, and at the rock festivals the mood seems hardly conducive to radicalization. How much lasting alienation from the Puritan ethos the music creates is a moot point. It may promote a commitment to the "counter culture" through the prestige it gives to deviant life styles and also has impact

in promoting the counter culture among a segment of working-class white youth who enjoy the contact and occasional sexual opportunities that rock will give them with college youth.

Drugs and music have made a much bigger impact on youth society than has the "dropout" message of the hippie movement. Yet dropping out can take place, even while serving time in high school or college, simply by the withdrawal of motivation from occupational and family roles. For most, the moratorium is temporary; for some, even beneficial.

#### IV

**P**ERHAPS BOTH the drug and music cultures would have developed without the hippie phenomenon. The connection with the latter's love and freedom ethos gave the "practitioners" a feeling of group membership and self-righteousness, which greatly increased their proselytizing capacity. The same can be said about the political culture, which was born separately from the hippie movement and eventually merged into it without losing its identity—just as the communal movement, the drug and music cultures have done.

It was probably the collapse of the Communist party as a vital political force after the 1956 Hungarian uprising that provided an opportunity for the development of a tenderhearted and expressive oppositional movement, free of the bureaucratic discipline and "rule or ruin" tactics characteristic of Bolshevik politics. This was the New Left. It received considerable momentum from the FSM movement at Berkeley (1964), where it first discovered the vulnerability of the university to political protest.

Three social forces were to give unexpected impetus to the New Left. The first was the development of the "technico-professional complex" as a political tendency led by left-wing academics. The civil rights battles were their first experience with mass politics, after which came the peace movement as it found its real start on the campus

in the 1965 "teach-in" organized at the University of Michigan.

The second force was the cooperation of the mass media, especially the TV networks and the national news magazines (*Time*, *Life*, *Look*, *Newsweek*), which saw in these movements not only a source of dramatic news happenings but also of an ideology commonly shared by cameramen, reporters, news commentators, and even the vice-presidents in charge of editing the six-thirty news show. The mass media and especially TV will give favorable exposure to the New Left, but with this proviso: it must fit the interests of the technico-professional complex of which they are a part. Their coverage of the Vietnam war in 1967–68 was an extraordinary boost to the peace movement and yet remained "invisible" in its political intent.<sup>5</sup> "The Breaking of the President 1968" was also a major success, although of course they had a major assist from their victim.

The third force was the hippyization of antiwar students and the New Left. From the hippies the New Left took its life style, clothing, hair, language, sex life; and from 1967 onward many hippies renounced nonviolence and political indifference.

The hippyization of the New Left enabled it to attract the drug and the music fans, giving them a political identity of sorts as well as feelings of solidarity. For non-political but disaffected youth, the musicians legitimated the hippie garb. Though it would create difficulties with the world of square adults, the fact that the mass media customarily saw the hippified youth as the exemplars of the new style and the new rebellion also helped to push antiwar students toward the New Left. For when the mass media speak of "youth" or "the students,"

<sup>5</sup> Richard W. Jencks, head of the CBS broadcast group, declared in a recent conference on the problems of broadcasting, where he was being attacked from the Left ("T.V. Neglects Social Needs"): "History will assign television a major role in the black revolution and in the anti-Vietnam war revolution...."

they certainly don't mean the average youth with a vocational orientation toward college, good relations with his parents, coolness toward drugs and promiscuous sex, and a political outlook slightly to the left of Hubert Humphrey. No Stalinist front has ever been so successful in endowing the young with its distinctive aura as has the coalition of anti-war students, New Left, hippies, and the mass media, operating without any formal committees, secret accomplices, or central apparatus.

## V

FROM THIS COALITION two major currents have emerged as the standard-bearers of the counter culture. The first is the literary-sociological assault on the Puritan ethos and the WASP establishment; the second, the Che Guevara type of political activism where the effectiveness of the action is subordinated to the exaltation of the participants.

The literary-sociological assault has been carried out by a group essentially marginal to the academy, but which desires to keep the aura of the academic commitment to scientific truth. Yet it cannot accept the uncertainty of scientific truth, its perpetual renewal, its rejection of the temptation of power. This group, which might be called the "intellectuoids," searches for a theology in science, a fighting faith which will help to destroy the country club set, the yacht club set, the deanery, the professorial establishment, Palm Beach, the military-industrial complex, and install in their place a brotherhood of freedom.

Inevitably many of these "intellectuoids" are young instructors and assistant professors who in their professional fields are ready to accept the burdens of uncertainty but revert to self-serving ideologies when it comes to social issues. It is probably too much to ask that they should approach social science in an intellectual fashion when many of their own peers in sociology, psychology, and political science seem to have transformed their disciplines into a sort of muckraking journalism where the basic

"theoretical" orientation is a new version of *delenda est Carthago* or Voltaire's *Ecrasons l'infâme*. Too often when opening *Trans-action* and even *Psychology Today* one can predict the argument of the article from a mere knowledge of the title, at least if one follows the principle that the WASP establishment and the Silent Majority are oppressive, dehumanizing, pig-dominated, exploitative, polluting, inefficient, sexist, afraid of sex, racist, authoritarian, rigid, frigid, fearful, paranoid, white-collar criminals, desperate, sick, sadistic, infantile, and ignorant.

Besides *Trans-action*, *Ramparts*, the *New York Review of Books*, the intellectual ammunition of the counter culture on campus is provided by the radical paperbacks dealing with street violence, racism, and the Third World. Marcuse, Fanon, Kenneth Keniston<sup>6</sup> (who sees in the student radicals a breed of moral supermen as, more realistically, Richard Flacks sees in them the new Social Register), and Jerry Rubin's and Abbie Hoffman's non-books, Roszak's *Counter Culture* and Charles Reich's *Greening of America* are typical resources of the radical faculty. They have organized courses entitled *Where It's At* and *The Revolution of the Sixties*, the prototype of which is Harvard's full-year course *Social Relations 147-148*, taught to some 600 students rewarded by easy A's. Part of this counter culture is seeping down to the high schools and private schools where, in conjunction with the drug and music culture, it contributes to the development of the "freak" grouping, somewhere between the "frats" and the "grease."

The literary-sociological assault has "radicalized" the culture of "Proper bohemia," to which belong the young college instructors, the civil liberties lawyers, the Unitarian militants, the Quaker work camps, the mass media specialists (especially those below the

<sup>6</sup> Kenneth Keniston seems to be having some second thoughts as he discovers the self-serving aspects of moral righteousness in the student radical. Some of the writers used by the counter culture can become quite distressed by their fans.

\$40,000 level), the publishing-house readers and editors, movie directors, actors and actresses between jobs, and other professionals and paraprofessionals who gravitate around the university. A few rich businessmen contribute heavily to the financing of the local underground press and often own the FM stations which provide them with tax write-offs and their younger friends with job opportunities.

The counter culture takes from the upper class its casualness about rules, and also its willingness to use four-letter words that show it to be above middle-class constraints. Most exponents of the counter culture are of petty-bourgeois origin, and most petty bourgeois, not having been raised in bourgeois manners, try to bypass them. They imitate the aristocracy's disregard for proper form, believing that they thereby partake of its elegance. They assume the permissiveness of the upper class but not its *noblesse oblige*.

The hippies have provided a pattern of dress which, interpreted by the jet-set boutiques, becomes a badge of being "with it" and a challenge to the status of the traditional Puritan elites. The doctrine of "crystallized establishment violence" has facilitated the transition from the pacifism of the civil rights movement to the legitimation of the violence perpetrated (way downtown) against the establishment and its Irish cops. The worship of the Black Panthers whereby Proper bohemia atones its guilt—sometimes intellectual guilt, sometimes a disguise for ethical vanity, sometimes guilt as to the sources of the parental fortunes—has become another badge of membership and a gambit for claiming moral superiority over the conservative old rich.

In the 1930s Proper bohemia, besides being much smaller, was influenced by the Stalinist version of Marxism and held real power in some publishing houses.<sup>7</sup> At the present time the ideological tenets are more of the hippie variety. Not that hippies in-

vented them (the sophisticates will refer to young Marx and Wilhelm Reich), but they provided the symbolic rejuvenation for some of the old utopian standbys: arts-and-crafts communism, elegant pastoralism, the poor as noble savages (more specifically the black and Indian poor, certainly not the Polack poor). The hippie cultivation of mood has become the emotionalism of sensitivity training; hippie work avoidance, hippie stress on equality of the sexes, the promotion of career aggressiveness in women and of sensualism in men. While the Puritan ethos implied a commitment to abstract values and a suspicion of ascriptive group ties and unearned pleasure, the counter culture promotes a sort of organic groupism in battle against the enemy camp and an existential concern with body pleasures from which active sports are usually excluded.

## VI

THE MEANING OF THE COUNTER CULTURE is not exhausted by referring to its obvious protection against the pains of possible failure and its utilization as a weapon of class struggle. There are other aspects which might turn out to be effective solutions to major problems of the postindustrial world: the development of an international community of the young; a blurring of the lines between work and play; a considerable decline in status formalism; a greater equality for women.

Everywhere, perhaps even in Soviet Russia, there seems to be an erosion of classical patriotism. By contributing to this erosion the counter culture orients the search for the sacred toward an international community of students. On the other hand, the critique of nationalism too often takes on a shrill quality that denies any obligation of the citizen to the nation. Instead of replacing nationalism by a thoughtful dedication to an entity beyond the nation that requires even more self-sacrifice, there is a tendency toward a premoral affirmation of the primacy

<sup>7</sup> For a good description of this milieu, see Mary McCarthy's *The Company She Keeps* (1942).

of self-interest. The counter-culture hatred for the nation is parochial, often too bitter to be the result of a greater love.

Similarly, the counter culture seems to be trying to create the elements whereby the traditional division between work and play can be overcome by a new synthesis. What seems to be wanted is an end to the guilt that attends some of the processes necessary to creative work: the careless as well as the careful experimentation, the trials and errors, the sloth of discovery and the failure to discover anything, the painful fact that most innovations are useless. If we are to solve the problem of work meaninglessness (and I am aware that there is a lot of romantic drivel being peddled under that expression), it is likely that a definition of work less associated with the routine deprivations of discipline must become more generally accepted. Professors know this problem well who feel guilty when they have an enjoyable conversation with their colleagues, a conversation that often leaves a sediment of new ideas, while their superego associates work with the careful reading of Talcott Parsons or the thorough preparation of a lecture which leaves little room for response to the audience.

In the process of this search for a new definition of work the counter culture seems to have been instrumental in the destruction of the post-Sputnik university, whose excesses contributed to the development of the hippie movement and to the spread of drugs. In the present permissive atmosphere of academe most students can accommodate a commitment to the music, drug, and political cultures without any need to drop out from either the university and/or their families. It is possible that the revival of Rousseau's ideas on education, which the counter culture is promoting, may have a positive impact on teaching. So far the older faculty, puzzled and frequently demoralized, laments the passing of the post-Sputnik university, while young faculty want to transform academe into a sanctuary from which to lead students into forays against the Establishment. Mean-

while, little is done about teaching, and the decreased power of the deanery makes it less likely that anything constructive (hence somewhat painful) will be done. It is unlikely that the impulse will come from the students now that they have gained soft grading, Mickey Mouse courses, and mixed dormitories.

A greater rate of discovery and change, even if limited to the expressive spheres of life, will demand a greater solidarity, a willingness to put up with the higher rate of obsolescence and disorder that creativity implies. Thus the counter culture's stress upon the legitimacy of ephemeral art, the poetry of mood, the immediate sensitivity and positive response to others, may just possibly create conditions for a solution to the problem of work, play, and rank in the postindustrial world.

Meanwhile, its search for intimacy often seems like a Hollywood version of the shoe salesman's pseudo-*Gemeinschaft*, a ploy for Portnoy on the make. It mocks work discipline and suspects the poor of "Uncle Tomism" if they take "blind-alley jobs." Since most of its adherents work in bureaucratic organizations where they do not own the means of teaching or administration, contempt for private property may seem to have a revolutionary meaning: the property is that of the pig landlord, the pig stockholders, the pig establishmentarian government. It seeps down to the youth society as indulgence for "ripping off." Solid bases for comparison are lacking, hence we cannot be sure that there is really more stealing in the stores than 40 or 50 years ago, or much more cheating in school. On a short-run basis, we all know that cheating and thievery on campuses have reached epidemic proportions. Some of it may be the result of the changing composition of the student body, or of a redefinition of stealing by middle-class students as a matter of taste.

The decline in status formalism may facilitate social mobility and reduce the costs of marginality. Yet the intolerance that the straight upper-middle class reserves for

bad manners is more than matched by the intolerance the counter culture shows to those who disagree with its views. In many localities it has created a level of political contentiousness and law-suit proneness that did not exist before it gained a substantial following.

One might hope that the positive advantages of destruction and reconstruction created by the counter culture will be gained without disorder and reaction. But this hope seems unrealistic. New solutions for tomorrow may come from a few of the communes, but so far the intellectual caliber of the blueprints for tomorrow proposed by the literary-sociological assault has been disappointingly low. Again the medium has been the message.

The weakness of the counter-culture analysis, once it tries to go beyond the exaltation of mood and personal freedom, is partly reflected by the weakness of the political movement it sustains, and which I here describe as the Che Guevara movement. This movement contains the political spectrum that made up the non-Bolshevik section of SDS of 1968–69, and independent groups like the White Panthers, whose leader John Sinclair was one of the original Midwest hippies and a good jazz critic. The core of the Guevarist movement is made up of the more romantic and antibureaucratic revolutionaries who remind one of the Russian Narodniks (Populists) of the 1860–70s, except that our Narodniks have little desire to convert the white working class and peasantry, and are not often welcomed by the blacks. They meet their best response in the “swinging” and “Proper bohemians” of the middle class, and of course among the college students and/or middle-class dropouts from either high school or college. The Weathermen might well take for their hero Nechaev, who wrote with Bakunin the famous *Revolutionary Catechism* (1869). They have seized the imagination of the revolutionary students by their undeniable courage and flamboyant actions, as well as their luck in avoiding arrest. It will be a

while before the police effectively penetrate the organization and corrupt it—which seems to be the fate of all underground movements unable to come quickly above ground and relate directly to the political public.

While the original hippie movement had many aspects of radical Puritanism, this tendency is now found mostly in the rural commune; the Che Guevara tendency is much more overtly anti-Puritan. In contrast with the ascetic patterns of the Bolsheviks, the strength of the American Narodniks resides in their capacity to combine the delights of moral righteousness with the underwriting of sensual release through drugs, sex, music, vandalism, “ripping off,” and violence. They have developed a style of leadership that permits their roving bands or campus-based groups to have the benefit of direction without the penalty of felt subordination. To middle-class youth this seems to have more appeal than the authoritarian “delegate from the Central Committee” typical of the Bolshevik tradition.

The Guevara movement has had some success (though more apparent than real) because it was carried along for a time by the peace movement created by professors of the elite colleges and universities. Within that movement—which, for instance, in the mainstream (Michigan) campuses of the University of Michigan, and of Oakland, Michigan State, and Wayne State universities receives the support of 70 percent of the liberal arts students<sup>8</sup>—the Che Guevarists were like fish in water. As a result, until 1969–70 the revolutionary activists benefited not only from the support of Proper bohemia, but from the indulgence of some antiwar professors, and the favorable publicity of the mass media which played down their provocations but gave maximum publicity to police excesses in repression. The Guevarists (and the Bolsheviks) thus used the peace movement as a cover and a resonance box, and in return provided an energy and drama that aca-

<sup>8</sup> This is the result of a poll of 1,200 students in these universities in May–June 1970.

demics could not supply. They also benefited from the inexperience of college administrators and police in coping with the type of disorder created by a group that amounts at most to 1.5 percent of the student body in the Michigan universities, and probably to no more than 3–4 percent of the Ivy League undergraduates.<sup>9</sup>

The present fading of the peace movement has left the Che Guevara groups stranded. Its activists try to take the leadership of a new mass of American *bezprizorniki*, the “street people.” The latter are quite different from the hippies and their teeny boppers, even if their hair and dress are similar. While the hippies were attached to nonviolence even when it delivered them to the exactions of hoodlums, the “street people” use knives and guns without much reluctance. Their panhandling is aggressive while the hippies’ was humorous, hiding behind a joke the guilt they experienced. While heroin was considered uncool by the hippies, its usage is not rare among street people. While hippies would delight in “blowing the mind” of an ogling tourist, the street people are more ready to roll him. No doubt hippie centers were not without some of these pathologies, but they were recognized as deviant. The norm of universal love and keeping one’s cool worked toward self-control and personal responsibility. “Keeping one’s cool” is not an expression one hears very frequently among street people, and this means more than a mere passing of argot.

The street people, roaming, turning on, panhandling, ripping off, raping (i.e., a “gang bang” with a bit of force at the beginning), once in a while getting killed (and killing), hanging around the universities (preferably the prestige ones) from which they secure some crumbs and protection, resemble the sometime students, sometime bums, sometime hoodlums that lived around the medieval universities. The connection to high cul-

ture, more and more fictitious, saves the street people from being defined as common juvenile delinquents. The Che Guevarists are trying to dignify the amoral violence that prevails in this group by politicizing it. They hope for rehabilitation through revolutionary uplift and opportunity. Meanwhile the result is more often the spreading of a new set of hip rationalizations for aggressive acting out, which includes bombing and arson, and a rip off on the new brand of self-appointed social workers.

ON THE BASIS OF THIS DIAGNOSIS, two scenarios can be constructed. The first is based on the hypothesis that the academic community will not be further influenced by the counter culture and will not attempt to increase its own political power—and that the liberal-left faculty will let the peace movement die on the vine and not allow the Guevarists to use the university as a sanctuary. Then, the faculty would take toward the student movement the same stance it took toward the jock and fraternity cultures which provided much of the contrameritocratic ideology before 1960. Through an interval in the student movement, an irresistible momentum of social assimilation would be imparted to the ethnic and racial minorities that provide its more determined militants. The 1970s would then see a period of university and social adjustments to the strains of the meritocracy, which would motivate a new creative surge at the end of the decade. The counter culture would then be preempted of its useful elements and the rest encapsulated, so as to provide a permanent justification for those whose rewards in the capitalist-bureaucratic society do not seem commensurate with their ambitions. This, paradoxically, would contribute to the long-range stability and productivity of the meritocracy.

Another scenario requires at least two postulates. First, that the faculty—partly because of the threat of downward mobility implicit in the “high-schoolization” of college, partly because of the charisma of science

<sup>9</sup> Figures derived from the Michigan survey mentioned above. There is a higher percentage of revolutionaries among the students at the University of Michigan than at the three other universities.

which it generates, and partly because it is the most articulate segment of the technico-professional class—will try to develop the peace movement into a political battering ram, using masses of students and new voters as its army. Second, that the counter culture will reach the white working-class youth.

The politicization of the colleges and universities would lead to the growth of influence of "Proper bohemia" over the "straight" faculty. The disaffection of the intelligentsia and the near-monopoly of the mass media held by groups hostile to the WASP establishment would result in widespread alienation of the youth for whom meritocracy would cease to be meaningful. The result is that economic and military institutions could not be staffed with adequate talent. At the other end of the scale, there would be an accumulation of college diplomates or partial diplomates having to settle for jobs which in the generation of their parents did not even require a high school degree. The experience of downward mobility from the college student status, if not tranquilized sufficiently by the counter culture, would create much resentment and smoldering aggression, especially in a climate where the dignity of labor, the last fortress of pride, had been debunked out of existence.

Meanwhile the WASP establishment, bereft of the symbols of legitimacy, as well as of intellectual advice and support, would lose its nerve and its capacity for social control. The United States would then enter a phase of disorganization, with lesser growth in industrial productivity leading to relative deprivation among the working class. From there one can choose his climax: Berlin 1930 with a fundamentalist reaction, or St. Petersburg October 1917 with the assumption of power by a theocracy of politicized intellectuals, which would bring back order and the comforts of a sacred orthodoxy. Of course, such a disequilibrium of the capitalist order in America might lead to atomic war.

Somehow, the pessimistic scenario does not seem convincing. The mass media have a way of banalizing and sterilizing new

cultural forms by giving them instant success. A movement in the U.S. soon becomes a fad, overwhelmed by the problems of success before it has had time to deepen its insights. Were this Czarist Russia, the disaffection of the mass media gatekeepers (if not of the intellectuals) might herald revolution. But this is multicentered America.

Most of history is dull rather than dramatic, and the 1970s seem more likely to result in the stabilization of a contrameritocratic movement, which would blunt the cutting edges of meritocratic competition. Furthermore, the professional intellectuals have begun a criticism of the counter culture, which should soon result in a decline of its prestige with the mass media.

The professional intellectual has a crucial role to play in the solution of the problems created by the meritocracy if he can find a way to show the society that the true goal of man is the understanding of nature and that the face of God "can be found in the anatomy of the louse." In this contemplation the search for the sacred finds a solution in which achieved rank differences, so emphasized by the meritocracy, are shriveled to insignificance by the cosmic perspective of learning. Within a generation, more than half our population may well be involved in the learning process, as learner, as student, and more often as both. What an opportunity for the professional intellectual to expand his influence if he will only resist the temptation of power! Meanwhile he must put his house in order, dampen his snobbery, strengthen the community of equals and the international community of scholars, take more seriously his teaching responsibilities. He must incorporate the adult community into the universities, and recuperate his legitimacy as the leader in the search for elusive truth. In the disenchanted world of the meritocracy people long for a sense of purpose and meaning. It is the intellectual's urgent task, at this juncture of history, to teach through the word and his example that the passion to know must replace the passion to conquer.

## From Gomulka to Gierek

### The Moral Decay of the Polish Bureaucracy

**W**LADYSŁAW GOMULKA'S SON told me in 1957: "Only fools can believe that there are differences in theory or ideology in the Party. The only differences are purely personal; it is merely a struggle to have one's hand in the till. They will never fool me again. Never again."

This pessimistic realism expressed by Ryszard Strzelecki has been confirmed by recent events in Poland. Edward Gierek, the new party leader, and his associates are no different from their predecessors. They have no plans for changing the structure of the Polish government, which will surely lead to the same problems that caused Gomulka's fall. Gierek does not even have the advantage of coming to power as a result of popularity, as did Gomulka in 1956.

In 1955-56, Poland had undergone an acute crisis. There were demands for change among the people, not only among peasants and workers, but also in the government and the Party hierarchy. When the Communist Central Committee convened on October 19, 1956, the old Stalinist functionaries were aware of an atmosphere of hatred. They could not even count on the support of the lower-echelon security officers. Even the Polish censors announced publicly that they would no longer suppress the healthy criticism of the people. This was our Polish October. Under these pressures the Central Committee decided upon substantial changes.

It was by no means of its own free will that the Committee carried out the popular program of 1956: democratization, estab-

lishment of workers' councils, final rejection of forced collectivization, the introduction of a new and reasonable economic system, and the purge of the Stalinists and roughnecks who held the highest positions. They were made to realize that the loosening of Soviet control was crucial not only for the fulfillment of national aspirations, but to the solution of economic and political problems. To secure Polish sovereignty, and put an end to economic exploitation, the battalions of Russian supervisors had to be sent back to Russia. And to satisfy the people, the hero of nationalism, Władysław Gomulka, would be returned to power.

But Gomulka did not understand the movement he had come to symbolize. Nor did he really understand that the people wanted significant changes. I had spoken with him during that summer, regarding the dissatisfaction of the people which was the result of mistakes committed by those in power; he did not understand that the political and social system he had helped to create after 1945 was the cause of the upheaval. Brought up in the Stalinist school, Gomulka's reasoning was primitive, his conclusion simplistic.

It was a malevolent historical accident that Władysław Gomulka became a national hero, symbol of Communist patriotism and liberalization. He was like the hero of a satirical comedy that played in a Warsaw theater in 1956, *The Feast of Winkelried*, written by Jerzy Andrzejewski, now in disgrace. When Winkelried is by chance proclaimed the new

leader and the people enthusiastically welcome him, he asks his followers: "please explain to me the ideology of the movement I have kindly agreed to head." Gomulka never even asked this question.

In his first speech at the meeting of the Eighth Plenary Session of the Central Committee on October 20, 1956, he made all the necessary promises. His speech was less liberal and less profound than the hundreds of articles that had appeared in Poland in the preceding months; but the nation wanted to believe in him. He had been officially branded an anti-Soviet nationalist by Moscow, and this was the first time Moscow's official propaganda was believed without reservation. The Poles found everything they desired in the speech of the "patriot," who had resisted Soviet efforts to force him to "disclose his counterrevolutionary activities"; wishful thinking had its triumph.

From the day it seized power, the regime began to prepare its bitter end. Gomulka and Zenon Kliszko, number two in the Party, continued the old system. They began to strengthen the "leading role of the Party." In a talk I had with Kliszko in 1957, he tried to convince me that my interpretation ("The Ideas of October," in *State and Law*, no. 11, 1957) of the October events as a popular uprising was not correct and that it was the Party which had been instrumental in returning Gomulka to power, not the will of the people. I tried to argue my case, but Kliszko remained unconvinced.

**I**NTERNAL EVENTS soon persuaded Gomulka to turn away from his "national road to socialism." During the short period of "democratization" and free elections, for example, it was discovered that Party candidates were being defeated and reports flooded the Politburo that "socialism was losing ground." Gomulka fell into panic and returned to the old, discredited police methods. Every month the security police became more numerous, more powerful and oppressive. The loudly proclaimed freedom of the

press withered. The brutal suppression of *Pro Prostu*, the most liberal weekly, was a warning that the new regime had decided to finish with dissidents, "naive intellectuals," and other unreliable elements. Zenon Kliszko began to make speeches about the new version of "socialist realism."

Gomulka had seized power as a national hero, and whatever he now did became highly unpopular. Unpopularity, constantly aggravated by a falling standard of living, eventually turned into hatred.

Meanwhile, his relations with Moscow improved. As he lost his popular base, he became more dependent on Moscow. The new regime acknowledged that it owed everything to Moscow, and the Moscow rulers were pleased.

Gomulka looked toward Russia as the protector, not only of his regime, but of the Polish frontiers. In 1956 Polish diplomats had asked the Western powers officially to recognize Poland's Western frontiers and to give the Poles guarantees against German revisionist demands. Everybody, and especially the United States whose diplomacy was controlled by John Foster Dulles, refused. Chancellor Adenauer and the West German government demanded the restoration of the old prewar frontiers, and the Poles couldn't bear these demands. Gomulka and his gifted minister of foreign affairs, Adam Rapacki, tried to ease the tension in Europe by a plan to de-atomize Central Europe. When this plan was rejected, Gomulka unconditionally surrendered to the Kremlin as the sole guarantor of Polish sovereignty.

The results were well known from previous periods: economic exploitation, demands to silence liberals and "revisionists," the support of all Soviet initiative and aid in the struggle against all of Moscow's enemies, in the West and the East.

In the early 1960s Poland's economic and political crisis entered a new phase: administrative and economic disorganization, low labor productivity, unqualified individuals in high posts, lack of ideology and perspective. The distance between the standard

of living in Poland and the West was increasing. So was dependence on the Soviet Union.

In this situation Gomulka and his associates took their final step to reinstate a strong-handed government in Poland. They concluded that the liberal experiment had been unsuccessful. In 1966–67 they decided to finish with “disorganization and permissive liberalism.”

The student demonstrations that occurred in March 1968 were described by the world press as the revolt of democratic and patriotic Polish youths. Although the students were sincerely fighting the regime, the demonstrations were actually organized by security agents, supervised by General Moczar, with the acquiescence of Gomulka. Three days after the first demonstration at Warsaw University the government officially declared that the Zionists and “revisionists” were the organizers of the demonstrations. Thus began the purge of all liberal, enlightened, and patriotic elements from the Party, government, industry, army, universities, and social institutions.

The policies following the purge didn’t work either. At the end of 1970, Gomulka and his regime were compelled to raise sharply the prices of food and other commodities. They were bankrupt, and the people balked.

The strikes in the ports in December 1970 were political as well as economic. The workers in the shipbuilding industry understood that the main reasons for the economic disasters of Poland lay in its politics, in bureaucratic centralism, disorganization, and irresponsibility. They knew that a substantial part of their production was exported to the Soviet Union and the accounts of payments were kept top secret. They knew that nobody in Poland saw these accounts, because the bookkeeping was done in Moscow. Why all the mystery? The secret lay in the exchange value of currency. The official exchange rate is 24 zlotys for each United States dollar. But in order actually to receive that amount in hard currency, Poland is forced to ex-

port goods worth about 200 zlotys. Poland had to buy some of its equipment for the construction of Soviet ships in the West, and was forced to pay this high price. But the Russians paid only the official price when it bought the equipment from the Poles. The workers in the shipyards realized that Poland was losing a sum equal to the average worker’s monthly salary for every 10 dollars’ worth of goods re-exported to the Soviet Union.

The Poles also were annoyed by Soviet representatives supervising the quality of their work: they were very demanding of Polish workmanship but extremely tolerant of the quality of the goods exported to Poland from Russia.

In the 1950s the Poles didn’t have much to eat, but they had relative liberty and were proud of it. In the 1960s they had even less to eat, but they didn’t have freedom either. They followed Gomulka in the 1950s because they believed in his patriotism. In the 1960s they found, as it was described in Warsaw jokes, that they were like a man who wanted to find shelter behind a car but the car moved. . . .

**T**HE NEW RULING GROUP has even less to offer the nation than Gomulka. In the vocabulary of Gomulka in 1956 there were some elements of decent conviction and truth. The language of Edward Gierek is a repetition of Gomulka’s promises, but less radical in essence, more abstruse, and obviously fraudulent. Its only aim is to gain time and to mobilize the police forces.

Gierek’s explanation for the Polish collapse is what Leszek Kolakowski once sarcastically described as platonic: a good idea, although poorly realized, is still good. “We did not consult the masses, and therefore we committed some errors,” says Gierek. But this explanation, although true, is insincere. One might recall the remarks of the youthful Karl Marx, in his first published essay, “Concerning the New Prussian Instructions About Censorship”:

Maybe one tries to make persons guilty of shortcomings of the institutions, in order to create false appearances of improvement without improving the nature of things? It is characteristic of false liberalism, that—being compelled to make concessions—it sacrifices men, and instruments, in order to preserve the essence, the institution. Thus one draws the attention of the superficial public away.

But why should an old Communist like Edward Gierek care about the opinion of a young liberal neo-Hegelian, who was not even a “Marxist”?

Gierek took his recent accusations against Gomulka’s regime from Khrushchev’s repertoire of expressions: Gomulka did not care about collective leadership, underestimated the role of the Central Committee, did not listen to the masses, and became arbitrary. Edward Gierek promises that he will avoid these faults. Since when? And for how long? *And what will the masses be able to do when he fails to consult them?*

Edward Gierek is an old Communist, but without fanaticism. Encumbered by few dogmas, his Marxism is almost pragmatic. He believes in the leading role that history has conferred upon Communist parties, and he lives by the maxim that a government must be strong. As an old Communist he has some sentimental links to the Soviet Union, but for him the Kremlin is a temple without a god. His materialism is exemplified by Bacon’s observation that the worst rebellions are belly rebellions. Thus, his province, Silesia, usually had adequate supplies of meat, flour, and milk. Later there were new cars and houses, all secured at the expense of other parts of Poland.

Gierek’s Party nickname was “Tshombe,” and Silesia was called the “Polish Katanga.” There he operated almost as a sovereign prince, a talented organizer with a gift for finding efficient and loyal henchmen. All professions were represented in his court: engineers, economists, professors, writers, Party apparatchiks, and security agents. He overcame resistance from Warsaw to the found-

ing of a Silesian university. He prodded and schemed to place his people in high Party offices all over the country.

Though he will try to reorganize Polish industry, Gierek has never believed in far-reaching liberal reforms. He has no taste for autonomous workers’ councils that would impinge on the prerogatives of the Party apparatus. He is fond of the technical intelligentsia, but has a Stalinist’s contempt for humanistic intellectuals. In his book he takes a hard line: intellectuals should be “servants of the people,” which means that the Party must be their only source of inspiration.

**B**Y CONTRAST with the periods of Stalinism and Gomulkaism, Gierek will represent some kind of enlightened absolutism—but absolutism nonetheless. Political liberties will not be restored even to the degree of 1958. The new leadership is ideologically unified because it has no ideology. They all believe in Hobbes’s philosophy: the government must be strong and absolute, otherwise anarchists will gain the upper hand.

One of the most powerful members of the Politburo, General Mieczyslaw Moczar, has proved to be a master of political intrigues. When Gomulka first fell in 1948, Moczar was in disgrace, and so was sent to Olsztyn as head of the provincial government. After October 1956, he returned to Warsaw as one of Gomulka’s closest collaborators. He became security chief and chairman of *Zbovid*, an organization that united former Polish combatants of all political ideologies. He played the role of a patriot and nationalist, and mouthed slogans once considered heretical—about the spiritual unity of all the Polish underground fighters. He succeeded in convincing many people that he was anti-Soviet. Even Western journalists believed it and some experts at the United States Embassy in Warsaw were inclined to believe that there was a struggle between Moscovite Gomulka and nationalist Moczar.

If Machiavelli had written his *Prince* in this century, he would have included a chap-

ter about Moczar. The son of a poor peasant becomes one of the most important figures not only in Poland but in the entire Communist camp. He is uneducated, but surrounded by scholars; he mistrusts intellectuals, but he has written a book and to my best knowledge is the only member of the Politburo who is also a member of the Association of Writers; he is an anti-Semite, but lets all the Jews leave Poland and at the same time publicly drinks Polish vodka with an eminent Jewish writer. He issued instructions at the end of the 1950s that the Jews are unreliable and should be closely observed, and their organizations infiltrated. He dismissed the Jews from his apparatus (all? perhaps there remained some *Ehrenjuden*). But when an ousted Jewish officer approached him, and asked when he would be allowed to leave Poland to visit an uncle in the United States, Moczar shook his hand and smilingly answered: "Immediately. I have full confidence in you. I am sure you would be unable to betray any secrets to the CIA." (The waiting period for emigration for security functionaries is usually two to five years.)

General Moczar is the first Communist leader who understands that Marxism-Leninism has no propaganda value, that it is bankrupt and must be replaced by something which in Poland always appeals: nationalist slogans. His ambitions are unlimited. One day there will be an open struggle between him and the First Secretary. In this struggle the role of Security Minister Franciszek Szlachcic may be decisive. As an old partisan he is connected with Moczar; as an old Silesian, with Edward Gierek. He is officially inferior to them, but in practice he could be a most powerful partner. He is the best read apparatchik and security officer I've ever met. He graduated from a technical institute, but

has read humanistic and philosophic books. I met him several times during the last 20 years, and each time I got the impression that he had become more cultured and more reasonable.

He fits into the new group. His apparatus will be effective but not cruel. His close associates are well-educated alumni of the law schools, including some brilliant graduates of Warsaw University. Szlachcic studied the writings of Machiavelli and understands his recommendation that a government should be feared but should avoid being hated.

Neither Edward Gierek nor the new Prime Minister Piotr Jaroszewicz have discussed the most important reasons for the Polish troubles: lack of democracy and lack of organized responsibility. The bureaucratic centralization (even if decentralized a little) is wasteful and inefficient. The system of nationalized industry can work only under continuous and profound criticism. But without democracy and freedom to criticize everyone, criticism can only be a mockery. The main source of the economic troubles in Poland and other Communist countries is the bureaucratic system.

Nor have the new leaders analyzed relations with the Soviet Union. The cancellation of the alleged Polish debt in Moscow was one of the reasons for the first economic successes of Wladyslaw Gomulka in 1956. Gomulka could resist Moscow for a short time, because he had the backing of the nation. The new regime's lack of popular support is the main reason for its dependence on the Soviet Union, and this dependence has bad effects on internal politics. A vicious cycle.

The next round of the crisis is inevitable and the same powerful internal forces that toppled the former leaders will confront the new regime. The drama will repeat itself.

## R. D. Laing: Psychiatry & Apocalypse

**R**ONALD LAING MUST BE ACCOUNTED one of the main contributors to the theoretical and rhetorical armory of the contemporary Left. By the contemporary Left is meant that soft variant of the utopian urge which has jettisoned the Marx of *Capital* for the spiritual exploration of alienation, which acknowledges that capitalism "delivers the goods to an ever increasing part of the population,"<sup>1</sup> and therefore concentrates its attention on the salvation of the all-too-common man from what Marcuse calls "one dimensionality."

With the erosion of a proletarian Communism, its confinement to institutional rigidity or its continuing commitment to Stalinoid deformations, one is left with a *salon* Communism, whereby the Ortega y Gasset of the Left join forces with their conservative opposite numbers on the other side of high table in a lament for the regrettable tendencies of mass society. It is they who—to take an image of Laing's—are the lonely "survivors" in a neocapitalist civilization which is condemned to swinish contentment; confined to the pleasures of consumption without appropriate refinement of palate. "Consume more, live less," as one of the slogans has it. So pessimistic is this approach that hope is only thought possible by calling in a Third World to redress the balance of the two old ones.

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This is the general and by now familiar picture presented by the "soft Left," and it is the aim of this essay to locate the place of R. D. Laing within its broad syndrome of attitudes. Unfortunately the term "attitudes," is only too appropriate, since we are confronted here by a psychological set that positively avoids careful analysis and treats the notion of fact as a treacherous bourgeois invention. The old Left did at least propose an analysis and practiced a policy in relation to concrete politics. It is arguable that their analysis and their verbal rituals were as stiff, predictable, and stereotyped as a Punch and Judy show, but the outline was devastatingly clear, and their political responses were sometimes angled (however woodenly) to what was actually happening and even to what could actually be done at a given time. It was thus susceptible to criticism. The contemporary Left, if very much more amiable, is marked above all by its preference for spiritual exhibitionism. To utilize another phrase of Laing, it has given up the experience of politics in exchange for the "politics of experience."

The contrast between "soft" and "hard" Left needs to be related to a further contrast between the rational Left and the irrational Left before the first approximate placing of Laing on the map of left-wing ideology is possible. In its origins the Left was both the party of humanity and the party of reason,

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<sup>1</sup> *The Dialectics of Liberation*, D. Cooper, ed. (London: Penguin, 1968), pp. 176 and 129.

and in Marxism its abstract rationality succeeded in locating itself within the movement of history and in what was held to be a rational understanding of that movement. Now, however, the contemporary revolutionary has largely lost confidence both in the movement of history and in the efficacy of reason. The former development is mostly gain, the latter almost entirely loss.

The contrast between the rational and the irrational Left has, of course, a long history, though the contemporary drift to irrationalism and to subjectivism is particularly strong. In the present century in Britain it is possible to trace a continuous counterpoint between rationalism and romanticism within the non-Communist Left; between, that is, the argued politics and articulated policies of a Bertrand Russell and the gentle apolitical withdrawals of the *gemeinschaftliche* anarchist. What Russell proposed still retained an affinity with the attitude of the hard Left in being at least a kind of politics. However much marred by the silliness of great minds, it assessed certain kinds of situations, and proposed what looked like remedies.<sup>2</sup>

The romantic anarchists proposed an end to politics, a generalized condemnation of Western industrial society which sometimes had religious or mystical overtones and betrayed more than a penchant for what lies behind the famous phrase "Civilization: its cause and cure." Lacking either a developed sociology or an articulated politics, these anarchists tended to concentrate on the liberation of the repressed psychology produced by civilization and its discontents, or on the achievement of that liberation through sex, art, and aesthetic education. Herbert Read was one of the most attractive examples of those who lay within this band of feeling and attitude. D. H. Lawrence, the archetypal contrast to Russell, provides another exemplar. "How beastly the bourgeois is!" But whereas

in the historical dramas constructed by the hard Left the bourgeois played a definable role in the predictable mechanics of the plot, for the romantic anarchists he was simply the object of ritual cursing, an all-purpose stand-in for Baelzebub.

There are, of course, innumerable varieties of romantic anarchism, and not all of this is harmless artistic alienation: irrationalism can embrace both the mystique of creation or the mystique of destruction and nihilism. It can even claim to combine both, as in the slogan "creative vandalism." For some people destruction must precede cleansing. Thus there is a hard Left as well as a soft one among the romantic anarchists, and its pedigree can be traced not only to Bakunin, but to Durutti's Barcelona and to Sorel's *Reflections on Violence*.

Another point: mystique is not far removed from mysticism. This has meant that the romantic anarchism of the Left, particularly in its soft variant, has always included an interest in these religions with a weak component of rationalism. Roman Catholicism is an allowed option, not because it is irrationalist (clearly it is not) but on account of its symbolic richness, its partial dissociation from industrial civilization, and its margin of mystical experience. Thus Herbert Read once declared that in the last analysis he stood with Pascal and Simone Weil and not their opponents, and the very names cited indicate that Catholicism itself has never been quite certain about this particular margin. No doubt that fact provides an additional attraction for the temperamentally heterodox. But beyond Catholic mysticism there has been the attraction of experiential cults from Eastern religions, and of Zen, not to mention the various mind-expanding drugs which have simultaneously served to release weary souls from the chains of everyday technical rationality and from the bondage of industrial society.

At any rate, on the "soft" side of romantic anarchism, where R. D. Laing is mainly to be located, subjectivism, personalism, mys-

<sup>2</sup> See the analysis of the political attitudes of rationalists like Russell and Kingsley Martin to the prewar crises in my *Pacifism* (London: Routledge, 1965; New York: Schocken, 1966).

ticism, and creativity are in, whereas positivism and rationalism are out. The predominant style is not "honorable argument:" instead it is gnomic, testamental, and confessional. The following paragraphs from Laing are perhaps the quintessence of both style and attitude. The first begins with a quotation from Laing by Jules Henry:

"If all through school the young are provoked to question the Ten Commandments, the sanctity of revealed religion, the foundations of a patriotism, the profit motive, the two-party system, monogamy, the laws of incest, and so on . . . , there would, says Laing, "be such creativity that society would not know where to turn. . . . Children do not give up their innate imagination, curiosity, dreaminess easily. You have to love them to get them to do that.<sup>3</sup> Love is the path through permissiveness to discipline: and through discipline, only too often, to betrayal of self."

Here is the second quotation:

And immediate experience of, in contrast to belief or faith in, a spiritual realm of demons, spirits, powers, Dominions, Principalities, Seraphim and Cherubim, the Light, is even more remote. As domains of experience become more alien to us, we need greater and greater open-mindedness even to conceive of their existence.<sup>4</sup>

This is the style and the atmosphere. It is in milieus which invoke visitation by indiscriminate ecstasy that Laing's writings have their provenance, and it is in a period characterized by Aleister Crowley redivivus that they resonate.

<sup>3</sup> Some of what Laing means by love may correspond with the situation noted by D. Cooper in *Psychiatry and Anti-Psychiatry* (London: Tavistock, and New York: Barnes & Noble, 1967), where a mother makes statements suggesting independence and by gestures indicates that she is afraid of any attempt to implement the suggestion. Love in this sense can destroy the loved one by predefining all alternatives as wrong, in one way or another.

<sup>4</sup> R. D. Laing, *The Politics of Experience* (London: Penguin, 1967; New York: Ballantine), p. 60.

LAING WAS BORN in 1927 in Glasgow, educated at a grammar school and at Glasgow University. The flyleaves tell us that he graduated as a doctor in 1951 and became a psychiatrist in the army for two years. He then held various posts at Glasgow Royal Mental Hospital, at the Department of Psychological Medicine at Glasgow University, and at the Tavistock Clinic (1957-61). He worked for the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations and has been director first of the Langham Clinic and then of the Kingsley Hall Clinic in London since 1962. At the Tavistock Institute he concentrated initially on research on schizophrenia and the family. From 1961 to 1963 he held a fellowship of the Foundations Fund for Research in Psychiatry. So much for mere external biography.

The main writings of Laing are *The Divided Self* (1960), *The Self and Others* (1961, rev. ed. 1969), and *The Politics of Experience* (1967), which consists largely of miscellaneous writings from the years 1964-67. He collaborated with his fellow psychiatrist David Cooper in *Reason and Violence* (1964), which examines Sartre's principal writings between 1950 and 1960. He also collaborated with Aaron Esterson in *Sanity, Madness and the Family*, vol. I: *The Families of Schizophrenics* (1964), and with H. Phillipson and A. R. Lee in *Interpersonal Perception* (1966). Both Laing and David Cooper helped to organize the Congress on the Dialectics of Liberation, at the Round House, Chalk Farm, in 1967, an event that resulted in 23 gramophone records and a book of the same name edited by Cooper. Laing contributed to those records and that book a piece entitled "The Obvious," and the Introduction by Cooper illustrates how closely linked their thinking is.<sup>5</sup>

A broad although ultimately unreal distinction needs to be made between Laing's work as a psychiatrist, which seems to be

<sup>5</sup> Cf., D. Cooper, *Psychiatry and Anti-Psychiatry* (1967).

best represented in *The Divided Self*, and his politics. It is not a prime concern of the present essay to evaluate his psychiatric work, except insofar as the leading ideas of the psychiatric school he represents are connected with his political attitudes and also insofar as the professional perspectives deriving from psychiatric training of whatever school often seem to lead to sociological and political naiveté. Clearly a discussion of this latter could develop into a full-scale sociological critique of psychiatric perspectives on social processes which is not appropriate here but is clearly much required. All that can be attempted here is a brief summary of Laing's methodological prescriptions, and some indication of his major substantive ideas as a psychiatrist. That done, we may pass to an analysis of the broad syndrome of attitudes, and especially religious elements, embodied in Laing's work, notably as illustrated in *The Politics of Experience*.

The main methodological prescriptions of Laing are broadly of a kind with which the present writer is in sympathy. These are mostly and perhaps appropriately addressed to psychoanalysts rather than to social scientists, and are not so much new in psychoanalysis as inadequately disseminated among the general public interested in such issues. One thinker who illustrates these trends is Binswanger,<sup>6</sup> and he is only one of a number of theorists to whom Laing is indebted. By methodological prescriptions is meant not so much therapeutic techniques as the fundamental therapeutic strategy and personal stance taken up by the analyst in consequence of his basic assumptions about the nature of the human entity and about the status of the notion of "person." However, this will clearly have its impact on what one considers therapeutically and ethically appropriate techniques.

Perhaps Laing's position is best summarized in his own remark that one does

not *have* schizophrenia, in the same way as one has the measles, one *is* schizophrenic. A succinct statement of his position is to be found on pp. 25-26 of the Introduction to *Reason and Violence*, in some paragraphs where he is discussing both Sartre's position and his own on the limits of psychoanalysis. Laing argues that at a certain point in the process of explanation some psychoanalysts cease to make their observations within the context of mutual exchange between persons and assume a one-sided superiority of objective external judgment toward the condition of the patient as if he were a mere biological organism. Both the personal relationship and "the person" disappear.

There are several different points encapsulated here, and some confusion. For example, there is no necessary relation between stepping into an objective role for the purpose of "judgment" and losing the reciprocity of a relationship. Indeed, there must be *some* assumption of superiority which the analyst will take up in his role as specialist in psychological dynamics, otherwise he is simply interacting with the other person. This need not be the absolute assumption characteristically made (say) by a consultant in relation to biological disease, since the patient is always himself experienced in what it is to be a human being and often acquires insight comparable in kind if not usually in degree to that possessed by the analyst. The patient may even, in particular instances and in relation to particular aspects, have superior insight.

Presumably Laing is not objecting to the assumption that on the average and at the margin, the psychoanalyst is more experienced and in a sense more objective than the patient, and therefore must on occasion step back for a "review" on the basis of that experience, objectivity, and detachment. Moreover, a doctor may recognize how marginal the superiority of his experience and how frail and partial his objectivity while not wanting to trumpet the fact to patients who are often specialists in using such admissions

<sup>6</sup> Cf., D. Cargello, *From Psychoanalytic Naturalism to Phenomenological Anthropology* (Daseinsanalyse). "From Freud to Binswanger," in *The Human Context*, vol. 1, no. 1, August 1968.

as means of avoiding whatever fragments of the truth the analyst has managed to acquire. He may also legitimately restrict the degree of reciprocity and involvement which he allows himself, since he, too, has to survive.

Yet here are real dangers to which Laing points, though it is regrettable that some of his criticisms are not more specific. For example, the psychoanalytic profession is not only expert at the game of "tails I win, heads you lose," not only curiously indifferent to external fact such as perfectly genuine threats and difficulties, not only often oblivious to ongoing social situations, but it also protects itself far more than mere personal or professional survival requires in terms of a group of ploys designed to cover the extent of professional failure. These ploys do not have very much to do with treating people as things or with biological reductionism or anything so grandiosely perverse, but are simply the verbal mechanisms for coping practically with patients, for the reduction of proliferating involvements and for the safeguarding of medical prestige. In a way one feels that Laing prefers to concentrate on the grandiose perversity to the neglect of these unhappy mundane truths. Perhaps the exploration of the personal and professional defects which psychoanalysts share with the rest of us has less *éclat* than accusing them of misconceived ontology, and of treating persons as things.

Just as there is no necessary relation between elements of objectivity assumed for purposes of review and the loss of genuine reciprocity, so there is no necessary connection between either of these things and treating persons as biological entities, although there may be a necessary connection in reverse, insofar as those with a biologically and neurologically reductionist approach must find it difficult to achieve a full recognition of the equality involved in person-to-person relationships. Insofar as psychoanalysts do take up biological reductionism, Laing is surely right in pointing out that it explains all and explains nothing:

It explains all in the sense that . . . ultimately perfected biochemical and neuro-physiological techniques, and carefully delineated instinctive units of behaviour, will account "correlatively" for every possible "psychic drive" that can be thought up. Meanwhile the person, his purposes and choices (his "project") have disappeared: his ongoing mental life has been explained out, stultified with "fetishised pseudo-irreducibles."

As Laing says, "It is only through the discovery of a freedom, a choice of self-functioning in the face of all determinations, conditioning, fatedness, that we can attain the comprehension of a person in his full reality."

All that is well said, though those of us who are not doctors or psychoanalysts can only wonder that those who are should discover so painfully what the rest of us are not tempted to forget: that people are, after all, people. Most human beings do not require to be reassured that a person is a person by a long detour through the more verbose, pretentious, and obscure German philosophers in the existentialist and phenomenological tradition. Maybe such trials are reserved as necessities for those who specialize in the science of persons, since they, it seems, have a special facility (not to say training) in forgetting what the rest of humanity remembers without thinking about it. Yet no doubt we *do* need to think about these matters: to establish as part of a carefully articulated phenomenology and ontology the validity of personal life qua personal life, independent of our unreflective awareness of it or as imparted to us through the partly unspoken assumptions of humanist and religious traditions. A philosophical detour that articulates what one always knew is not a waste of time, and the emphasis achieved by Laing in so doing is important.

Yet it *is* an emphasis, and at times so emphatic and careless as to be absurd. Presumably what he is saying amounts to an assertion that the interpenetration of levels of analysis from physics and chemistry to

existential philosophy does not destroy the independent validity of each level in its own terms or render them reducible to each other. Presumably he is also saying that reductionist assumptions lurking in the medical mind lead doctors to resort more frequently than is appropriate to drugs and to physicalist methods of dealing with particular problems, such as prefrontal surgery and electric treatment. Occasionally he bothers to state this position in a qualified and commonsense form,<sup>7</sup> but at other times the assault on his own profession must seem so extreme as to prevent fellow doctors from hearing what he has to say. Thus: "doctors in all ages have made fortunes by killing their patients by means of their cures. The difference in psychiatry is that it is the death of the soul" (*The Dialectics of Liberation*, p. 19).

LAING'S SECOND MAIN POINT with respect to methodological prescription concerns the relevance of the social context in interpreting individual psychology. This leads in two different directions: one is to establish the relevance of social context in any explanatory model of behavior and the other involves a philosophical issue insofar as the positivistic abdication from value judgments prevents one from seeing how the psychoanalyst is in his whole mode of operation expressing and executing the values of society. The latter point is linked with the issue already mentioned in relation to physicalist methods: an executioner dealing with crime by the rope does not absolve himself by declaring that ethical judgments are not his business. But the analogy is very partial, and in any case methods do not need to be physicalist for the essential point to be made that the psychoanalyst may act as an agent

of current values by defining madness within the terms set by his society, thus failing to observe the partial responsibility of the mechanisms and institutions approved by that society for the genesis of mental disorder, overlooking the valid protest lurking behind the supposed abnormality, and assisting the patient to acquiesce again in the mad routines of supposedly normal people. This is an important point, however much overstated.<sup>8</sup>

The point about the relevance of the social context is also genuinely helpful, but it suffers like almost all psychiatric excursions into sociology from excessive universalism. Let us take Laing's wholly acceptable remark about men qua men ultimately being free, choosing as well as "chosen." He both asserts this as a universal truth about the human person as such and refers to the nature of capitalist society as being a near-universal social context in which that freedom is deformed. Unless he appeals to contemporary Communist society as *not* implicated in such deformations, which seems an unlikely and certainly an unpersuasive recourse, he is saying that developed society as such is a universal context within which freedom is distorted. Indeed, where he appeals to an alternative type of society he actually looks back to periods notorious for their deformation of the possibility of freedom, actually postulating in one instance a decline over the past thousand years. Since he firmly indicates no concrete milieu where deformations do *not* occur, one suspects that his category of society is not limited at all, even when it appears to have special reference to capitalist society: it is society *tout court* in all its historical manifestations hitherto which is at fault. *Vide* Freud. Thus we have two universals, the universality of freedom and the universal repressiveness of society as such.

<sup>7</sup> R. D. Laing, *The Divided Self* (London: Penguin, 1965; New York: Pantheon, 1970), pp. 22-23. "I am not here objecting to the use of mechanical or biological analogies as such, nor indeed to the intentional act of seeing man as a complex machine or animal. My thesis is limited to the contention that the theory of man as person loses its way if it falls into an account of man as a machine or man as an organismic system of processes."

<sup>8</sup> Occasionally even the overstatement is avoided; e.g., on pp. 90-91 of *The Politics of Experience*, where he suggests his main purpose is to *loosen* any assumption that the psychiatrist is right and the patient wrong.

Now it is worth asking here whether men are more or less free according to the *variations* in their social milieu, within societies as well as between them. It has been suggested, for example, that the British working class is a less "free" milieu than the middle class because it lacks the dramaturgical skills and appropriate "role distance" (in Goffman's sense) to exercise its freedom. Without endorsing so gross a contrast it remains true, surely, that given milieus (within the overall repressiveness of society as conceived by Laing) do make freedom more or less accessible, so that the experience of a person in the one milieu may lead him or her to have that margin of desire to exercise freedom and therefore climb by beneficent spirals out of a psychological cul-de-sac. Conversely another person may lack just that margin and by parallel vicious spirals reach a point where he is literally without option—where he may say, quite correctly, there is no way out.

Such examples do indicate both the relevance of a milieu *much* more specific and particular than society as such (though clearly this plays its part too as an overall environment) and also the possibility of losing one's freedom, in some cases entering a vicious spiral very early in the process of life such that no human mercy or grace can save one or elicit one's free choice. Personally, I would agree with Laing that freedom is a universal option of humanity, but I would also want to know whether that affirmation, as stated by Laing, takes adequate account of the *variation in its availability*. At what levels of analysis is it universal, at what levels variable?

There is a subsidiary point that arises here and has some relevance to Laing's politics insofar as those people who are burdened with a metaphysic of freedom frequently ignore or despise the concrete variations in the institutionalization of liberties. Just as a psychiatrist may proceed with a crude dichotomy of the individual and society which ignores the variable inter-

mediate institutional network from society to society, so philosophers in the pursuit of genuine individual freedom despise the variations in stabilized liberties. British society, no doubt through a concatenation of favorable circumstances, has been relatively successful in the institutionalization of liberties, yet Laing's criticisms presumably apply to it with equal vigor as to anywhere else, and, since he lives here, with added emotional violence. In short, the denunciatory style of radical psychiatrists touched by existential philosophy is likely to be indiscriminately global, whereas there are, after all, seven circles both in hell and in heaven.

The points just made have been related to the variable cultural context of personal freedom and of institutionalized liberty, but they also can relate to Laing's general attempt to bring the social context into account as contributing to explanations of psychological phenomena. Laing does, of course, speak of the socialization provided by the family, and very occasionally by the school, as agents of the general socializing process emanating from global society. But he gives almost no impression whatever of the hierarchy of status and class, the processes of aspiration, of mobility and peer-group formation, and all the vastly differentiated milieus in terms of cultural pattern from one area to another, town and country, north and south. He may describe very well a highly generalized social process such as the mechanisms of gossip and scandal by which everybody is caught up in a situation that thereby acquires its own autonomous momentum because each person is primarily concerned about what the other thinks. But while he refers to persons and to groups and to society, there is little particularized social and historical location through which the universal processes have to be channeled if they are to be truly explanatory.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Cf., some comments by D. Cooper, in D. Cooper and R. D. Laing, *Reason and Violence* (London: Tavistock, and New York: Humanities Press, 1964), pp. 44, *et seq.*, on "hierarchies of mediations."

This is perhaps more a complaint about psychiatry as such than about Laing, but it does indicate why the jeremiads and lamentations in which he engages refer so much and so indiscriminately to "*the society*," "*the family*," "*the school*," and so on. Since he seems not personally to have rejected the family, this suggests that some families in certain circumstances are better than others. The question is: which? By always referring to institutions in general, his work is a triumph of masterful evasion.

Moreover, the generality of his work also weakens his remarks about sociology, in that sociology simultaneously aspires to adequate generality and adequate particularization. Laing's concentration on *the group* or on *the society* leads him to draw conclusions either from reading the social psychology of groups or from very abstract considerations of *the nature of society*. His comments on sociology contain very occasional slanting references to Parsons and Durkheim, but any serious acquaintance with the vast literature on the explanation of all the varied institutional patterns of modern society, or for that matter with the equally enormous literature discussing what are among his major interests—objectivity, internal personal knowledge, etc.—seem entirely lacking. While he rightly criticizes Sartre for attacking sociology on the basis of fragments from Lewin (a social psychologist) and Kardiner

(a "cultural" psychoanalyst), Laing is engaged in precisely the same exercise himself.<sup>10</sup>

This is equally evident in his plea for an evaluative stance and an enveloping "total" perspective within which social science may operate. Such a plea rests on an objection to positivism, the very word "positivism" (or "vulgar positivism") being a "booword" in certain circles. The core of this objection has already been stated above insofar as it relates to the abdication of the social scientist from judgments of value and his silent implication in a supposed consensus. This is a persistent theme to which one may return later. But first let us analyze, by way of example, the statement, "Much social science deepens the mystification. Violence cannot be seen through the sights of positivism" (*Politics of Experience*, p. 51). This issue has been discussed in a thousand academic articles, and the proportion of social scientists accepting a crude positivism is very small, whether in denying the relevance of what Polanyi calls "personal knowledge" or in asserting an unqualified scientific objectivity, whether in dismissing value judgment as merely emotive or in refusing to acknowledge the imperatives that should operate on the scientist qua person as distinct from the special role taken up with respect to problems at a given analytic level. Sociologists are simply determined to assert that it is important at least to note the *distinction* between "is" and "ought." Ethical judgments will be none the less forceful for not being confused with scientific propositions. And similarly scientific propositions will not gain by being worked up and then stuffed as a mediate element in some totalizing synthesis, even one continuously constituted and reconstituted.<sup>11</sup> It is one of the major achievements of social science to loose itself from the bonds of ethical judgments and global metaphysics,

<sup>10</sup> D. Cooper and R. D. Laing, *Reason and Violence* (1964), p. 22.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, part 3, section A.

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not in order to reject the importance of ethics or metaphysics but to acquire a necessary (not merely a provisional) autonomy, a fragile but genuine independence for its own particular scientific purposes.

HAVING DISCUSSED certain aspects of Laing's methodological prescriptions, one may very briefly note what are his substantive ideas in the field of psychiatry. Indeed, since a great deal of Laing's work has been on schizophrenia, it may be worthwhile to utilize a summary indicating his approach from *The Divided Self*, pp. 161-64. This is perhaps the place to say that his analyses of interpersonal relations, either dyadic ones such as those between husband and wife or within the overall nexus of the family,<sup>12</sup> strike me as rich in insight. Such skill in understanding interpersonal relations does not of course validate his contentions vis-à-vis the geneticist-constitutional school with respect to schizophrenia, except insofar as he may quite rightly insist on the provisional hypothetical character of their approach, nor does such skill validate the naive set of attitudes informing his political comment.

In schizophrenia the self is "out of the body," and both wishes and fears to be re-integrated with it. The result is a disembodied self which may be lost in fantasy or engaged in a kind of dry "observation," or else may regard itself as essentially lost or destroyed. If the self is bent on self-destruction it may do so because what has been destroyed is then eternally safe. Alternatively it may be self-destructive because it has lost any sense of the personal right to be alive, or the ability to operate with a sense of what is due to one, even (say) the right to occupy a chair. The result is an experience of "chaotic non-entity" whereby verbal expression acquires a quite bizarre and obscure coherence and in which the obscurity is deepened further because the schizophrenic

is preserving his being from intrusion. His attempt at mad privacy is an effort to tell without being understood, to inform and communicate without giving anything away. To meet another person and communicate with him is to acknowledge the other's free existence and thus open up the possibility of the other treating one as a mere object. One takes no risks, because one believes that advantage will always be taken, and one may avoid any contact not only by secrecy but by an overcompliance, which also expresses the sense of other people's ontological weight poised threateningly against one's own insubstantiality. Yet at the same time one's greatest desire is to be allowed to *be*, and to be understood and accepted. The schizophrenic is knocking obscurely on the walls of the sunken submarine, terrified of the dangers involved in the upward route to safety and conscious of the steady diminution of the possibility of life within.

Now in Laing's view this is a condition, or rather an experience, to be investigated not primarily on an individual basis but within a social context, notably the context of family dynamics, and these constitute a complete pattern of interaction, processes and structure. Sometimes his focus of understanding is the family, though at other times he seems to suggest that one may conceive of a kind of primary network of some 20 to 30 people within which schizophrenia is to be treated. Neither the family nor this group ought to be regarded as a pathological organism, since the problem must be viewed as an intelligible outcome of people's intentions and actions (praxis), however much the resultant processes acquire an autonomy of their own. The schizophrenic within the family and within the wider group exists to conduct its tensions, to take the brunt of its "unlived living" and bear the weight of its crazy structure for the rest. Perhaps one might even say that "one dies for the people" in that the rest achieve a kind of corrupt and desperate viability through the sufferings of the chosen one. In David Cooper's words,

<sup>12</sup> As in *Interpersonal Perception* (London: Tavistock, 1966).

Most people who are called mad and who are socially victimized by virtue of that attribution . . . come from family situations in which there is a desperate need to find some scapegoats, someone . . . to take on the disturbance of each of the others, and, in some sense, suffer for them.

The basic unit of interaction is dyadic, "I" and "You," and what happens in all the possible combinations of "persons" in the family or beyond it can be partly illustrated in the basic interaction of personal perspectives. These constitute a kind of spiral based on how "I" look in the view of "the other." As Laing puts it, this takes the form of "I like you; you like me but I do not know that you like me; however I do know that you know I like you; and I do not know that you do know that I do not know that you like me." This does not necessarily lead to withdrawals, but it is clearly potent with "mismatched interpretations, expectancies, attributions and counter-attributions,"<sup>13</sup> and is particularly relevant to understanding the various circles of misunderstanding, desolation, fear, and corrosion into which husband and wife relations frequently fall.<sup>14</sup>

These are, if you like, the basic notions: schizophrenia as a problem of personal ontology and threats to the affirmation of personal being; the "mad" person as essentially "bearing" the condition of the group; and the "spiral" of potential misunderstanding informing all interlocking personal relations, but most dramatically of all perhaps, the dyad of husband and wife.

SUCH A BRIEF ACCOUNT, however inadequate, does allow us to move on to an analysis of the underlying personal attitudes of Laing, since the fact that he sets a particular type of "abnormal" experience within a social context, coupled with a suspicion of the psychiatrist as representing an undesirable society, allows him to question both the ab-

normality of the supposedly mentally ill and the normality of the society which is the context of the illness. Indeed it is perhaps central to Laing's position that modern society attempts to turn every child into a conformist and in so doing deprives the child of its potentialities and creativity, devastating its being with the chains we choose to call love. The child has gradually to be converted to a treason against itself by making a pact with the madness of society. And in this process the schizophrenic may be the one who cannot suppress his instincts enough to perform the much-solicited treason. The psychiatrist is not so much the objective representative of health as the corrupt solicitor, the secret agent of society whose *modus operandi* is tainted by precisely the ills he attempts to heal. (Those who do not view patients as persons depersonalize themselves.)

Here one must turn to a group of ideas and attitudes that provide a bridge passage between his psychiatric stance and his politics: they are contained in the notion of the "mystification of violence." For Laing, a central element in the broader task of "demystification" is an attempt to "demystify" violence, and the essence of this task is to recover access to that direct experience which socialization so successfully violates and destroys. Socialization, for him, is the local agent of that canalized institutional violence which is located in central government and which stalks society cloaked in the language and unspoken assumptions of the mass media. Socialization is the first and primal violence against the person which can only be met by projecting violence on to others, acting violently toward them and justifying oneself by attributing violence to them. *It is this view of socialization which links the experience of the family to politics, psychiatry to global issues, approaches to upbringing and pedagogical method to Vietnam.*

For people of this mind, all delimitation of issues, all academic division of scholarly

<sup>13</sup> *Interpersonal Perception* (1966), pp. 21 and 38.

<sup>14</sup> Cf., R. D. Laing, H. Phillipson, and A. R. Lee, "The Spiral of Perspectives," *New Society*, November 10, 1966.

labor, and all attempts to view phenomena objectively from a variety of specialized perspectives at different analytic levels are part of a policy of divide in order to rule. There can be no taking apart of Humpty-Dumpty even in order to put him together again: the question is, as Humpty-Dumpty himself said, "Who is master?" The appeal of this to the kind of young person looking for quick global answers, impatient with the requirements of careful study, and armed with a drifting paranoid suspicion of all authority, is obvious. The psychology of identifying a malevolent "Them," which he describes, is unusually well developed in his followers.

Global accusation, like libel and rumor, is easy: refutation, like art, is long and difficult. There is no answer to a grain of truth eked out by indiscriminate misrepresentation except a disciplined understanding. It would take too long; but one can at least begin by pointing to the central assumption, derived from Rousseau, that man as man is originally innocent, and civilization, especially modern civilization, the focus of original sin. Incidentally, it is interesting that this assumption links Laing with another large success in the field of commercial publishing: the type of egregious ethological speculation represented by *The Human Zoo* and *The Naked Ape*. In short there are those who see human institutions as dykes canalizing a raw, variable, morally ambiguous human potential into the fructifying ways of civilization, and those who see those institutions as barriers to a flood of inherent generosity, innate humanity, and abounding creativity. Laing is of the latter.

That said, it is instructive to look more closely at what appears to be a very confused discussion (pp. 50–53 of *The Politics of Experience*), which Laing conducts concerning socialization, violence, and value judgments. What he says is this. First, socialization, including moral and political socialization, is a violence against personal experience because it is socially derived and imposed rather than individually achieved.

Now it is not clear how else moral perspectives can be derived in the first instance except from society, and it is even less clear that people do not, as they mature, partly transform what is so derived into a personal and critical perspective. Second, Laing argues that to regard animals and humans in a given scientific context as (e.g.) biochemical complexes is equivalent to a denial of their true nature as animals and persons; and such a context prevents those who adopt it from an ethical response when violence against men and animals is perpetrated.

Now there is a tiny grain of truth here, which is that a person specializing at a given level of scientific interest such as biochemistry may become so professionally deformed as to forget that what he studies is also a human being, may indeed refuse to acknowledge that in principle results may need to be reassimilated within a wider view that includes the specifically human. Humpty-Dumpty may lie shattered on the floor. It may even happen that such an attitude enters into a scientist's general moral perspective. But it happens to a certain degree to certain people, and the extent to which it does would require extensive documentation; unfortunately the techniques of the propagandist asserting the primacy of his "genuine" human experience do not allow so wasteful an expenditure of intellectual energy in the cause of mere verification. It is more economical and more effective to say, "Meanwhile the Vietnam war goes on." And here, of course, one encounters a cheapness of effect which in Laing goes with this kind of intellectual economizing. The situation in Vietnam is too appalling, the issues are too confused, the murderous intent on both sides is too typical of war at almost all times, for it to be used as a catchall riposte by those too lazy or too frenetic to engage in honorable argument.

In any case, a more appropriate intellectual economy might have been employed, since what is being said is even more simple

than it appears. Laing is claiming that his value judgments are rooted in his genuine experience as a human being, whereas those who disagree with him are the deluded facsimiles of oversuccessful socialization. He has not adequately considered the possibility that—to quote him from a different context—his opponents may be people like himself, dressed differently. They, too, may be human.

**W**ITH WORLD ENOUGH AND TIME, it would be worthwhile indicating just how grossly Laing exaggerates the pressure of socialization on the child in the democratic West as compared with almost any other period or type of society. It is in fact so affected by a degree of indecision and by a measure of self-indulgent irresponsibility (backed by fashionable psychologies) about its right to socialize, that it often neglects to give those firm, compassionate guidelines within the family and the school without which the child is a flailing ego. Many children rightly suspect that absence of discipline is absence of love. Our school systems are attempting to achieve a balance between required structures and individuality: if they err it is sometimes in taking the sentimentalities deriving from Rousseau too seriously, in acceding too easily to callow cults of spontaneity. On the contrary, it is the duty of a home or school proudly and exultantly to induct a child into that incredibly rich human achievement called civilization, and into those social, spiritual, and intellectual disciplines on which it is built.

It would also be worth showing that some element of mystification is inherent in every civilized social achievement, including the violence of socialized, rationalized, and sometimes civilized, in the state. Masked (or “mystified”) violence is often a step forward in a peaceable direction; in certain circumstances men gradually conform to their own peaceful self-portraits and are pressed by opinion to implement their misleading idealizations. Men always partially misrepre-

sent their actions: legitimate and minimum authority can be labelled repressive violence; repression can be labelled the maintenance of civilized order. That is not surprising. Men do attempt to delude themselves and others. There are indeed certain situations where the total truth is the grossest violence and where the question is always: what is the most responsible and compassionate proportion of truth and delusion? That is as true of politics as it is of person-to-person relations. Confronted by one’s own humanity and others’, there is only one possibility: a relaxed compassion toward oneself and other people.

The logic of Laing’s position is ultimately violent and totalitarian in spite of (or because of) its extreme libertarian gloss. Perhaps its possibilities are best illustrated by a passage from John Gerassi in *The Dialectics of Liberation* (p. 93). Gerassi presents as an alternative to Stalinism something exemplified in Cuba, where “one way to guarantee that their people are genuinely free is not elections, is not free press, is not all the trappings of the so-called political democracy that we have, but simply to arm their people.” In short, if democracy and a free press are less genuine than they claim, the best answer is to abolish free elections and ban open comment; and the best response to militaristic tendencies is the total militarization of everybody. It is a curious consummation to the metaphysics of freedom.

This is the framework, these the plausible half- and quarter-truths which are major keys to the syndrome of attitudes found in Laing. They are allied to a stress on the need for transcendence, which is in part a range of experience akin to mystical illumination, which modern society is held to inhibit and denigrate and which is also an ability to see beyond the confines of one-dimensionality to another mode of social life. Since this is important, any exposition must include some reference to the religious elements found in Laing: our alienation from ecstasy and the problem of an original sin uniquely focused in capitalist society. The best way into such

an exposition is to concentrate on these attitudes as illustrated in *The Politics of Experience*, and to preface them with a brief look at Laing's contribution to *The Dialectics of Liberation* entitled, "The Obvious." The crucial point for criticism of Laing is the contrast between his politics of experience and the experience of politics.

It is "obvious" to Laing that what is "irrational" in the individual can be understood in the context of the family, and that the irrationality of the family is intelligible within its "encompassing networks," and so on up to the society itself and the total social world system. Each of the wider systems pervades the smaller subsystems. There is nothing within which the irrationality of the world may be made intelligible, unless it be God, and perhaps He is mad too. Social salvation is not possible by individual conversion nor by seizing the state apparatus, but by working outward from the middle range of institutions, e.g., factories and schools. Psychiatry is the unwitting agent of a political operation against the individual, and the patients are thrown up and selected by a system of which psychiatrists are the malign solicitors. This violence against the individual is paralleled by violence on the societal scale: while the microsystem selects an individual, the macrosystem selects "them." "Them" currently comprise the Third World, the have-nots, the exploited. We are enabled to see the Third World as "them" by our own misconception of what we wrongly believe to be the Western desire for peace and by our faith in its vaunted democracy. We project our own unjust violence onto them, are surprised at their just violence against us, and so feel justified in destroying Vietnam.

So universal is our ignorance of and obedience to this system that the number of those surviving as human beings is minute. Socialization makes us into unwitting subjects of the system just as psychiatrists are made into its unwitting agents. The normal mode of socialization, terrorization into submission by love, repeats an endless spiral

back through countless generations to the beginning. This spiral backwards is the precondition of our projecting a world composed of "us" and "them" in which the hatefulness of "them" is ourselves seen in the mirror. The crux of the system is obedience resting on the generation of guilt and on the reflex of believing in the authorities. The state, the church, the government, scholarship and science—authority and authorities—all are partners in such a morass of delusion that almost nothing can be truly known: we can only trust something deeper than ourselves, and it is most obvious that *this* is most hidden.

These basic themes are simply found on a larger scale in *The Politics of Experience*: white Western society, its governmental system, its methods of upbringing, its science and its scholarship are part of a tissue of delusion which is responsible for stereotyped divisions into "us" and "them," and is to blame for violence and counterviolence. We think "they" are to blame; not at all, it is we who are to blame in the world. This is a simple diagnosis, easily achieved by standing an equally simple diagnosis on its head. The basic stratagem of this style of thinking is: if you want to know what to believe, find out what is the current consensus and turn it upside down; that way you won't necessarily be right but at least you won't inevitably be wrong. If, in addition, you hope for a hint as to what is right, listen to those whom society stigmatizes as abnormal. They've got something.

AS ONE PROCEEDS to document the Laingian position one can hardly help noticing two characteristics in his own work which illustrate his own analysis of what constitutes a fundamentally irrational view of the world. One is the simple stereotyping of "us" and "them," encapsulated in vast assertions about what people in Western societies think: a grandiose simplification of all issues achieved by stigmatizing whole societies as solidary elements in "the Enemy." No evidence is

cited, just projections about what people in the disapproved societies are projecting about "them." This looks like an unfortunate example of the spiral perspectives in which Laing is himself a specialist. The other characteristic is the repetition on the macroscale of what he describes as inherent in the experience of schizophrenia on the microscale. All other types of society *except* his own have some kind of ontological root, something which may be admired, some kind of right to exist. Only that which is his own constitutes a kind of delusion, a mass of sub-humanity, suffering from ontological weightlessness. There is in Laing's writing not a single word suggesting that any virtue inheres in what is his own inheritance. So total a rejection, so wholehearted a separating out of the self from the body of society, so extraordinary a fear of becoming reattached to it by fiendish subtleties, looks like a curious analogue of the self hating what is most truly its own.<sup>15</sup> Perhaps the condition could be called macroschizophrenia.

In *The Politics of Experience* the viewpoint expressed is religious not only in the chapter concerned with "transcendental experience" but throughout. The word religious is not used figuratively: it happens to be accurate. The more extreme forms of a religious rejection of the world often result in

two apparently contradictory responses both illustrated in Laing: the first is a flailing violence toward all mundane structures, all those things which for others may mediate elements of truth and personal being. Roles, institutions, and everyday experience are rejected because what they mediate is not *the* Truth, because they partly mask what they partly reveal. This obsessive pilgrimage toward the Absolute may result in a total rejection of all the way-stations where other people have rested on their journey, and in an excoriating contempt for their blindness. They are the blind led by the blind. They "scurry into roles, statuses, identities, interpersonal relations." In other words, they escape into the boltholes of partial sanity because they cannot bear too much sanity, just as others escape into partial madness because they have an inkling how partial the sanity found in those boltholes really is. Laing's choice of visionary viewpoint is allied to Eliot's "Mankind cannot bear very much reality," but without his compassion.

The second form taken by this religious rejection of the world is silence, because the search for the Absolute has been attempted and failed. The Truth itself was not available (or only intermittently) and, since all the mediate intervening half-truths have been rejected, nothing can be said. Speech is an impropriety and the structured or prepared speech is a blasphemous attempt at order when no order is possible. This is close to the Quaker experience. One must be silent concerning that which cannot be spoken. As Laing puts it, "Black on the canvas, silence on the screen, an empty white sheet of paper, are perhaps feasible. There is little conjunction of truth and social 'reality.'" Stylistically, the only mode of expression is unprepared, unstructured, gnomic, enigmatic. There is no truth in mere knowledge, no truth in social forms, no truth in ourselves. "We are all murderers and prostitutes. . . ." Here the Quaker experience mutates back to the characteristic Calvinist experience: the total reprobation in which man as man is uni-

<sup>15</sup> David Holbrook's criticism of Laing—"Madness to Blame Society," in *Twentieth Century*, 2, 1969—points to the seductive charm of blaming "society" for everything. He also suggests that in treating schizophrenia the analyst can come to play out for himself the meanings he desperately attributes to the patient. A histrionic manner is acquired which the analyst finds increasingly real to him until he feels lost outside schizophrenic company. To get through to the patient he adopts an exaggerated pose as a fellow-sufferer which requires him to blow up the oppressiveness of social situations and act contemptuously to ordinary common life and the normal sources of identity. Having originally seen the patient as an oracle, the analyst becomes oracular. Holbrook himself describes this as an essential self-indulgence according well with the attitude "I'm this way because society . . . , etc., etc." Naturally this attitude is in some tension with assertions of existential freedom. Cf. also P. Sedgwick "Laing's clangs," *New Society*, January 14, 1970.

versally implicated. Indeed, in Laing we have constant shifts between four main modes of the religious consciousness: mystical experience of the *coincidentia oppositorum*, intense prophetic violence, withdrawal into silence, into institutional and intellectual dissolution, and total reprobation. And Laing himself, through a residual Presbyterianism, is unwilling to assert that he is one of the Elect—"the survivors." As he puts it: "We who are half alive, living in the often fibrillating heartland of a senescent capitalism. . . . Can we do more than sing our sad and bitter songs of disillusion and defeat?" *Super flumina Babylonis* . . . the reference appears to be to capitalism *or* to Babylon: universalized, it is the essence of the religious awareness that "here we have no abiding city." Whether our civilization is so hostile to this awareness as he maintains, so relentlessly secular, as compared with others, is open to doubt. The nature of the dissent it is capable of producing may be taken both as its condemnation and its salvation. Laing himself contradicts his own thesis. It is a kind of compliment.

Although religious experience can achieve a general prophetic denunciation of a given social condition it is a poor guide to day-to-day politics. These are inevitably, and *quite properly*, conducted in a dubious half-light of more or less unhappy compromises; and to the extent that they are invaded by religion then either each shifty pragmatic compromise is papered over by religious legitimation or intimations of the New Jerusalem drive *l'homme moyen sensuel* relentlessly and intolerantly toward a predestined goal. Essentially the politics of experience are no adequate guide to the experience of politics; a denunciation is not a viable policy. It is this fact that should be the basis of any critical appraisal of the type of politico-religious awareness found in Laing.

When earlier in this essay I located Ronald Laing on the fringes of the irrationalist Left there was one sense perhaps in which it was untrue. He does not explicitly embrace ir-

rationalism, and indeed he uses the word "irrational" to stigmatize institutions and activities of which he disapproves. However, in such instances he rarely tells us what he means by "irrational," and one can only assume he uses the word simply as a stand-in for emotional disapproval. He can certainly be considered an irrationalist in that he finds rational and argued discussion of religious questions uncongenial, and insists that the essence of religion is ecstasy. And while it would be better to regard ecstasy as supra-rational rather than irrational, there is in Laing's whole style a *substitution* of ecstasy for argument and a disinclination to build up a sequence of ordered points, supported by carefully collected evidence, qualified in respect of this issue or that.

His method consists in random accusation and sloganized virulence, which destroys the possibility of genuine discussion. Patient refutation has to build up on a basis of carefully verified evidence, has to define its terms (whereas Laing simply prefers to use them), and eventually to build up a cumulative impression. Such a method cannot compete with a rhetorical either/or, with grossly simplified alternatives, with slogans used as an excuse for not thinking. You cannot talk with a man who throws his sincerity at you and who persistently implies that you and every other person who disagrees with him is a racist, an anti-Semite, and a crass authoritarian. It is like a discussion arranged between a Pentecostalist in the pulpit and a Unitarian in the congregation: the convention within which the exchange takes place is set by the enthusiast, not by the inquirer.

Laing will not engage in rational argumentation because that is not the way converts are made. Laing is also an irrationalist in the sense that he proposes no means to achieve his vision, apart from offering vague hints about psychic subversion in the middle-range type of institution, such as the school and the university. He proposes no policies, articulates no alternatives, raises no queries about viability, weighs no costs and

advantages, assesses no immediate and remote consequences. For obvious reasons: if he did, the whole visionary edifice would collapse like the baseless fabric of a dream. The old Left at least proposed a method of bringing dreams to fruition: when that method proved a nightmare the Left was reduced to the dream again and to variants of peyote. Not indeed that mankind should or can give up its dreams, but without an articulated machinery for the dream to be brought on stage it remains generalized in proclamations, embedded in rituals, and confined to what can be achieved by sympathy and goodwill: in short, it remains religious. Holy Communion—by sharing bread and wine—is a symbol and sometimes also a realization of a preliminary achievement in brotherhood and a pointer to the need for extending both its fellowship and the presence at the heart of that fellowship: but it cannot substitute for the pragmatic turmoil and administrative grind and cold calculation necessary for political action. Politics cannot simply be a Gospel, or else that Gospel eventually declines not only into ritual but into mere ritual.

So much contemporary protest of the kind Laing admires seems to consist of precisely these rituals and exhibitions executed by those who have no access to the idea of cost and are therefore unwilling to pay the administrative and personal costs of their gospels. For example, Laing's collaborator David Cooper refers to the schizophrenic as the author of the "totally gratuitous crazy act," and the once-for-all "happening" is precisely this: a negative symbol whose only point is its negation and which explodes violently into nothingness. As Laing himself might put it: a "happening" is the negation of the negation. On the continuum running from pragmatic articulated politics to the gratuitous crazy act Laing and Cooper stand about midway, but their sympathies clearly turn toward the latter end of that continuum. They find it easy to indulge in generalized abuse of politicians, easy to sympathize with the

psychotic and to regard him as less "estranged from reality" than the politician. Yet sympathy for psychotics need not be linked to a modish contempt for politicians.

There is no more important task in defending the disciplines of civilization against writers such as Laing than the rehabilitation of the political vocation. The abuse of politicians is one of the major forms of contemporary self-indulgence. In the demonology of those who aspire to be *real human beings* (and who so often inflict their humanity indiscriminately on others) politicians are the archetypes of the straw man, drained of all ontological root. They are regarded as the prisoners of themselves and the goalers of the rest of us. Yet in this competition for ontological supremacy perhaps even the politicians and the bureaucrats have a chance. When one considers the nature and constraints of politics there is perhaps in politicians a kind of heroism. Let us at least nominate them as competitors in the ontological stakes, alongside those traditionally easy winners, the artists and intellectuals.

The politician can be a man who wears a mask over his humanity in order the better to serve that humanity. Admittedly it is often an orthodox, conventional mask: yet it could be that behind the disguise lies more humanity than in those who affect no disguises, whose appearance of open-hearted innocence depends on the proclivity for unmasking other people. In any case, many people accept the disciplines that require a mask in a certain limited area of their life, say, their profession, but are able to relax into simple humanity in every other sphere of their life; others have no imperative need for masks in any area of their lives, perhaps because they have chosen just those areas of social life where the discipline of social relations can be lax and easy, where few exigencies constrict and few responsibilities congeal. The politician, however, has chosen a role where exigency and responsibility demand a mask at nearly all times.

Consider the following proposition: that

the highest moral responsibility could conceivably reside in a civil servant, or a politician at the ministry of defense, who uses the coolest rational calculation to tread that narrow edge which is marginally closer to survival than all the alternatives. Once such a man has chosen a policy, he is within certain limits committed to it and indeed knows in advance that what he has chosen may acquire a momentum that will control him. He knows it includes certain costs, may in extreme circumstances begin to include further costs that may be appalling, but when that stage has been reached are probably (but not certainly) less appalling than the alternative costs. Perhaps such a man is a *kind* of genuine human being: willing to accept what it will be like to live with himself and with the obloquy of those not in his shoes should the worst happen.

As the consequences of his choice accumulate, he becomes totally immersed in fending off the worst, and this may mean the death of his personality; nothing but a public life and an "insane" commitment to politics. Not even the relief of an autobiographical exposition of his motives is open to him: he can only advise and act. Whatever he does now will acquire no honor in the world of those easily achieved martyr-

doms undertaken in "progressive" causes. Indeed he may have to face the obloquy of seeming to acquiesce in and abet just such a martyrdom. This kind of man accepts the need for painful struggle and refuses to inveigh easily against the structures of reality, but instead employs the highest rational cunning to play those structures as far as they can be played: this is both a creative act of his own *and* an encounter with a strange, alien, recalcitrant otherness.

His highest achievement will be a tiny victory, his normal achievement just to survive. This he will never be able openly to explain, and may have to accept the mortification of having to claim that a tiny victory was a great one. He may even acquire a reputation among the cognoscenti for naive reasoning and dishonest appeals, simply because the public neither wishes to know his actual reasons nor would be willing to face the stark alternatives involved in that reasoning. It may even be that he is a man of the highest intelligence who must accept the contempt of an intelligentsia which has never tried to understand why he must appear stupid in public and appear ignorant of what he may know better than anyone. Perhaps such a man has some claim to his humanity and ours.

## "Citizens' Politics" – How to do It

*Last summer Michael Walzer began writing some notes on the problems of "citizens politics"—that is, the kinds of local groups, some tenacious and others short-lived, that have grown up throughout the country during the last few years. Naturally enough, his notes grew into a book, published this spring by Quadrangle Books under the title Political Action: A Practical Guide to Movement Politics (copyright © 1971 by Michael Walzer). Drawn from his own experiences in the Cambridge area, Walzer's little book is a useful guide, and sometimes a very wry and funny one, to the kind of "amateur" politics without which democracy withers. Here, with the kind permission of his publishers, are a few sections.—Ed.*

### Strategic Choices

**Q**UIET MEN AND WOMEN often exaggerate the importance of their own outrage, their long delayed decision to *do something*. If they are moved, how can the rest of the world stand still? But it is always best to plan one's moves on the supposition that most of the world will stand still, that established institutions and social practices will survive the shock. All that has changed is that some group of people have decided to use the pronoun "we" and to act together. Nor is it the case in a democratic society that this decision challenges the political system. Quiet citizens are the resources of a democracy, saved up, so we are told, for those moments when professionalism fails. They may feel unconventional; they may behave unconventionally; but their intermittent forays into the political arena are by now one of the conventions of democratic politics. That doesn't mean that what they do isn't important, nor that it isn't sometimes dangerous. Using democratic rights puts

them at risk: now there are men and women —now there are enemies—threatened by that use. For this reason above all, it is important for activists to know what they can and cannot do and never to indulge themselves (or frighten their enemies) with fantasies of social and political changes they cannot actually bring about.

Revolution is such a fantasy, less common than is often thought, but worth dealing with early on. Citizen activists may aim at this or that fundamental change, but they cannot hope to make a revolution. It is not very often that anyone actually *makes* a revolution. Revolutions happen, and all sorts of people find themselves, unexpectedly, participants in the happening. Ordinary citizens will be among them (often yearning not to be), but at such moments it is the professionals, newly recruited professionals perhaps, who take charge. Power of the ultimate sort is at stake, and no one contends for such power in a part-time way, or carries on simultaneously a nonpolitical career, or retires

casually from the struggle once some point of special interest has been won. But these are the characteristics of citizen activists; simply listing them helps explain why amateur politics is most often parasitic on the routines of a more or less stable democratic system. The crises and outrages that set off the political activity of ordinary citizens are serious enough, but they occur within a system that is not yet in a state of total crisis and that protects even the irregular recourses of its members. Most men and women join the movement counting on that protection. It isn't absolute, as they will learn, but it is a great deal more than revolutionaries have any right to expect.

Giving the system a "last chance" is another fantasy. This suggests that revolution is the next step if citizen activism in general, or this particular citizens' campaign, fails to carry the cause to victory. But activists have no business imagining that they will win right away; they are a minority, probably a small minority, of the country. They must risk failure, and they ought to be aware that the most likely consequence of failure is not revolution at all, but the fragmentation of their movement and the retreat of many citizens from politics. Small bands of sectarian militants may then experiment with disruption and violence, fantastically imitating Jacobins and Bolsheviks. But this is rarely a serious business. One day, hopefully, there will be a new mobilization of activists, a reorganized movement, and another citizens' campaign—that is, another "last chance" for the system. There is nothing else to do but try again.

The real choice faced by the men and women who plan these successive attempts is between two kinds of politics, both of which have conventional names, though they can each be pursued in a variety of irregular ways. The two kinds are pressure politics and electoral politics, and I am inclined to think that there are no other kinds. To choose pressure politics means to try to influence those people who already hold power, who

sit in official seats, who may even be responsible for the outrages against which the movement is aimed. To choose electoral politics is to try to dislodge those people and plant others in their seats, not necessarily or even probably the leaders of the movement, more likely whatever alternative set of professional politicians the system provides. Of course, the two choices overlap in important ways; they are often pursued simultaneously, with stress being put on the first only until some group of professionals adopts the cause. But it is worth emphasizing the two simply because they exhaust the range: changing the policies men make and changing the men who make policy. Changing the political system within which policy is made is rarely a real option for citizen activists.

It is never easy to know when to shift from pressure to electoral politics, whether at any given moment (and the moments are recurrent) to enter or to avoid the campaign of this or that candidate or party. On the one hand, electioneering is the sort of politics citizen activists are most familiar with, know best, probably do best. On the other hand, they often feel that their break with the routines of the system precludes it. They have come to be distrustful of the promises of professional politicians. They are in search precisely of a politics that does not require them to support candidates who are only barely better than their opponents and who have, most likely, weak and vacillating positions on what the activists believe is the crucial issue. Sentiment of this sort is entirely justified. It is, after all, what makes the movement possible in the first place. But assuming that pressure politics (petitions, mass meetings, marches, and so on) doesn't lead to a change in government policy, electoral politics is a necessary next step. The movement can't avoid it, even if supporting conventional candidates and parties involves some compromise of its principles. It is only a question of when, and to that there is no specific answer. The general answer is, not until the movement is strong enough to force

fairly clear positions on the professionals and to exercise some control over them once they have won.

This general rule sometimes suggests to activists that they must run their own candidates or that they must join in a new political party. A single-issue educational campaign, even with victory inconceivable, may be a useful activity; whether it is or isn't in any particular case is a tactical decision. A new party is something quite different. It involves the movement in a coalition with many other groups and so defines its position on many other issues; it requires a commitment to an elaborate program and to broad social change. That is a commitment many of the activists would probably like to make, but it is not what first brought them together and it is not what holds them together with other activists in the movement. Nor is it at all clear that a new party and a struggle for social change on a wide front is the best (the easiest or the quickest) way to carry their own cause to victory. There are, in fact, two very different strategies entangled here, which will have to be separated out in the course of movement debate and action. Two questions are crucial: should the citizens' movement be committed to single-issue or to multi-issue politics? should the movement be organized as a single constituency or a coalition?

#### *Defining the Issues*

NEW POLITICAL MOVEMENTS GENERALLY take shape around a single issue—a wrong being done to the people who join or to some other group with whom they have political connections or moral sympathies. The activists are likely to disagree about much else, but this sense of injury or indignation they must share. As they work together they may come to share more than this. Issues related to the original one come into view and the values that underlay their first choice of action lead them to choose again, to extend the range of their movement. Sometimes, however, and probably more often, new is-

ssues have opposite effects: the movement splinters; its members find that they are really radically different from one another.

These different possibilities lead from the first to very different views of what the movement should be like. Some members insist that its focus should be resolutely fixed on the single issue that brought them together. Necessarily they attribute great importance to that issue: they believe or they say that the world will be different (and much better) once it is resolved. They blind themselves, sometimes willfully, to the entanglements of social and political life, to all the obstacles that lie between the particular victory they may in fact win and the transformations they hope for. They choose the part over the whole, that is, they have or choose to have perceptions of the part, only visions of the whole. Other members seem to be more realistic. They try to fit the single issue into a complex of problems. They try to develop a coherent program for social or political change. Then they want the movement to adopt their program, to switch from single-issue to multi-issue politics. Perhaps that means that some activists will drop out, they say, but ultimately the movement will be stronger and because of its wider scope will appeal to more, not fewer, people. The tendency of this second group is to turn the movement into a political party.

Now it is a great deal harder to launch a party than a movement, as American history amply demonstrates. Or, to make the same point in another way, it is all-too-easy to establish a very small political party, an association of activists who have the same position on almost everything. But a party that grows, losing something of its coherence, but retaining a common program: this is an extremely rare and difficult achievement. It may well be the "right" response even to very particular wrongs, rooted in sociological sophistication, reaching toward intellectual complexity and completion. But it requires too much from too many people—too much time, energy, money, above all,

too much commitment—to be politically viable. The movement, with all its necessary pretension, is more nearly possible. And victories can be won through single-issue campaigns. Indeed, it is hard to think of any other kind of victory that citizen activists have ever won. Winning turns out, of course, to be something less than they expected. The end of child labor, women’s suffrage, prohibition, the end of this or that war: none of these planted the new Jerusalem. Nor, however, were they or will they be without significant effects, for good or ill.

Issues should be defined so that victories can be won. This doesn’t mean that one should be able to imagine winning tomorrow. The question is not so much of time as of particularity and limit. It is always possible to describe one social problem so that it involves every other, so that its solution requires the solution of every other and the transformation of society as a whole. This is one of the major achievements of Marxist ideology. But it is also possible to describe one social problem as if it stands alone or sufficiently apart from other problems so that it can be solved without doing anything else or waiting for anything else to happen. Neither description is true, though it is possible that the first is more sophisticated. Political activity anywhere in a society obviously produces adjustments, not necessarily transformations, everywhere. But the character and extent of these are almost impossible to predict. We make guesses and are usually wrong. In any case, action cannot and does not depend upon a true theory of social change. It requires a useful theory, or something less than a theory, a point of view, a set of opinions, an argument, that at least does not contradict whatever little we know to be true. And the most useful argument is one that imposes upon activists only one choice and only one fight at a time. They can always make further choices, join further fights, later on. Some members of the movement will want to plan ahead and should certainly do so, though not at the expense

of the movement’s immediate focus. That focus should almost certainly be on a single issue, an important issue, but simply stated: the vote, the war, the bomb. Activists and their spokesmen can safely exaggerate both the importance and the simplicity. Let victory bring its complications and disappointments.

### ***Searching for a Constituency***

A CONSTITUENCY is a social base, a sector of society (ethnic group, age group, economic class, or whatever) within which the movement finds sympathy and support, from which it recruits members, for which it claims to speak. But this constituency is not given, like that of a congressman or senator. It presumably has objective characteristics; it recognizably exists in the sense that men and women sharing those characteristics exist. But it is not organized; its members may not be conscious of the identity they share; nor does it act as a single body. Activists can try to turn it into a single body, a self-conscious whole, a collective force; or they can try to build such a body from among its members. Often they do the second, while pretending to do the first.

Finding a constituency is not always a problem. The constituency of the labor movement is the working class; organizers know exactly where to look for support (though they may look elsewhere as well). Generally, movements seeking to respond to injuries or injustices endured by particular groups of people plausibly direct themselves to those same groups. But sometimes such groups are thought to be incapable of defending themselves; someone must act on their behalf. And sometimes a movement is aimed at a policy thought to be unjust or immoral, but which is not injurious or not obviously injurious to any group of possible political actors (a foreign war, for example). In either of these last two cases, constituencies may be particularly hard to search out and put together. Yet the historical evidence is clear: the available people in such cases

are largely middle-class; and they come from fairly distinct sectors of the middle class: urban professional families, suburban housewives, students, and so on. I am not concerned here with efforts to explain the peculiar capacities of the middle class for moral indignation, nor with the level of education, leisure time, child-rearing practices, ethnic history of its members. What is more important for our purposes is the special difficulties that middle-class activists have in dealing with their own people, their inevitable constituency.

The choice of action requires a break with the conventional world. Usually this is a break with the middle-class world, and the men and women who make it are eager to differentiate themselves from the people they have left behind. Differentiation takes a great variety of forms, and many of these are harmless enough: small badges, self-awarded, for distinctive conduct. One form, however, is not harmless at all, that is, the adoption of an ideology that focuses the new activist's hostility on his own past, his social or ethnic origins, his former friends and neighbors. This is appropriate for a revolutionary, perhaps, but it makes citizen activism a great deal harder than it need be. Activists do best if they begin by assuming that there are more people like them where they came from. They are wrong to think of themselves as unusual people, though they may well take pride in their resolution and energy. If they are in fact different in more fundamental ways, they are unlikely to be able to act effectively. *Begin where you are*—this is one of the central maxims of moral life, but in the life of a political movement it is often necessary to begin where you were.

That is especially important in the case of student activists. Their first constituency is the campus; their second is the world of their parents. They prefer often enough to go almost anywhere else (though they are unlikely to end up anywhere else). But there can be no doubt that they are most effective among the people they literally left behind,

who are glad (mostly) to see them back. And they ought, whatever their preferences, to be as effective as they can.

I don't want to deny the need to reach or try to reach beyond immediately available constituencies. The efforts of middle-class activists to organize "in the community"—which usually means among working-class men and women—are sometimes worthwhile. For sometimes there are plausible signs that a working-class base can in fact be won or some substantial number of people recruited to the work of building their own base. But this is a foolish effort if there are no such signs, if the sole reason for not organizing elsewhere is the ideologically rooted belief that members of the middle class are different from "the people." In fact, of course, like everyone else, they are salt of the earth.

#### **Going to the People**

IT'S NECESSARY to think twice before turning the movement loose on "the people." Efforts to reach beyond the middle class are so often ruined by the arrogance or condescension of the citizen activists involved. Their good intentions are transparent, but so, unhappily, is the assurance of superior wisdom that is the badge of their class. The truth is that the class barrier is painfully difficult to break through, and the difficulty is not reduced simply because activists agree on the importance of making the breach. This is not a boundary that one can just dash across. Indeed, the more sudden and seemingly uncalled for is the attempt, the more certain it is to fail. Failure can be seen clearly, I think, in the way workers look at students leafletting at a factory gate: "Who are you?" they seem to be saying. "Why are you here *today*? Where will you be *tomorrow*?" The effect is not much better when students spend a summer inside the factory. On the other side of the class line, a man is a stranger for a lot longer than two months. He is betrayed every time he opens his mouth, even if his rhetoric is as radical as it can be.

It makes more sense to approach first the

leaders of whatever organizations are established among the people one is trying to reach: unions, churches, veterans' groups, community clubs. Many citizen activists explicitly assume that these leaders are not to be trusted. They are where they are, however, because people trust them, and unless some support can be found in their ranks, no other success can be expected. The notion, so common on the Left, that workers must be organized "from below" is one of the clearest examples of the arrogance of the organizers: they assume they have some message to deliver that has never yet been thought of, let alone argued and championed, by leaders and would-be leaders within the working-class community itself. They are almost certainly wrong, as a more humble approach might well demonstrate.

Once contacts have been made, it is possible to think either of organizing a local branch or forming an alliance of some sort with groups that already exist. In either case, the actual work must be done by people established in the community. No serious political enterprise can be sustained for long by outsiders—though it is always possible to make a few converts and pretend to be leading a mass struggle. If local activists don't take charge, it's best to give up and begin again somewhere else. If they do take charge, they must be given their head. In time, the cause will be described in new accents; ac-

tivity will take on a new style. It's all to the good if the movement comes to look very different in different parts of the country or even of the city.

When working among the poor, there is one thing that must never be forgotten: they have more immediate and pressing concerns than those of the movement. The worst kind of middle-class bias is the assumption that everyone else has or ought to have leisure, disinterest, and a passion for distant goods. In fact, for many people, a cause, even their own cause, is a luxury they can only occasionally afford. So a conventional politician who provides routine and necessary services easily wins a larger following than citizen activists with a program for utopia, and probably deserves the following he wins. His followers are rational men, not the victims (not, at least, in any simple sense) of oppression or "false consciousness." That is a reason, of course, for the movement staff to provide whatever services it can: day-care, legal help, advice on available welfare programs. It is also a reason for seeking out conventional politicians and urging local activists to run for office. Among the poor, the movement cannot live on the cause alone: that's not or not necessarily a reason for giving up its single issue, but it does mean that it must ally itself with political groups and ambitious individuals who address themselves to other issues as well.

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Revista trimestral de Ciencias Sociales publicada por el ILARI

Director: Luis Mercier Vega

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Redacción y Administración: Instituto Latinoamericano de Relaciones Internacionales

23, rue de la Pépinière

PARIS-8e

Suscripción anual: 28 F o 5 dólares

## Contempt of Court & Respect for Law

**T**HESE ARE REBELLIOUS DAYS, the kind of days in which we tend to become polarized about law. Some stridently emphasize the need for respect; others stridently express their contempt. This contempt has come in our society from both the Right and the Left. Many of those who argue for "law and order" are in fact showing contempt for law, and many who now express contempt are in fact striving for a law that they can respect, a law that seems more just to them, institutionalized in courts that appear less biased.

The civil rights movement, headed by such men as Martin Luther King and James Farmer, worked at times in defiance of the law and its enforcing authorities, not because of contempt for law itself but rather because of a belief in higher laws, in this case the Constitution and to some extent a conception of natural law. On the whole, the movement was legitimated by the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. Those who violated laws were prepared to go to jail, in order to show their respect for the general principle of law.

It is hardly novel to say that people look at law from conflicting viewpoints. William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, proclaimed, "Where law ends, tyranny begins." Oliver Goldsmith wrote, "Law grinds the poor, the rich men rule the law." And both were correct.

Law has been at all times a weapon in the political process, an instrument for stabilizing or revolutionizing society. It has given legitimacy to those who exercise sovereignty and has been used to put at least a coating of legitimacy over conquest and revolution. Contempt of court has been an assault on

sovereign power, a challenge to the authority of the state, and never merely a legal issue. It has been, and still is, a social phenomenon, and therefore a proper subject for those who are concerned as thinkers or activists with politics and social behavior.

When we speak of contempt of law we think at once of the Chicago trial of eight men accused of a conspiracy to create riot and disorders during the Democratic Convention in 1968. As a lawyer I cannot but feel that they did express contempt of court, as did their attorneys, by their disruptive procedure and refusal to express in an orderly way their objections to the rulings of the court. But in another sense they expressed respect for law. They wanted an application of law that respected their constitutional right of free assembly and free speech; their tactic was wrong, but nevertheless tactical. Judge Julius Hoffman, on the other hand, did not express respect for law. He indicated bias; he engaged in undignified controversy with lawyers and defendants; and his sentences, on the count under which the defendants were found guilty and on the contempt of court charges brought by Judge Hoffman himself, were so punitive as to cause disrespect of the judicial process. So, too, was the excessive bail which was later reduced.

Like all of us, judges naturally have their own biases. That we must expect. But those biases have to be controlled if there is to be fairness; they cannot be expressed theatrically in the course of a trial, or by excessive punitive sentences. This destroys the possibility of justice and is itself contemptuous toward the judicial process.

THE SUPREME COURT has been a symbol of law as resting above the partisan realm of politics, and that is why, for over a century and three-quarters, the Supreme Court and its members have had so much prestige. Frequently the court has lagged behind the social and political thought of the times, while, on other occasions, it has led the country into new attitudes toward political and social problems.

The early opinions of the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Marshall favored the policy of strengthening the federal government as against states' rights: whereupon the Jeffersonians vilified the Court. The Court of Chief Justice Taney made the horrendous *Dred Scott* decision: its defense of the slave economy and the strict view of property rights prevalent in those days was so outrageous that it gave strength to the abolitionists and brought to their cause more moderate people, those who wanted only to prevent the extension of slavery, not its abolition. So the Supreme Court became a hated, not a respected, court. President Franklin D. Roosevelt tried, in his way, to use the court for specific political ends. Angered by its declaration that some of the measures he sponsored for the economic recovery of the country were unconstitutional, he made his bid for reform of the Court. He was defeated by Congress as well as by a great surge of popular opinion to maintain the integrity of the Court above political manipulation.

In more recent years the Court, under Chief Justice Warren, was condemned for upholding the rights of defendants to counsel at all stages of criminal proceedings, for ruling against the use of confessions obtained under any kind of duress, and for protecting the civil liberties of persons accused of Communism. The Court was accused of interfering with the police and coddling criminals. On other occasions it filled vacuums and led the country when the Administration and Congress failed or faltered, as when it declared in *Brown vs. Kansas* that segregated education was unequal education. Similarly

the Court gave leadership when it laid down the rule of one man-one vote and started to break up the system by which some legislators and congressmen were elected in the interest of party control rather than in the interest of voter equality. The Warren court was treated to some of the most astounding expressions of contempt of court by Senator Eastland and other members of the Congress. Those who have talked most loudly about law and order have treated the courts with the greatest contempt.

To my mind, it was an act of contempt of the Supreme Court to propose such men as Judge Haynsworth and Judge Carswell for that bench. In the one case the nominee was a man who showed no discretion about judging cases in which he had a financial interest and, in the other, a man who time and again had been overruled as a judge and was acknowledged to be "mediocre." Both were clearly men of racial bias.

We now have an Attorney General who has shown so little respect for the law that he has urged preventive detention of accused persons, a procedure that has not been acceptable under Anglo-Saxon law since the revolution against the Stuarts in England and the Revolutionary War in this country; a procedure that has, moreover, been the hallmark of totalitarian political systems in the recent past. He has indicated that he would not abide by the Supreme Court rulings with respect to electronic surveillance and wire-tapping and, unfortunately, this contempt of law has been repeated and greeted with approval by many members of Congress.

Under Attorney General Mitchell, the Justice Department filed a brief in support of a slick evasion of desegregation law, giving tax deductions for contributions to private schools in the South established to avoid public school desegregation. Here, the chief law-enforcing agency of the country teaches a lesson to millions of black citizens: that what has been accomplished by law can be rejected by the enforcing authority.

The contempt of federal law shown in the

recent past by Governors Wallace and Barnett is, of course, well-known. A few years ago there was Governor Kirk of Florida, who tried to overrule the federal court order requiring desegregation of schools in one Florida county. He threatened to use force against the United States marshals and did not finally succumb until he had demonstrated to all students that if you didn't like a law and objected to a court order, you could defy them.

If we are to have a stable society, we have a right to insist on respect for law. Without law, there is no avoiding a disorganized society, almost certainly to be followed by a neofascist tyranny. But how can the advocates of law and order be taken seriously by intelligent young people and the residents of slums, to whom law and order must mean law as people with power want it and order as they define it? What a terrible example of respect for law it is when a court, attorneys, a president, an attorney general, and governors all defy the law.

**T**O THE POOR MAN laws means the police and the lower courts, not the legislators and not the highest courts of the state or federal governments. How are their rights and liberties protected by these instrumentalities of the law?

The poor in our society know the law mostly through their contact with the police. I believe it is just as much a mistake to assume that all policemen violate the law or are brutes (or that the lower courts are not interested in doing justice) as to say that all residents of the ghettos are rioters and looters, or condone rioting and looting, or that all students are revolutionaries and participate in or favor breaking windows, setting fires, and throwing bombs. But the police do have their political biases and tend to support the ultraconservative factions in politics. Thus, last year, when students were demonstrating in Wall Street against the Cambodian foray of President Nixon, and

construction workers (evidently well organized) began to attack the students, the police stood aside and refused to intervene. On the same day the "hard hats" went to City Hall and forced officials to raise the Flag, which was flying at half mast. Again the police did not intervene. But in a good policeman, as in a good judge, personal opinion must be restrained in the interest of professional performance. This is not very different from the position of a scientist who also has his prejudices but who must be aware of them and not permit them to color his scientific experimentation.

There have been a number of studies showing that the police treat white-collar people more leniently than blue-collar people. At the same time there is much evidence—recent articles in the *New York Times* on police corruption in New York City bear this out—that everybody in the slum areas of the big cities knows that the police know the people engaged in the numbers racket and those who push drugs, yet do not arrest them. Many are paid to protect these law breakers, some are afraid to arrest them, and some believe that even if they arrest them their "protection" is such that there will be no conviction or only small penalties. The policeman will be put on the spot, not the criminal; and this, of course, undermines respect for law.

Nothing better illustrates disrespect for legal process than the recent slayings and persecutions of dissident students, protesting black people, and Black Panthers by police and National Guardsmen.

All these incidents: the National Guard shooting of student demonstrators at Kent State University, resulting in the death of four and followed by the exoneration of the National Guard by an Ohio grand jury; the killing of two black students and the wounding of nine others by the Highway Patrol at Jackson State College, and the firing of live bullets into a girls' dormitory there; the indiscriminate shooting at Augusta, Georgia, where six black men were

killed by the police, all of them shot in the back, four of the six, at least, having been bystanders and not involved in any riot; and the charges trumped up against the Black Panthers by the Chicago police after the killing of a Black Panther leader by the police (which ended in a refusal by the grand jury to indict the Panthers and the discontinuance of prosecution by the prosecuting attorney) —all these are horror stories that not only are acts of disrespect for the law but incitements to further disrespect. And the cold, unsympathetic regrets voiced by the president and the attorney general, along with the comments by the governors of Ohio and Georgia supportive of such acts, turn many youths and black people against a law whose enforcement officers kill so indiscriminately.

Judge George W. Crockett, Jr., the presiding judge of the Detroit Records Court in 1969, two years after the Detroit race riots, relates in the law publication *Judicature* one of the incidents of that time. Two police officers had been shot. The police surrounded a church in the neighborhood of the shooting and arrested 142 occupants, including women and children. In violation of rulings of the Supreme Court and the Constitution, they refused to permit the arrestees to telephone or otherwise make contact with attorneys, relatives, or friends. After a hearing by the judge, 130 of the 142 persons arrested were released because of lack of evidence; "the prosecutor had moved for their release."

Judge Crockett tells of another event in connection with the riots in 1967. During the riots 7,200 persons were arrested, almost all of them people living at the poverty level and almost all black. They had little or no financial means with which to defend themselves. Some 3,230 of the arrestees were charged with looting, a felony that made them subject to a five-year sentence. Half of the cases were dismissed at the preliminary hearing for lack of evidence. Nevertheless for all of these alleged looters the prosecutors demanded a large bail and it was granted by

the judges, ranging from \$10,000–\$20,000 per person, "for men and women who had never had \$500 at one time in their lives." Let us assume that Detroit was in a state of shock, that there was real hysteria about. One may, however, question whether the prosecutor and the judges who set this bail were performing their duty in such a way as to create respect for the law, or were in fact succumbing to the popular hysteria.

In the lower civil courts, where again the poor have most of their contacts, as in the magistrates courts, the calendars in large cities are so vast that few people can feel that their cause has received adequate consideration. And surely this violates a main purpose of the law, which is to give people a sense that if they have a legal cause, they will get a fair hearing whether they win or not. Some years ago small claims courts were created so that the poor could appear and state their causes without the need to pay lawyers. But the small claims courts have been utilized as much by the loan sharks and the companies selling merchandise on credit to harass the poor as by the poor to get their own claims justly determined.

Another place, outside of the courts, where poor people see an example of disrespect for law is the frequent failure of landlords to obey rulings by the various city departments that inspect housing. The tenant must pay his rent no matter what fire hazards, plumbing defects, and general filth the landlord tolerates, often in violation of city ordinances.

One must wonder sometimes about the extent of the collusion between city inspectors and landlords. I remember when I was president of the Board of Education in New York City and found an extreme fire hazard in a metal shop next to an old school building. I reported it to the proper authorities. In spite of my position, the reaction was that we shouldn't require the offending neighbor to reduce the hazard. Instead they slapped violations on the school. I certainly could not object to correcting violations by the

Board of Education, but the danger to children from the neighboring shop was far greater, and it remained.

WHEN COURTS are held in contempt and law is not respected, the stability of society is threatened. We point to rebellious youth, Black Panthers, rioters, revolutionary extremists: these are dissatisfied people, and some of their dissatisfactions are understandable; but that does not make violence tolerable. People can only be a threat to themselves and our society if their behavior is in a context of general disrespect for the law. But if we wish to isolate and contain them,

the first thing to do is to make the courts more respectable and to have responsible people, from the president of the United States to trial attorneys and judges and the police, show less contempt of court and more willingness to abide by the law. And we must be concerned not only with change in the here and now but also with the means by which change is brought about.

We all try to forget the unpleasant. It is not when the law brushes over the unpleasant without perceiving any need for change but when law is prepared to face the unpleasant and to become a means of change that it is worthy of our respect.

## AMONG OUR CONTRIBUTORS

DAVID BROMWICH, an undergraduate at Yale University, contributed "Hollywood Discovers 'The Revolution'" to our November-December 1970 issue.

PRAN CHOPRA, our frequent correspondent in India, is a well-known journalist and former editor of the *Calcutta Statesman*.

NORMAN GALL is a veteran Latin-American correspondent whose articles have appeared in a number of American magazines. He and his wife have recently returned to Caracas from an 11-months' trip through Peru, Bolivia, and Chile, gathering material for a book on the Andean revolution.

MIECZYSLAW MANELI, former dean of Warsaw University's law faculty (dismissed in 1968 by the Prime Minister and charged with "antisocialist didactic activities"), teaches political science at Queens College since 1968. Among his works is a five-volume history of political juridical doctrines (Warsaw, 1962-68), and *War of the Vanquished*, written in the U.S. and based on his experiences with the International Control Commission in Vietnam (1954-55, 1963-64), to be published this year by Harper & Row.

JAMES MARSHALL, a member of the New York Bar, has been president of the New York City Board of Education and an adjunct professor of public administration at New York University. He is the author of *Intention in Law and Society* (1968) and *Swords and Symbols* (1969).

DAVID MARTIN is a reader in sociology at the University of London.

EDWARD PESSEN, a professor of history at Baruch College and the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, is the author of *Most Uncommon Jacksonians* (1967) and *Jacksonian America: Society, Personality, Politics* (1969). He is completing a book on mobility, class, wealth, and power in antebellum America.

JESSE PITTS, a professor of sociology at Oakland University, Michigan, is a coeditor of *Theories of Society* (1965) and coauthor of *In Search of France* (1963). He has two books in progress, one on the aborted May 1968 revolution in France and another on the contramercitocracy.

LEO P. RIBUFFO, an acting instructor in American Studies at Yale, is completing a study of the far Right in the 1930s and 1940s.

RICHARD ROBBINS, a frequent contributor, teaches urban sociology at the University of Massachusetts, Boston. In 1971-72 he will be a visiting professor of sociology at the University of Leicester, England.

MYRA WOLFGANG is an international vice-president of the Hotel and Restaurant Employees Union and the secretary-treasurer of Local 705 of that union. She heads the Coalition for Women's Advancement.

Edward Pessen

## Is History Irrelevant?

THE STUDY OF HISTORY is under attack today on many fronts, both from within and without the historical profession. Where free choice replaces a required curriculum, students increasingly desert the study of Western civilization for the sociology and psychology courses that promise insight into pressing current problems of society and the individual. Some students charge that historians either focus on the wrong subject matter or offer the wrong—or proestablishment—interpretations when they stumble on the right questions. Activists scorn scholars who seem indifferent to the consequences of their studies. Only recently a brilliant young historian gave public notice that he plans to quit the field, convinced that every feature of the past is unique and therefore without value to an understanding of the present or future. In effect he damns history as a mere intellectual exercise because history as actuality does not repeat itself. History is irrelevant.

No one who values historical research can be indifferent to these attacks. Even if the critics were all wrong, their influence, articulateness, and seriousness can't be ignored. And it is always possible that the critics may be right, at least in part. In either case, a serious historian has no alternative but to respond.

Most strange is the source of modern criticism of history. Not long ago Henry Ford was proclaiming that "history is bunk," no doubt reflecting a widespread contempt felt by men of affairs for a discipline that butters no bread. Secret police in the 20th century, as in the 19th, have kept close tabs on what historians were writing or teaching. Certainly the despotisms which take great pains to rewrite history, whether of the nation in general or the ruling party in particular, act as though history is altogether relevant—even too much so. That parochial businessmen and dictatorial rulers are

hostile to history does not of course automatically negate the accusations of its high-minded critics. Thus, if at the end of the film "Z" a voice reads off a list of some of the things banned in Greece today by the military dictatorship, it does not follow that all of the proscribed items are inspiring. Some testify to nothing more than the perverse taste of the generals in charge of that unhappy country. Mini-skirts, even when forced underground, possess only a limited significance in their own right—for all the undeniably liberating implications of the bared female knee and thigh. If critical historical scholarship is outlawed in dictatorships, however, it is not because it offends the puritanical or perverted morals of the despots but because it threatens their political power. These fears, even if exaggerated, should give pause to history's idealistic critics in this country. An enterprise that evokes such reactions from the evil cannot be totally without redeeming social value.

There is no denying that much American historical writing is bland or yea-saying. Some highly touted works are unconvincing, precious, unserious, representative above all of their authors' wish to assume a modish stance, to be revisionist for the sake of being revisionist, or to enhance their careers by catching the eye and winning the approval of the right academic people. Some of us historians simply cannot tell a story interestingly, a deficiency that is hardly compensated for by the adoption of sociological patter or by the inclusion in our writings of recondite statistical tables. Others among us sadly may not be very bright. (Physics and philosophy *are* harder subjects than history.) Yet, with all of our shortcomings, our histories would be anathema to despots come to power. Since our histories were written by free men they would be certain to infuriate

totalitarian censors. For if our interpretations may be foolish, they *are* varied. What is more frightening to those who claim to know The Truth than the existence in print of opposing concepts of it?

HISTORY'S CRITICS, both yesterday's conservative businessmen and today's activists, make the similar charge that history is useless in solving real problems, whether these have to do with increasing productivity or promoting social justice. The older accusation, for all its narrowness, comes off better than the more recent attack. True; an understanding of Caesar's campaigns in no way improves the quality of a Ford Maverick. If the truly "better idea" enhanced the production and sale of cars, Henry Ford's denunciation of history would have a certain merit. His comment had as its unspoken assumption the belief that men live in order to produce and consume. His loveless utilitarianism showed no recognition that men have other purposes than to serve the assembly line. But given his presuppositions, contempt for history was logical.

The same cannot be said for most of history's modern critics. For know it or not, radicals above all need history. Not only is every vision of social justice based on a unique reading or interpretation of history. History is the indispensable ally of every iconoclast, every dissenter, every rebel who would challenge the status quo. Social critics seek to induce their contemporaries to feel scorn for present arrangements. Part of their argument must deal with the *origins* of social evil—be it of the Vietnam war, racism, or the maldistribution or poisoning of our resources. And by any other name the discussion of origins is *history*.

That court historians in any country at any time rationalize the irrational or justify the unjustifiable is a condemnation not of history but of sycophants who distort it. The work of the honest historian cannot fail to give comfort to the critical. The scholar's research invariably discloses if not the sordidness of the powerful, then the vast gulf that separates theory from practice. In those rare instances in which a community's deeds *have* conformed to its thoughts, both have typically been low rather than high—men, as *The Threepenny Opera* reminds us, being what they are. Most nations,

our own included, have lied about the reasons why they make war. They have proven capable of administering institutions as repulsive as slavery and religious ghettos. The historian need not be emotional or a "bleeding heart" to indict such practices. He need only describe their operation—that is, their rationales as against their detailed effects and consequences.

It is, of course, true that history is not a science. Santayana's memorable observation that those who do not learn from the mistakes of the past are doomed to repeat them is unfortunately not true. Repetition is impossible in history, given the uniqueness of its human actors and their circumstances. A further assurance against scientific certainty is the inevitable subjectivity of historians. We are all too human. But while the humanness of historians precludes perfection, it by no means detracts from the possibility that they can make discerning, useful or even true observations about the past. Who can improve on Socrates' swift, marvelous analysis in the *Phaedo*, when he says: "Whence come wars but from the stomach and the needs of the stomach?"

The maxim that we cannot learn from history is offensive above all to those who would change society for the better or who would end an unjust war. Those of us who admire Socrates' insight do *not* delude ourselves when we think that we have learned from history. Our problem is not that we are incapable of learning from history. Rather, it is to overcome the awesome difficulties that attend any attempt to implement history's lessons. That human institutions are terribly complex, or that powerful men do not lightly relinquish their power, or that men are creatures variously motivated—often by irrational considerations, against their own interest—all these are not the fault of history. If anything it is history that has taught us these unpleasant but important truths.

Well-meaning but impatient perfectionists, frustrated by the brutalities of present circumstances, will understandably focus their energies on activities likely to produce results, and in this world, not the next. But only an understanding of history will infuse their goals with that indispensable element—attainability. And only the invocation of history offers the hope of transforming significant numbers of their passive neighbors into allies.

Myra Wolfgang

## What Price Women's "Equality"?

PATRICIA SEXTON'S CLAIM in the February 1971 DISSENT article "Women Debate the Equal Rights Amendment" that "the vulnerable woman down at the bottom of the job ladder" will in the long run be pulled up by the Equal Rights Amendment is outrageously optimistic. Unfortunately, the only way to go is not up. Far more likely, a good many women would be forced off the job ladder altogether, preferring the purgatory of existence on ADC to the hell of backbreaking, home-wrecking compulsory overtime—overtime they could be required to work if state protective legislation is abolished. The pie in the sky so generously proffered by the advocates of the Equal Rights Amendment must seem like a cruel joke to women who have no hope of reaching it. Just try telling a woman obliged to work a 60- or even a 70-hour week, as well as meet her family responsibilities, that the Equal Rights Amendment should boost her "morale, aspiration, and fighting spirit."

The middle-class supporters of the Amendment make the mistake of thinking that sweatshops belong to the past. This is not the case. Profit is still the name of the game—just as it was in the heyday of *laissez-faire*. It is legislation and not any notable improvement in employer morality that gives us better working conditions today than we had a century ago.

Witness what happened when Michigan's 54-hour-a-week law for women was temporarily suspended in the late fall and winter of 1967–68: one automobile manufacturer immediately initiated excessive overtime for women—a 69-hour week—which resulted in some women literally dropping from exhaustion and having to be carried out on stretchers. A meat-packing company began requiring its women employees

to work a 70-hour week in a refrigerated room where temperatures ranged from 32 to 40 degrees.

This took place not at the turn of the century, but in 1968 and should give us a glimpse of the havoc that would be created if existing state protective legislation was swept off the books.

Labor standards legislation also protects working women in other ways. Mrs. Sexton refers to the guarantee of "some amenities." But since when are rest periods and separate washrooms mere niceties? Is it just a nicety not to require a woman to ruin her health lifting heavy objects, or to be granted a maternity leave? Of course not. These protections are absolute necessities if women are to survive—let alone thrive—in our labor force. The Equal Rights Amendment would make possible their abolition.

Mrs. Sexton's rose-colored spectacles are not admitting the light of common sense when she suggests that the Equal Rights Amendment will dislodge the male hierarchy of academia. It is doubtful that a woman was ever denied a full professorship because of state protective legislation, while a good many have probably been denied one on the centuries-old, if unspoken, assumption that "women just can't think like men." To be sure, this is nonsense—but it is equally nonsensical to claim the Amendment would change it or the discrimination. Such discrimination, we all know, is deplorably pervasive. It exists not only in our universities, but in virtually every field of endeavor. It is firmly rooted in attitude; and attitudes—predispositions to act or react in certain ways—are intangible, insidious, and extremely hard to change.

"Banker's hours" has become a cliché, and

certainly the work in banks demands no outstanding physical prowess. Yet banks have been notorious for sex discrimination. Obviously, the reasons for this discrimination will not be discovered simply by pouring over law books, nor will the situation be eliminated by destroying existing state protective legislation.

The Equal Rights Amendment creates no positive law in itself to combat discrimination in private employment. Most sex discrimination is a matter of private practice, not of public law, and will not be effected by the Amendment.

The Equal Rights Amendment doesn't require the promotion of women to better or "decision-making" jobs. It's not going to make the maid a manager, or the instructor a professor—either overnight or "in the long run."

The middle-class women who push for the passage of the Equal Rights Amendment will, at best, be "liberating" only themselves—at the price of adding to the exploitation of the 64 percent of the female working force who hold low-paying or menial jobs and who desperately need what protection they now have.

JUST WHAT, THEN, IS INVOLVED in the concept and practices of true "Equal Rights"? Certainly, the chief conflict between those who support the Equal Rights Amendment and those who oppose it is not whether women should be discriminated against, but what constitutes discrimination. As some feminists seem to have it, any difference is a discrimination. If this be the case, women are damned from birth. No Equal Rights Amendment will alter one whit the basic biological differences between men and women. Nor, unless we are foolish enough to imagine we can restructure in one broad sweep our entire society, will it alter the traditional role of woman, not only as the bearer of children, but also as the one primarily responsible for their care, their growth, and development. This being the case, "sameness" of treatment will never result in true equality.

We who want equal opportunity and equal pay for equal work and equal status for women know that frequently we obtain real equality through a difference of treatment, rather than an identity of treatment—or, as it often turns out, an identity of mistreatment.

Laws limiting hours for women were enacted originally to provide them with a shield against obligatory overtime so that they could carry

on their life at home as wives and mothers, fulfilling a double role in society. While all overtime should be optional for both men and women, it is absolutely mandatory that overtime for women be regulated because of this double role. Furthermore, according to New York University's Dr. Erwin Tichauer, America's foremost biomechanical engineer, and according to the British Industry Studies, men are better able to work overtime than women. Women's proneness to accident increases and their efficiency drops very substantially after long hours of work, when compared to men doing the same job.

Mrs. Sexton has also failed to consider the impact of the Equal Rights Amendment in the field of domestic relations, marital duties, and parental responsibilities. It must be borne in mind that the majority of American women who are mothers of young children elect to remain at home and out of the work force. Their right to that choice must be respected. Every state now makes a husband liable for the support of his wife and children.

*McCall's Magazine* recently compiled and published a list of state laws which they contended discriminated against women. The majority of the laws dealt with family support. Does Mrs. Sexton, too, suggest that a family-support law is a curtailment of women's rights?

Equally little concern has been shown by the proponents of the Equal Rights Amendment about other of its implications. What will the effect be upon thousands of California women if their state minimum wage law is repealed? (It applies only to women.)

It will also be disastrous for the farm worker, since the state minimum wage exceeds the federal minimum wage. Small wonder that the farm lobby, the Manufacturers' Association, the Republican Women's clubs, and the Business and Professional Women support the Equal Rights Amendment.

To achieve "equality" in our social security laws, will women have to wait until 65 to retire, and will men be permitted to retire at 62? Which will it be?

In many states, there are different laws governing ages to contract marriage, 18 for females, 20 for males. From one point of view, only young women are given the benefit or privilege of contracting between 18 and 20,

(continued on page 320)

David Bromwich

## Trash, Art, and Critics

"WHEN HE SPEAKS against kitsch he seems to be speaking from the point of view of art," wrote Harold Rosenberg, describing the stance of a certain well-practiced critic of mass culture; but "when he speaks about art it is plain his ideas are kitsch." The moralist declaiming against trash can be useful, up to a point, but it is his besetting fault to attract an audience that will not disagree with him—he flogs dead horses in the public trust. On the one hand, somebody must do the dirty work: if Arthur Miller is bad, then he must be weaned away from the *hubris* born of too many honorary degrees in Literature. There is nothing sadder to contemplate than kitsch that tries too hard, looking to become art, and we should be mildly grateful to those indefatigable souls who have made of this sadness a permanent occupation. Yet the man who dwells on this type of criticism is suspect. If he doesn't like Miller, why not write about Ibsen? Does he care about Art (always capitalized), except as a wonderful dusky region from which to condescend? And hasn't art itself been trivialized by its merely symbolic use to ward off intruding spirits?

Criticism in this vein was bound to seem a little airless, and before long it had exhausted its value as an instrument of cultural hegemony—i.e., a stick to beat the philistines with—giving way to a more cheerful acceptance of homogenized culture, well represented, I think, by Leslie Fiedler's ideological defense of comic books and by Susan Sontag's brilliant (but oddly deadpan) study of camp. The moralistic line on mass culture was a bore since, as Rosenberg noted, the "taste" thereby established had to be negatively inferred, while the Art holding on at the opposite end of the balance could

turn out to be a portentous sham. Now one interesting point about the newer, ostensibly more tolerant view is the special logic by which it must refuse to break down standards if it once recognizes their existence. When Miss Sontag, for example, notifies us that "the singing style of Dionne Warwick can be appreciated . . . without condescension," her self-conscious *choice* not to be condescending is what gives the game away. A truly one-cultural sensibility would have no way of comprehending the sympathetic gesture as such: only a very intellectual sort of person could be excited by this particular bag of tricks—indeed, only a decadent academic. And so, not surprisingly, a course has been instituted at Yale centering around this same knowing indulgence in cultural transgression. You read *Sherlock Holmes* alongside of *The Trial*, shiver at the cleverness of it all, and presumably learn something about the generic nature of mystery stories.

In the end we lose interest in this contorted exercise of wit, and we realize that it is just as well to leave kitsch alone, allowing some of it to be fun (like *Sherlock Holmes*) and some of it worthless (like *Love Story*, also required for the Yale course). Such, at any rate, is the commonsense solution, ignoring kitsch in the hope that it will go away. This view has the advantage of being infinitely less pretentious than its competitors, for the first position says, Art is precious, kitsch is awful, and I am going to tell you all about kitsch; the second says, I was nurtured by art and know just how to appreciate it, but I think trash also has a certain appeal and isn't that very daring? The last view says, I have become acquainted with trash while spending most of my time with better things—that is the way I intend to keep it,

thank you, and I think the separation will take care of itself.

HAVE THE MOVIES ALTERED our perception of these problems? Looking through Pauline Kael's recent collection of reviews,\* and in particular her essay "Trash, Art, and the Movies," one finds the beginning of an answer. Right off, Miss Kael signals that she won't be put on the defensive by lousy pictures, since "there are worse things aesthetically than the crude good-natured crumminess, the undisguised reach for a fast buck, of movies without art," recalling that wonderful little poem by Frank O'Hara with its Liberty Bell ringing out "Mothers of America let your kids go to the movies!" Miss Kael always writes in this spirit, and when she comes through with a kind of epic catalogue of her favorite bits from old pictures, it naturally includes "the inflection Gene Kelly gave to the line, 'I'm a rising young man' in *DuBarry was a Lady*, Tony Curtis saying 'avidly' in *Sweet Smell of Success*." Rejecting the sorry inhibitions of the *nouveau riche* highbrow, Miss Kael can pull sapphires out of the mud and find things to like even in the most rudely exploitative pieces of commercial muck; very sensibly, she holds out her sympathy for the kids who violate their parents' advice by seeing *Wild in the Streets* instead of *Closely Watched Trains*:

It connects with their lives in an immediate if grossly frivolous way, and if we don't go to the movies for excitement, if, even as children, we accept the cultural standards of refined adults, if we have so little drive that we accept "good taste," then we will probably never really begin to care about movies at all.

And her conclusion is simple enough—"Trash has given us an appetite for art."

This happy ending, so oddly utilitarian in its need to justify the ways of trash to art, in fact does violence to the spirit of Miss Kael's argument. Indeed, the whole tendency of her criticism has been to show that movies affect us for reasons having nothing to do with art, so that the teleological up-to-art exit must look a bit willed. Films are an immediate experience, as Miss Kael made clear in those earlier essays now collected under the heading "Broad-sides" in *I Lost It at the Movies*. And leaving aside the films of the great directors—only an

\* *Going Steady*, Atlantic Monthly Press, 1970.

imbecile could go on debating whether or not the cinema is art after seeing the best work of Renoir, Lang, Bergman, or for that matter Godard and Truffaut—movies have their special function of informing the *Zeitgeist*, in ways that operate quite independently of what is called intrinsic worth.

In times gone by, before she was domiciled as weekly critic for the *New Yorker*, Miss Kael would take in several movies at once to point out why the objects under discussion were (a) meretricious, and (b) important, where (a) faded neatly into the background. Of all the phenomena surrounding motion pictures, this one has to be the most interesting to observe, and of course there isn't anyone who can't think of movies like this: movies that are striking before they are good or bad, in the manner of *Rebel Without a Cause*, *On the Waterfront*, *The Wild One*. Those with the slighter intellectual pretension (Nicholas Ray, as compared with Kazan-Schulberg) often have the more direct impact; then, too, an actor may come to dominate his material so far as to bend it in the direction just opposite from what was intended. Who remembers that *The Wild One*, produced by Stanley Kramer, was a moral tale about Responsibility asking us to *stop this from ever happening*? And who does not remember the small-town girl dreamily telling Marlon Brando, "I've never ridden on a motorcycle before"? Here the bright moments have to be separated out, leaving the husk of "message" to rot.

As a diagnostician of such trends Miss Kael was at one time preeminent, but with the obligation of filling out an (excellent) column each week she has seemed to lapse inattentive. For one thing, her trash-art formulation has nothing to say about this entire middle range of films; and in speaking of one of its recent instances, Kubrick's *2001* she misses all the fun:

It says man is just a tiny nothing on the stairway to paradise, something better is coming, and it's all out of your hands anyway. There's an intelligence out there in space controlling your destiny from ape to angel, so just follow the slab. Drop up.

It's a bad, bad sign when a movie director begins to think of himself as a myth-maker, and this lurid myth of a grand plan that justifies slaughter and ends with resurrection has been around before.

*2001* may be a disappointing film, depending on what you expected; certainly the banal transformation sequence must suffer by comparison with Cocteau's journey to Hell in *Orpheus*. But the myth is more complicated than Miss Kael makes out, and the one thing most people seem to enjoy in this picture is the spectacle of machines becoming more human than their masters; Hal, the super-computer, with its voyeuristic whim leading on to petty jealousy and murder, finally losing its mind to sing "Daisy, Daisy" like some cosmic Ophelia doing her mad scene; or the way a group of scientists approaching the monolith were made to look just like the apes who began the story.

We go to the movies hoping not to see trash, not to like anything about a gigantically conceived failure like *2001*—but then, the movies have made nonsense of our categories. A director like Godard takes half of his inspiration from Brecht and the other half (following the Brecht of *Jungle of Cities*) from American comic books, crime thrillers, science fiction, not to mention Sartre; and while there are also "pure" artists to be considered, yet no one is going to wish Robert Bresson had made twenty films instead of nine. We should try to be honest about our reasons for going to the movies, and those reasons are not in the least pure: that is what I take Miss Kael to be arguing at her sanest. Such an attitude is not uncritical—it is, simply enough, an attitude that starts from the immediate response.

So that the first mistake of an intelligent movie audience comes out of taking a film more seriously than the occasion wants. And when I came across Diana Trilling's weighty piece on *Easy Rider*—a commercial success wrung out of a slightly doped-up hippie travelogue—I wondered what all the fuss could be about. Mrs. Trilling had spent much of her space recounting the plot of *Easy Rider*, discovering in it the anti-intellectual sentiment mixed in with anti-Americanism and nostalgia for the old America (the two are by no means incompatible) which is so characteristic of the hippie subculture and, even more, of the rich hippies who made this particular film. "Here, then," she roundly submitted, "are some of the lessons taught in this popular film, and an enticing brew of the fashionable, the false, and the pernicious they are." False the movie cer-

tainly is, from beginning to end: the farmer who is seen fixing his horse while Hopper and Fonda fix their motorcycles (Yes, We Too Are America) might as well have been the farmer down South who kills off the heroes—only the second one happens to be physically ugly. This kind of redundantly stupid narcissism may not be exciting to watch—I confess I don't ever want to see *Easy Rider* again—but does it really have the force of wicked propaganda? The reviewer who spoke of "juicy photography" as the mainly attractive feature of *Easy Rider* was nearer to the truth, in her vulgar phrasing no less than in the observation itself. The "picturesque" quality makes it a film of sharply limited interest; Peter Fonda's good looks have the James Dean audience shouting "Come off it"—hardly the thing to set alight the fires of terrorism.

NEVERTHELESS, *Easy Rider* did convey something of the rootlessness of American life, its shortcoming being the device of blurred allegory, tacked on, in this case, by people too insensitive to create living characters.

*Five Easy Pieces* is another film made somewhat along these lines, but with a deeper interest: it has much of that strength which was once the special province of the novel, indeed it is alone among recent American films in showing decent unspectacular lives (which means also: not conspicuously drab ones) as they must be experienced at the present time. There is, too, an unusual directness in the exterior realism, giving you the American landscape with its bright new gas stations, parking lots, cafeterias, motels, barren highways, decaying oil works—all strange and a little ugly and real, without editorial nudging. Starting from what might have become a reprise of *Easy Rider*, the makers of *Five Easy Pieces* (including Laszlo Kovacs, cinematographer for both films) no doubt understood that they were on to something different and more truly resonant. And even allowing for the extraordinary rapport generated by Jack Nicholson, which makes it hard to take anything else in focus, the film still deserves to stand on its own.

The five easy pieces—the reference is to music—bring together two environments in which Bobby Dupea chooses to exist, and it was shrewd as well as honest to make him an

artist on the slum rather than a "romantic" lower-class drifter. Bobby is a drifter self-made, having renounced the concert hall for the society of bowling alleys, first off, because Culture had all begun to look like his uncoordinated and priggish brother. At some point his ambivalence changes mind, and he drives back home to see his dying father, trying to get rid of his other-life girlfriend (a waitress with a highly developed attachment to country music). When his girlfriend sings for him he can say, "I love it." Returning home, he can do an easy Chopin for his brother's mistress (throughout the film we are aware of what separates terms like "girlfriend" and "mistress"), and wave off the obligatory compliment with "I faked a little Chopin—you faked a big response." He has it both ways, but of course it won't ever seem right: inevitably, he walks out of the film, hitching a ride up North where "it's gonna be cold."

Superficially, *Five Easy Pieces* bears a certain resemblance to the novel *Rabbit, Run*, which could have been a good movie but has just now been made into a bad one. Norman Mailer found fault with the Updike story because there, too, "his character bolts over a literal hill and runs away"; and the earlier hero was also caught between two lives, both rather more constricting than the alternatives given Bobby Dupea. But these similarities are less interesting than the differences. Updike made his character an ex-basketball player, riding the ennu of lower-middle-class Protestant America in the fifties, yet he gave him too many good lines for the part, tried out too many of his own private worries. For example: "If you're telling me I'm not mature, that's one thing I don't cry over since as far as I can make out it's the same thing as being dead." That line doesn't belong to a moron, but we have no idea where it came from—not, surely, from the man who reached his peak as a high school basketball star. The good things about *Rabbit*—like his theological arguments—had either to be cut or justified; logically enough, the movie of *Rabbit, Run* cuts them to portray Rabbit, method-style, as a poor big boy with an I.Q. of 90. Running off at the end of the movie, he looks dumb, not mysterious, and with an incredible burst of imaginative poverty the director thought to blare out his plastic theme song while solemnly printing the last line of the novel on screen.

*Five Easy Pieces* was not left open to that kind of vulgarity: its hero comes from a family of gifted musicians, and his anxiety makes sense. Having said all this, it has to be added that the movie is unsubtle in at least one aspect, for it very predictably comes at other tensions by way of sex and its attitude toward sex is—immature. Bobby can be tender, now and then, but the violent side of him is apparently what attracts women. That this is at odds with his sensitivity did not bother the director, Bob Rafelson, or perhaps it didn't occur to him. In one of his two serious lapses, Rafelson has Bobby wrestle an anonymous panting girl down to bed, perform an unspecified act (intercourse?) that makes her pant some more, after which he stands up grinning stupidly. It is worth noting the dead silence that prevails over audiences during this scene, since nobody really knows what is going on: is the girl on drugs, or what? Whatever was intended (and I suspect we are viewing the remnant of a discarded longer scene), this segment, lasting a minute or so, seems utterly gratuitous, and better editing would have done away with it altogether.

The second lapse happens when Bobby tells polite society to go to hell. We know this sort of thing well enough from all the recent movies about campus life, and so we can watch with a certain detachment as the confrontation builds. Moments of crisis have been met throughout the film by a bluntness not exactly in character, which is derived from those earlier movie actors on whom Bobby was patterned. When Bobby starts quarreling with Catherine, his brother's mistress (excellently played by Susan Anspach), it comes out this way:

- I don't find your language very charming.
- It's not charming, it's direct.

And when a pretentious and—of course—frigid academic woman addresses the gathered company in the Dupea living room on the subject of innate human aggression, Catherine is the first to leave, calling the theory loveless, while Bobby, whose anger we have seen growing inside him, finally yells out "You're full of shit, you're totally full of shit!" Here, I think, Rafelson and his screenwriter Adrien Joyce were seduced by the obverse side of a familiar dishonesty: where in other films the hero is a primitive with a strangely refined consciousness,

*Five Easy Pieces* allows him his refinement and education only to present his antisocial impulse in primitive terms, misleading the cheering audience. So that the movie, too, must have it both ways.

Is a film like *Five Easy Pieces* trash? Art? "Midcult"? Taking it frame by frame, I don't think Rafelson has much to offer the Museum of Modern Art publications in which stills from Antonioni and Fritz Lang look so good; the set pieces delivered up by Laszlo Kovacs often verge on the arty. Yet this is a better film than *Rebel Without a Cause*, the screenplay is strong enough where it had to be strong, avoiding mushiness by playing its heavy speeches off against the unserious reactions of other characters. There is one exception, and Nicholson's monologue near the end of the film—"I move around a lot. . . ."—where he tries to explain himself to a paralytic father who reminds us of Hemingway, will last for as long as we remember Brando's famous speech in *On the Waterfront*: "Oh Charlie, Charlie. . . . You don't understand. . . . I could have been somebody, I could have been a contender—instead of a bum, which is what I am." It connects with our lives in a way that is neither gross nor frivolous.

Bob Rafelson may not be through as a director of interesting films, but past experience should teach us to expect otherwise. The forces that brought this film to the surface work by chance, and although Rafelson shows a good deal of skill at finding out what works, like his full-circle pan of the family portraits while Bobby plays Chopin, yet he too often settles for what merely "works," like the funny hitchhiker Bobby picks up on his way home. It is the first kind of success that makes a real director, the second that makes a usable and amusing hack. In *Five Easy Pieces* Rafelson found the right screenplay, a splendid group of actors, and a new star: once around, the hitchhikers are

good. At any rate, the chances for Jack Nicholson are slightly better, if only he can distinguish the essential from the "relevant." During the fifties there were hundreds of wayward-adolescent pictures floating around Hollywood, and one of them, embodied in the person of James Dean, survives. Right now, *Five Easy Pieces* is being swamped by God knows how many Statements of Our National Mood, and you may be sure plenty of them are worse than *Rabbit, Run*.

Good movies are sometimes popular and popular movies make money: apparently there are people to whom this is offensive. Expounding his views on Culture for *Newsweek*, Mr. Joseph Morgenstern recently made a comparison of *Five Easy Pieces*, which is doing well in this country, and Truffaut's *The Wild Child*, which is doing badly. *The Wild Child*, he said, was arguing faith in culture and so couldn't help being a minority movie, while *Five Easy Pieces* went along with all our slick preconceptions; thus, Mr. Morgenstern found in himself a defender of the faith against the philistinism of the moment. Unfortunately he was wrong about both films. The remark about Chopin which he quotes as typical of the outlook encouraged by *Five Easy Pieces* was important mostly for what it said about Bobby; and the ambiguous last moment of *The Wild Child* comprehends not only the monuments but the chains of bourgeois civilization. Besides, François Truffaut, who has written admiringly of Hitchcock, would be the last one to applaud his movie being used in this stuffy manner.

Those who worship at the shrine of capital Culture, or Art, have a way of being insensitive to the specific products on which their religion ultimately rests. They should find another religion, since their love for art is after all secondary. And one thing is plain: they are never going to enjoy movies.

Leo P. Ribuffo

## "Pluralism" and American History

THE POLITICS OF UNREASON, by Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab.  
New York: Harper & Row. 547 pages. \$12.50.

FEW SCHOLARS HAVE INFLUENCED our thinking about "extremism" as much as Seymour Martin Lipset, professor of social relations at Harvard. The first writer to apply the concept of a "radical Right" to American social movements (in 1951), he later proposed a theory of "working-class authoritarianism." He has consistently attempted to study the far Right as part of a comprehensive analysis of American politics, arguing that the Right shares with the far Left an intolerance of the amicable group conflict that characterizes pluralist democracy. In an effort to document his theoretical premises, Lipset has joined with Earl Raab, a member of the San Francisco Human Rights Commission, to compile a massive volume about "right-wing extremism."

The authors interpret "extremism" in terms of pluralist social theory. American society, they tell us, is composed of varied interest groups, which usually get on pretty well by compromising their interests in "pragmatic" fashion. Each group grants the other's right to exist, and guarantees its access to the "open marketplace of ideas." "Extremist" movements, however, are basically "inimical to a pluralism of interests and groups, inimical to a system of many nonsubmissive centers of power and areas of privacy." Believing that political debates are doctrinal struggles "between good and evil for man's soul," ideologues at both extremes deny the "legitimized ambiguity" that is "the genius of American society." They shun compromise and try to shut down the marketplace of ideas. This kind of behavior is the "antipluralist nub" of "extremism" (or "monism," a term the authors favor as a synonym).

Lipset and Raab maintain that the "monists," Left and Right, sometimes share ideological premises, including "isolationism" and "opposition to Wall Street Banking"; and that they frequently adopt the same tactics, "such as a working impatience with dissent." More important, all "extremists" seem to accept a way of looking at the world similar to what Richard Hofstadter called the "paranoid style." By "logical extension" their moralistic approach to social issues leads them to accept "extensive theories of evil conspiracy."

The authors argue that a feeling of "status anxiety"—the sense that one's power, influence, and importance are being eroded by "secular endemic change"—is the chief motivation for "extremism" on the Right. Those "preservativists" who feel especially challenged by newly influential groups or are particularly disturbed by modified social mores turn to "backlash politics" as a way to "reverse or stem the direction of change." The opening 250 pages of *The Politics of Unreason* contain a survey of American politics from the 1790s to the 1950s which purports to demonstrate that right-wing "monism," propelled by "status anxiety," has long been a significant force in the United States.

I have deliberately chosen the word "survey" because this treatment can be called "history" only in the very loose sense that it deals with the past. On the whole it betrays that ahistorical (or antihistorical) temperament which Lipset has condemned among young radicals. Originally intending to study the far Right since World War II, the authors expanded their work after discovering an "ideological link" between contemporary movements and earlier "extrem-

isms." Perhaps this is why the first half of the book reads like an afterthought. It is a poorly researched and tortured attempt to force the square peg of "monism" into the round hole of American history.

LIPSET AND RAAB START WITH THE FEDERALISTS, telling us that they represented "the camp of displacement and preservatism" at the turn of the 18th century. Threatened by "distasteful social change and political impotence," they responded "with the basic model of monistic logic which was also to be repeated in similar instances throughout American history." The Federalists blamed their troubles on a foul international conspiracy—personified by the Bavarian Illuminati—and they passed the Alien and Sedition Acts to intimidate the opposition.

This interpretation seems plausible only if we ignore the historical context. Unfortunately for the Lipset-Raab thesis, the Jeffersonian Republicans were at least as fond of conspiracy theories as their Federalist rivals. Jefferson himself thought that his adversaries were plotting to establish a monarchy, and as late as 1820 he voiced suspicions that the Missouri Compromise was a symptom of royalist machinations. Moreover, if "monism" is defined as a "politically repressive" program, then the Republicans also possessed a well-developed monistic streak. Stripping Jefferson of his "libertarian halo," Professor Leonard Levy has shown that even our third president tried to pack federal grand juries (particularly during the trial of Aaron Burr), acquiesced in a military dictatorship over New Orleans, used troops without constitutional sanction to enforce the Embargo Act, and urged political tests for faculty at the University of Virginia.

Lipset and Raab might respond to this criticism by saying that the Jeffersonians were merely reacting to their own anxieties caused by *increasing* status. But to say that everybody in a society suffers from "status anxiety," and that everybody therefore yields to "extremist" behavior doesn't explain very much. The problem is that Lipset and Raab want to force 18th-century situations into 20th-century categories. What they consider abnormal was standard during the 1790s. Indeed, Bernard Bailyn has shown that the ideological basis of the American Revolution was a belief, inherited from the English republican tradition, that there existed

"a comprehensive conspiracy against liberty in the English-speaking world." Although this great fear had been dismissed by historians until Bailyn reexamined the revolutionary pamphlets, it was taken seriously both by the colonists and by their British friends—including William Pitt and Edmund Burke. When the Federalists and Jeffersonians interpreted the world in conspiratorial terms, they were merely using the idiom that had dominated political discourse for 60 years.

Carrying their ahistorical review of the American past into the Jacksonian period, Lipset and Raab further weaken their case by passing over scholarship that disputes their preconceptions. This time, the forces of "monism" gathered in the Antimasonic party, "a sociological precursor of movements like the Ku Klux Klan and McCarthyism." The Antimasons sometimes formed alliances with the displaced elite in the Whig party, an organization that fostered "a program of cultural preservatism." Both groups suffered from "status anxiety" because "the Jacksonians and the common man" were about to take over the government, "with the skeptic and the new urban workingman in the wings." Perhaps to remind us of the persistent threat of left-wing "extremism," the authors include a section on abolitionism, describing it as a manifestation of "Protestant moral emphasis acting on a socially displaced elite from New England." The opponents of slavery found "an outlet in moral political action against the 'immorality' of a society which rejected them."

Again, this is a simplistic analysis of a complex situation. It is true that the Antimasons tended to be egalitarian and religious, but there is little reason to suppose that the Democratic party swarmed with freethinkers—especially in those states where it eventually captured the Antimason vote. It is at best confusing to say that the Whigs were "essentially more conservative" than the Democrats. In one of the standard books ignored by Lipset and Raab, Marvin Meyers has illustrated the Jacksonian desire to defend a "chaste republican order." On the other hand, if the Whigs were "preservatists," it doesn't seem to have affected their policy decisions. Not only were they more firmly committed than the Democrats to industrial growth and internal improvements, but some of their leaders were early advocates of American expansionism. And Andrew Jackson was

no paragon of pluralism. He was fully prepared to "kill" the Bank of the United States before it killed him, even if he had to bury economic stability with the "Monster." Finally, if the authors had consulted Aileen Kraditor's *Means and Ends in American Abolitionism* or Martin Duberman's *The Antislavery Vanguard*, they still might not agree that William Lloyd Garrison and his allies had to choose (as Kraditor puts it) between "agitation and silence"; but they would have learned that abolitionists were not necessarily radical, evangelical, or anti-institutional.

PRECURSORS AND FORERUNNERS abound as the authors write their way through the Know-Nothings, the American Protective Association, the first Ku Klux Klan, and the Populists. After noting that "the monistic impulse quickened" in the late 19th century, and suggesting that World War I "legitimated" attacks on "un-American" activities, Lipset and Raab move on to lengthy discussions of the 1920s and 1930s. These are probably the two weakest chapters in the book, particularly disappointing because the authors fail to use the extensive primary sources that survive from the period.

The chapter on the "bigoted twenties" contains the fullest account of what the authors call "virulent fundamentalism." Now the term "fundamentalism" is derived from a series of booklets—*The Fundamentals*—published between 1909 and 1912 by an interdenominational group of Protestants; and the word can be used with care to classify certain theological conservatives. But the authors don't bother to be careful. "Fundamentalism" wanders through 500 pages, from Antimasonry to Billy James Hargis, as a catchall label. It is apparently more or less synonymous with such fuzzy phenomena as "Protestant moralism" and the "evangelical middle class." In the face of sensitive historical accounts by Paul Carter, Willard Gatewood, and Ernest Sandeen, all suggesting that evangelical Christians were more anxious about their souls than about their status, Lipset and Raab simply ascribe the fundamentalist controversy to the "waning dominance" of rural and small-town America. On the whole the authors' understanding of American denominationalism extends little farther than a vague notion that Episcopalians are classier than other folks.

Lipset and Raab see the 1930s as a turning

point for "extremism." For the first time the right wing included "American fascists" as well as such traditional "nativist" groups as the Klan, the Black Legion, and some newly politicized preachers. But there is a catch to this analysis. Just as "fundamentalism" doesn't mean "fundamentalism," "fascism"—you guessed it—doesn't seem to mean "fascism" either. The authors recognize that "mystical European fascism" did not win much of a following in the United States, but they never explain what they mean by an American "fascism." Like the term "fundamentalism," this category is used with sweeping imprecision. Charles Coughlin, for instance, was "a kind of prototype for American fascism" or "at least fascist in style." In a phrase which defies my understanding, Lipset and Raab assure us that toward the end of the thirties Coughlin adopted "a more overt fascist-like posture."

Nor can they quite decide where to put Huey Long's "monism." The leader of a lower-class protest movement whose ideology was "in the populist tradition," Long was personally a "pure species demagogue." The authors finally intimate that he "resembled Mussolini in fostering leftist demagoguery, while basically maintaining the existing system of privilege." We are told that Gerald Winrod of Kansas, the "son of a small-town evangelist," moved from preaching to politics during the thirties, and that he became "overtly pro-Nazi" after a 1933 visit to Germany. His group, the Defenders of the Christian Faith, "was overlaid with a mimicry of Hitlerian anti-Semitism that differed in kind and emphasis from the traditional nativist patterns of bigotry. But the similarity was again superficial. The main tone was still that of moralistic fundamentalism, and no cogent plan was offered for the reorganization of the economy or society."

These descriptions hardly provide a nuanced introduction to the beliefs and activities of Coughlin, Long, or Winrod. Much of what the authors say is distorted or factually wrong. For example, Gerald Winrod's father was an evangelist in Wichita; it wasn't Boston or San Francisco, but when Lipset and Raab call it a "small town," they tell us more about their own biases than about Kansas demography. Moreover, what they casually call Winrod's "moralistic fundamentalism" carried with it a complicated theology, on which he based *all* of his opinions.

He earnestly believed that the turmoil of the thirties signalled the imminent (but temporary) triumph of the Antichrist, to be followed by the physical reappearance of Jesus, the final judgment of mankind, and the millennium. Christians could understand the arrival of the last age (or dispensation) only by studying the prophetic books of the Bible, especially Daniel and Revelation, which predicted specific events as well as general trends. It is not surprising that a man holding these views did not bother to create a "cogent plan" for economic reconstruction. Literally convinced that the blue eagle of the NRA was kin to the Beast of Revelation, 13, Winrod campaigned for senator to call America back to God.

Long active in the movement to convert Jews to Christianity, Winrod thought that roughly a third of the world's Jewish population would embrace Jesus during the final tribulation. He professed this belief throughout his life, even while denouncing "Jewish Communism." To us it all sounds pretty strange—and not very appealing—but it was hardly "a mimicry of Hitlerian anti-Semitism"; the notion that some Jews would be "saved" during the Second Coming had been basic to dispensational Protestantism since the 18th century.

As Coughlin, Winrod did like certain aspects of Hitler's regime, particularly its antagonism to Communism, its opposition to "Jewish" power, and its supposed defense of Christian faith and morals. Both men, however, emphasized that an autocratic government that was necessary to control decadent Europeans was not appropriate in the righteous United States. Combining dispensational theology and the rhetoric of republican virtue, Winrod said that Americans could avoid much of the wrath of the Antichrist if they repudiated the New Deal and returned to the Founding Fathers' ideals.

Although my complaints about the chapters on the twenties and thirties may seem like the quarrels of an antiquarian, they have a deeper significance. These criticisms are meant to underscore the authors' sloppy research methods and the narrowness of their analytical framework. Lipset and Raab have not examined Long's speeches or Winrod's sermons. Instead, they have relied on selected secondary works, usually ransacking these for quotations while paying little heed to their arguments. While pointing to Mary Ann Buitrago's master's thesis

as their chief source on Winrod, they overlook the connection she draws between his prophetic writings and his politics, as well as her verdict that his views did not alter "in any significant way" after two trips to Germany. Elsewhere, they flatly declare in the text that American cities have "never been the center" of "evangelical Protestant culture," but they cite in their notes Timothy Smith's *Revivalism and Social Reform*, a monograph written to challenge this stereotype.

My point of course is not that Lipset and Raab are, inherently, incompetent scholars. Certainly they would not write about Franklin Roosevelt without critically examining the secondary literature and scrupulously reading his speeches. They would, in short, pay attention to what Roosevelt had to say. But they don't bother to look closely at what "extremists" say because they are disposed from the outset to dismiss their ideas as nonsense. The book's narrow perspective is explicit in the title; Lipset and Raab say that they are studying the politics of *unreason*. Consequently, they reduce deeply felt religious sentiments and social attitudes to "cultural baggage" and "trappings" that happen to get invested with symbolic significance during status crises. Unable themselves to believe in conspiracy theories, Lipset and Raab refuse to work their way into the minds of those people who consider such things eminently reasonable.

After rendering the familiar (if questionable) thesis that McCarthyism was a symptom of antielitist, antipluralist passions, Lipset and Raab devote four long chapters to contemporary right-wing movements. This portion of *The Politics of Unreason* is more thoughtful, more fully researched, and better written than the "historical" section. Although the authors still can't make much sense out of revivalists like Carl McIntyre and Billy Hargis, they do offer a subtle examination of the John Birch Society. The section on George Wallace and the American Independent party is the best in the book. The authors show that Wallace ran best among former Goldwater supporters and among people who didn't vote in 1964. They also outline the post-1968 split in the AIP, and discuss the failure of erstwhile Wallaceites to win office on their own. And for those who think American youth will lead us into the joyous revolution of Consciousness III, the authors give sobering evidence of Wallace's appeal to young voters.

Most Americans, Lipset and Raab tell us in the concluding sections, are not deeply committed to a tolerant, pluralist social order. Fundamentalists, residents of small towns, and the poorly educated are particularly deficient in what the authors call "democratic restraint." When change threatens their social position, these people are likely to join "symbolic" protest movements that affirm their status, instead of backing organizations concerned with their economic welfare; they are prime candidates for membership in right-wing "extremist" groups. Lipset and Raab express some confidence, however, that the spread of education has raised the national level of democratic restraint. Nevertheless, they close with the warning that the growth of "monistic ideology among youth," both Left and Right, may have been "the most important and destructive aspect of the decline of political civility in the 1960s."

DESPITE ITS FLAWS as a piece of scholarship—or perhaps because of them—*The Politics of Unreason* points toward significant questions about how we "reasonable" people look at "extremists."

First of all, we should be wary of such adjectives as "bigoted," "prejudiced," "anti-Semitic," and "anti-Catholic." Not only are these terms emotionally loaded, but they share a serious analytical drawback. They all lead us to conceptualize "bigotry" from the viewpoint of the victim who is, of course, deserving of sympathy. But, especially if we want to promote tolerance and minimize social strains, it is at least as important to understand the "bigot." Some psychiatrists who investigate extreme behavior of a different kind try to find the rationale behind even psychotic thinking. Historians and social scientists could profit by adopting an analogous perspective in their studies of the far Right. If we begin to place "prejudiced" opinions within the configuration of the "bigot's" total world view, we will better comprehend his anger.

Second, it is about time that we openly admit the limited usefulness of "status anxiety" interpretations of discontent. Although these theories sound like social science, they are usually full of unexamined normative judgments. Lipset and Raab, for instance, consider interest-group politics inherently more reasonable than status politics. Indeed, the authors are so fond of their model as an explanation for

"unreasonable" political beliefs and activities that they obscure what is realistic (even by pluralist standards) about right-wing and "preservatist" strategies. The campaign by Winrod and his allies to drive evolution from the public schools may have been a symbolic crusade; even so, its participants honestly confronted tough intellectual issues. When the fundamentalists said that students who valued Darwin more than Revelation were likely to develop new standards of behavior, they were more perceptive—and/or more candid—than the modernists who claimed that the word of science was morally neutral.

Furthermore, the authors' notion that interest politics is more reasonable than "symbolic" protest is itself open to question. On first hearing, it almost sounds like common sense. We find it easier to sympathize with a family on relief than with the fellow who suffers from mere "status anxiety." But, by translating those two limpid words into a different (though still normative) social science vocabulary, we can see that the authors' judgment is based on a narrow conception of what makes men tick. If we say that change threatens man's "identity" or his "sense of self," we can grasp why he might support a "symbolic" protest instead of looking to his interests, narrowly conceived. Abraham Maslow has claimed that "wishes for safety, for belongingness and identification, for close love relationships and for respect and prestige" are human "needs in the same sense that water and amino acids are needs." Without endorsing Maslow's biological analogy, we can conjecture that people join "extremist" movements to gratify perfectly reasonable wants that go unattended in a "rational," pluralist society.

Aside from its suppositions about human nature, Lipset and Raab's "status anxiety" interpretation of "the politics of unreason" is normative in another way: it rests on a teleological reading of history. As much as any dispensational Christian, the two authors think they know which way history is going. Like many contemporary scholars, they assure us that something vaguely described as agrarian, religious, decentralized old America invariably will be urbanized, secularized, and centralized. This "modernization" process is so commonly thought to be inevitable that modernization theorists rarely bother to spell out the details.

Almost always, however, they tell us that the trend obliges evangelical Christianity to decline—perhaps to balance the ever-rising middle class. Lipset and Raab are true to form. Their Christians begin to decline in the 1790s, find “history against them” in the 1920s, and are still sinking today.

Not only do the authors think that they know where history is heading, but they are generally pleased with the direction. It is not surprising, therefore, that they deem “extremists” unreasonable for having “more of a stake in the past than in the present.” Trying to salvage a “stable agrarian society,” the Populist “preservatists” look pretty silly too. Partly because they won’t take seriously the ideas of their subjects, and partly because they adhere to a technological rendering of the idea of progress, Lipset and Raab don’t even consider the possibility that a stable agrarian society might be superior to a chaotic industrial one. Nor do they hint that some values from the “past” might be well worth preserving. Rather, they blandly assert that “continuous change, pushed to its limits” is “the quickest way to enlarge the democratic society”; it does not occur to them that this process could be the quickest way to deprive some groups of their most cherished institutions. Lest they be dubbed “extremists”—or “preservatists” at best—persons who are “somehow out of joint with their society” must grin and bear it as they are swept into the pluralist version of “the dustbin of history.”

The third question raised by *The Politics of Unreason* is just how “monistic” are American “extremists.” Although Lipset and Raab reiterate the familiar and generally sound thesis that the United States, lacking a feudal heritage, has always been a liberal society, they miss the irony that some of our most notorious right-wingers have been affected by the liberal tradition. The fruits of this heritage range from the rhetoric of republican virtue to a certain respect for civil liberties. Despite their attacks on “Zionist conspiracies,” both Gerald Winrod and Gerald L. K. Smith (whom Lipset and Raab designate “the dean of American anti-Semitism”) denied any intention to interfere with the constitutional rights of individual Jews.

An argument can be made that “preservatists” are sometimes more pluralist than the pluralists. Far from rejecting the “legitimized ambiguity” which Lipset and Raab call “the

genius of American society,” they want to take advantage of it. The fundamentalist controversy is a case in point. Numerous theological conservatives (including Gerald Smith) did not support legal action to bar Darwinism from the schools. Others (including Winrod) who advocated this legislation granted that evolution could be taught in private schools and perhaps at public universities. Basically, the fundamentalists wanted to shield their own children from evolutionary doctrine and to defend their personal faith against the ravages of “secular endemic change.” But they quickly discovered that the American “genius” for ambiguity did not apply to them. Their values were caricatured in the press, their ideas were ridiculed in the classroom, and their clergymen were eased out of influential positions in the denominations.

FINALLY, *The Politics of Unreason* suggests that we must take a closer look at the connection between “extremists” and the pluralist mainstream. Lipset and Raab are aware that movements in the center of the political spectrum are not above politically repressive activities. They know that Lincoln’s campaign workers alluded ominously to Stephen Douglas’s Catholic wife; that a Democratic administration conducted the Red Scare of 1919; and that Franklin Roosevelt denounced some of his detractors as “copperheads.” They also note periodic “marriages of convenience” between “elitist preservatists” and “antielitist preservatists.” But the authors do not push these insights far enough. They claim that the two major parties absorb “extremist” ideas simply to co-opt right-wing rivals, and that the thinking man’s “democratic restraint” usually saves him from the “monism” that afflicts his lower-class brethren. “Time and again,” Lipset and Raab explain, “the more educated and established segments of the American public have pulled away from right-wing movements when they became explicitly monistic.”

Determined to portray a tolerant center besieged by right- and left-wing radicals, the authors underestimate what might be termed the “monism of the middle.” We have all observed political “marriages of convenience”; the debatable question is which side holds the shotgun in these affairs. Some evidence indicates that the “established elements” of society are the ultimate source of “extremist” beliefs, not just

occasional co-participants in hysteria. When the fundamentalists damned Nietzsche's barbaric German philosophy, they only modified a theme made popular by George Creel, the government official who advertised America during World War I. Similarly, General Curtis LeMay's ideas about foreign policy bear an impeccable ancestry. Although he was Wallace's running mate, the old soldier endorsed birth control and abortion reform (issues often dodged by the pluralist practitioners of interest-group politics). His proposal to defoliate Vietnam was less enlightened. But he gave full credit to the State Department for teaching him that Communism must be contained; he merely wanted to do the job efficiently. LeMay was not a status-anxious cold warrior who despised the Ivy League elite. On the contrary, he seems to have erred by holding some of its opinions too dear after they had gone out of fashion.

The authors simply do not pay enough attention to the ideological and tactical lessons which "extremists" have learned from liberals. Completely ignoring Creel, they pass over A.

Mitchell Palmer in two paragraphs—the same amount of space allotted to a tiny Antimasonic revival after the Civil War. They denounce McCarthyism as mass politics without mentioning Harry Truman's internal security program. Nor do they discuss liberal participation in what Christopher Lasch calls the "cultural cold war." These establishment-sponsored enterprises may not have been "explicitly monist," but they were nonetheless repressive.

If we adapted the analytical scheme of *The Politics of Unreason* to interpret liberal "extremism," we could infer that Lipset and Raab are among the "monists of the middle." Though financially secure, they fear that "populist" movements will undermine the high status of intellectuals. Indeed, the authors admit that their views crystallized "in reaction to the McCarthyism of the early 1950's." This status anxiety leads them to embrace the ahistorical frame of mind which pluralists commonly assign to young leftists. Moreover, Lipset and Raab seem to have accepted the flimsy standards of evidence we usually encounter in right-wing periodicals. In an unfootnoted paragraph they say that Huey Long "was described by various observers as having a fascist potential." Elsewhere they vaguely hint that Gerald L. K. Smith "was reported to make anti-Semitic statements in private."

Let me quickly say that this final *jeu d'esprit* about the authors' "monism" should not be taken literally. They are undoubtedly thoughtful and tolerant men. The point of my little game is to emphasize that their mode of analysis can be used to discredit any kind of deviance or discontent—even their own. To understand "extremism," we might supplement *The Politics of Unreason* by reading the work of William James, a social scientist who believed in a pluralistic universe as well as a pluralistic social order. Declaring that "the most interesting and important thing" about every individual is his philosophy, his "more or less dumb sense of what life honestly and deeply means," James paid close attention to the weirdest ideas. He perceived, moreover, that the "healthy-minded" can be as intolerant as the "sick souls." And, perhaps because he suffered more than his share of status—and other—anxieties, James never forgot that even "the sanest and best among us are of one clay with the lunatics and prison inmates."



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An assignment like that—after all that has been said in the form of history, memoir, essay, novel—what teacher would give it out or student take it on nowadays? The answer to both questions is Harvey Swados. For years he has been teaching writing at Sarah Lawrence, at San Francisco State, now at the University of Massachusetts. For even longer he has been a worker in and a student of the labor movement, writing about trade union people, men and

women on the line, intellectuals enmeshed in a hundred different varieties of the Left. (His tribute to C. Wright Mills remains, in my opinion, one of the finest essays ever printed in *DISSENT*). Why not, then, rounding into middle age, before too much time makes for too much distance, have a last try at teacher-student in the workshop, an assignment to oneself to put right that time when young radicals started out bravely (and foolishly) to organize a better (they thought socialist) world. I think he succeeds, in an old-fashioned book, working against the grain of now-fiction. Even the defects become virtues in a way; a certain clumsiness and heaviness in the narrative reflects precisely the period narrated, those years of endless meetings in upstairs lofts, the talk heavy with expressions like "class struggle" and "building up cadres." *Standing Fast* rings true, holds up.

It starts slowly, almost as if there were an intention to lose you deliberately: look, if these people turn you off completely with their compulsion to make speeches in the midst of family crisis, even in bed no less, then quit here. If you read on, though, you will see that it does work; socialists do have families, and families stay together or come apart, Marxist or whatever. The strength of the novel is that the adult characters never vanish into abstractions. They talk about revolution, some of them do something about it, but all of them remain their sad-comic, vital-weary, idealistic-cynical selves.

With the children, however, it is another matter. Here the story is no longer "about us." It is about Paul, the sensitive son of the dentist Irwin. Paul dies tragically in Harlem, murdered by young blacks from the same neighborhood where he has worked so well and compassionately with the community; Paul does not come through much more strongly than the conventional, or troubled, children of the others. We are still too close to the children of the radicals of the forties—children now apolitical, Weathermen, socialist, solid bourgeois, Consciousness IIIers doing their own things. That's another novel.

IN THIS NOVEL we begin in Buffalo, just before the war. One way or another, the members of the little group, the faction, have come together, formed their New Party (nicely invented by Swados from bits and pieces of the Old Left), and set out to organize along socialist lines the growing number of workers in the plants.

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## BOOKS

But the time is the defense boom, work plentiful  
and wages up after the harrowing days of the  
Depression. The trade union spurts ahead on  
the basis of collective bargaining, not ideology.  
And even though Norm and Fred and Vera  
and Sy and Bill and Big Boy rejoice in the  
victory of the CIO, the exhilaration of the  
Reuther days, they are on the way to seeing  
what Big Boy, a black tightly controlled or-  
ganizer up from the South, has always said—  
pragmatism is going to count more than social-  
ism. From then on it is not so much downhill  
as sideways, through the war and into the fifties.  
If Norm, the intellectual-writer of the group  
doesn't always stand fast, he does hold on to  
his integrity, emerging into the sixties as one of  
those influential journalists of the New Frontier.  
Joe stays worker-organizer, going all the way,  
yet plagued with personal problems and intel-  
lectual doubts. Fred, the literary man, gets  
captured, and then cut up by TV which has  
made him a pop culture hero. Sy and Bernice  
stick it out for a long while, then try Israel  
(can't the kibbutz be socialism?), then return  
to come to terms with inner-city New York, in  
teaching and social work. Harry goes full-circle  
from high-powered organizer to high-powered  
wheeler-dealer in business. Vito just keeps  
working in the labor movement, different ways  
of standing fast, believing stubbornly in some-  
thing. As the political dream recedes, the family,  
with all its fractures, comes on stronger, a center  
holding, where things do not fall apart as  
swiftly. So, too, the women come on more  
strongly, helping, hurting their men. In the end  
standing fast is going to have to outweigh letting  
go (or getting worse—Paul's funeral and  
Kennedy's assassination occur the same day,  
foreshadowing the grimmer late sixties).

*Standing Fast* is a good, honest, *felt* novel,  
a farewell to the Old Left, people and politics.  
No more than that, but that's a great deal. It  
ought to be widely read—at least by "us." It  
has its structural problems; the story sags now  
and again. But what has to be said, finally, is  
that the form and structure of Harvey Swados's  
novel also represents a kind of standing fast—  
against the idea of free-form fiction as the only  
kind. Against the proposition that to write well  
and true about radicals and revolution you have  
only to feel free, jot it down, sell the book, take  
the money, and run.

Norman Gall

# Peru: The Master Is Dead

He commanded respect, despite his old-fashioned and dirty appearance. The principal personages of Cuzco greeted him seriously. It was uncomfortable to walk with him because he kneeled down before all the churches and chapels and ostentatiously took off his hat to every priest he met. My father hated him; he had worked as a scribe in the Old Man's haciendas. "From the hilltops he shouts with the voice of damnation, warning his Indians that he is everywhere. He harvests his vegetables, and then lets them rot; he thinks they are too cheap to sell in the cities, and too dear to be eaten by his serfs. He will go to Hell," my father said of him.

—JOSE MARÍA ARGUEDAS, *Los Ríos Profundos*.

**T**HE HACIENDA LAURAMARCA—the largest estate in the Department of Cuzco, ancient seat of the Inca Empire—is a gray-green feudal domain stretching over 200,000 acres of rolling, windy *puna* of grass and stubble and glacial stone in the highlands of southern Peru, occupied by immense herds of sheep, llamas, and alpacas, and roughly 5,000 Indian serfs. There is a primeval and intricate confusion of stone fences, defining each of the Indians' tiny subsistence plots, alongside the small river dividing the *puna* as the steppe reaches gradually toward the white slopes of Mount Ausanccate. In the old days the Indians were regularly sent

to fetch snow from the great mountain, 21,000 feet high, and carry it on their backs to the hacienda, wrapped in burlap and straw, to be made into ice cream and sold for the master's profit in the Sunday peasant market at the *casa grande* of Lauramarca. In the cold and darkness of sagging adobe huts cradled among their sheep pens and potato patches, the Indians tell stories of bloodshed and rebellion that won a certain fame throughout Peru for the Hacienda Lauramarca as a symbol of the struggle that led to the abolition of Indian serfdom and to the end of the hacienda system itself. For this reason, it was the first hacienda in the Andes expropriated in

the sweeping agrarian reform now being carried out by Peru's "Revolutionary government" of generals and colonels. The end of feudal bondage is the wellspring of the convulsive social changes that have now launched Peru into the most stunning and confused outbreak of reforms Latin America has seen since the early years of the Cuban Revolution.

One of the stories told by the Indians concerns the long ago murder of a *hacendado*, or master, of the Hacienda Lauramarca during a dispute with the neighboring town of Ocongate over the hacienda's traditional monopoly of the trade with its serfs. The town was a settlement of whitewashed mud houses occupied by half-breed merchants and petty officials who prospered from buying stolen sheep and from other forbidden traffic with the Indians, which emboldened them to agitate for transfer of the region's weekly peasant market from the hacienda to the town plaza. The *hacendado* was a lean, dour, imperious priest, Padre Hilario Antonio Saldivar, known for his black cassock and flowing hair and for assembling his serfs each Sunday at dawn in the chapel of the *casa grande* to hear him intone the Latin mass, for which they paid him a fee in sheep. The Indians cringed in church as in the world, and brought the master-priest many gifts. The chapel reeked of piss, and its cherished oil paintings—done by wandering artists centuries ago—were so badly damaged by the rains penetrating the chapel's tile roof, and so dim and primitive in their religious conception, that they appeared to have been made in the first strokes of a blighted Creation. On feast days the Indians filed into the chapel in glowing shawls and ponchos, wine-colored and cunningly woven with designs copying the plumage of the Inca crown; there was a squeaky orchestra of home-made flutes, harps, and violins that accompanied the mass recited by the *cura* Saldivar in a language incomprehensible to the Indians. The orchestra produced its traditional music with a devout and incandescent mysticism, and the Indian

harpist played, as always, with his eyes closed.

At dawn on February 8, 1899,<sup>1</sup> the townspeople of Ocongate crossed the small, misty river swollen by heavy rains to attack the *casa grande* of Lauramarca. On the night before the attack, the mayor and other town notables crossed over to the hacienda to sell *aguardiente*—a crude and powerful sugar-based liquor—to the Indians on the eve of the Lenten carnival. The attack came after the mayor of Ocongate was captured and marched shoeless to the *casa grande*, a fortress-like adobe compound encircled by walled stockyards and a few withered eucalyptus trees, which the Saldivars had owned for generations. Two Indians were killed while trying to stop the mob from breaking down the great door of the manor house; the townspeople rammed their way into the stone-paved interior patio and sacked the *casa grande*, leading away sheep and horses and alpacas, and carrying off stores of barley and *aguardiente*. When Padre Hilario Antonio Saldivar appeared at a window to speak to the mob, he was blasted with buckshot and died a few days later. "The Indians could not have done this, for they thought the *cura* Saldivar was something like a god," an old peasant told me in Quechua, the ancient Andean vernacular. "When the people of Ocongate shot him, some of us carried the *cura* over the mountains on a sheepskin litter for two days and two nights to Cuzco to try to save his life. He died just a few miles from Cuzco, and gave a curse with his last words. Before the *cura* Saldivar gave his curse, our potatoes grew the size of melons. But now they grow hard and small."

The uprising of the people of Ocongate in 1899—the weekly market was moved from the hacienda to the town not long after the *cura's* death—was an augury of the swift and sometimes violent changes that Peru has been experiencing in this century. Conflicts like these accompanied the rise of merchant

<sup>1</sup> According to the newspaper *El Comercio* of Cuzco, February 22, 1899.

towns in Europe during the Middle Ages, and helped drag these feudal societies into the modern world. The modernization of Peru has generated immense social pressures leading to the blizzard of decrees of the "Revolutionary government" that have been descending over Peru since the armed forces seized power two years ago. The townspeople of Ocongate are *mestizos* and *cholos* (Indian converts to Hispanic culture), and their triumph over the traditional power of the hacienda is part of the great political and cultural mutations now changing Peru: the increasing political power of the *mestizo* majority in the towns and cities, and what sociologists call the "chologification" of the Indians. The new social conscience of the largely *mestizo* officer corps of the Peruvian army, long known as "the watchdog of the oligarchy," became a guiding force after the army was forced to deal with a series of peasant and guerrilla uprisings in the Andes during the 1960s.

The army's recent decision to seize power and guide Peru toward "revolutionary" solutions came essentially from a military intelligence operation that grew like Topsy while combating three tiny—and overpublicized—guerrilla movements along the eastern slopes of the Andes. The mushrooming counterinsurgency operation—led mostly by officers trained at U.S. and French intelligence and antiguerrilla schools—mounted a military spying apparatus that penetrated not only the centers of rebellion in the universities and the countryside, but Peru's business establishment and traditional political parties as well; these officers later explained that they found the existing structure so rotten that it might dissolve into violence and chaos if there were no drastic reforms. Since executing their bloodless coup d'état at 5 A.M. on October 3, 1968, these officers have decreed new laws placing the main sectors of the Peruvian economy—the banks, the press, the mining, petroleum, fishing, and sugar industries—under state ownership or control. Among all these measures, however, the "Revolutionary

government" has staked the greatest part of its prestige and effort in executing the most radical land reform program of the past decade in Latin America.

On June 24, 1969, President Juan Velasco Alvarado, who was the army commander at the time of the coup, appeared on nationwide radio and television for a historic speech, announcing that

today the Government of the People and the Armed Forces put in motion a vigorous and irreversible process of national transformation, thus avoiding the chaotic outbreak of social violence and giving autonomous solutions to the age-old problems of Peru. . . . Today, the Day of the Indian, the Revolutionary government presents the peasant with the best of tributes, . . . a law that will end for all time an unjust social order that has maintained in poverty and iniquity those who have always had to till someone else's land, a social order that has always denied this land to millions of *campesinos*. . . . To these men of the land we can now say in the immortal and libertarian words of Tupac Amaru [leader of the great 18th-century Indian rebellions that swept across the highlands of Peru and Bolivia]: "*Campesino*, the master will no longer feed on your poverty."

# I

## Mancha Indígena

"EL PATRÓN HA MUERTO," Sixto Flores told me as we traveled across the *puna* on two skinny horses after the Hacienda Lauramarca was expropriated last year. "The master is dead. The agrarian reform has come in his place."

Sixto Flores Yucra, 41, is a veteran of the Peruvian army and, thus, one of the few Indians on the hacienda who can speak Spanish, though he can decipher a newspaper or a legal document only haltingly and painfully. (Most of the people of the Andean area known as the *mancha indígena*, or Indian oilstain, are illiterate and speak only

Quechua, which in its many local dialects is still the vernacular in most of the highlands of Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador.) Sixto is an affable man with strong, supple features suggesting a mixture of Indian blood with that of the African slaves brought to Cuzco three centuries ago. It is a strange face; elongated, with a broad, relaxed mouth and gentle brown eyes awakening, when roused, into quick anguish and the focusing of an acute rustic intelligence. He dresses like most Indians, in a heavy brown poncho, a broad-brimmed hat, and sandals cut from old rubber tires; he is the living image of the Indian awakening to the modern world.

After learning to speak Spanish as an army recruit 20 years ago—the immemorial way of obtaining recruits is for the army to surround an Indian village, herd all eligible youth into a truck and drive away—Sixto Flores three times has been elected *personero* (headman) of his community. He also has been a lay catechist of the Catholic faith, a leader of the peasant *sindicato* organized on the hacienda in 1957 with help from the Communist leaders of the Cuzco Workers Federation and, now, president of the cooperative that the Ministry of Agriculture has organized among the hacienda's 975 Indian families. Since the cooperative was formed last year, Sixto has been traveling back and forth from Cuzco, lobbying in the offices of the Ministry of Agriculture there and buying expensive breeding animals for the cooperative with a loan from the Agricultural Bank, as well as rice, canned goods, and *coca*<sup>2</sup> for the co-op store that has replaced the *cholo* merchant's roadside establishment at the hacienda's entrance. For his trips to Cuzco, Sixto has been paid 75 cents a day in expenses, and has spent his nights on a sheepskin in the Ministry of Agriculture garage, where a former Lauramarca peasant works as watchman. "Last month at the agricultural fair in Cuzco I lost my hat while buying six prize bulls for the cooperative," Sixto told me.

<sup>2</sup> The tropical leaf chewed by Andean Indians with a piece of lime to produce cocaine, stimulating a gastric secretion that reduces hunger.

"Because of the cooperative I haven't harvested my own potatoes. When I came home from Cuzco without my hat, my wife and mother-in-law said I had been drunk and sleeping with whores."

When the Hacienda Lauramarca was expropriated last year, its serfs had been on strike for nearly half a century. In 1922 this strike, or "campaign of disobedience," began after the government of Dictator Augusto B. Leguía (1919–30) rejected the Indians' petition that their feudal obligations be abolished. In 1926 the *cura* Saldivar's nephew, an influential member of the dictator's party, had army troops sent to the hacienda to crush the serfs' "campaign of disobedience." The troops were attacked by the Indians with slingshots, a tactic used in the peasant land invasions of the 1960s. According to an official report made after the Leguía dictatorship was overthrown, the army then

committed all crimes it was possible to imagine against the defenseless Indians. In frightful succession they effected rape, beatings, and burnings of the Indians' wretched huts. In a word, the inhabitants of Lauramarca suffered the effects of a true armed invasion. As an epilogue, several Indians (named in the report) were separated from their families and deported to the jungle area of Ccosñipata, where they still remain."<sup>3</sup>

All the deportees eventually died in the jungle, but the revolutionary strike of the Lauramarca serfs remained in effect. It was this kind of repression that earned the Peruvian army its notoriety as "watchdog of the oligarchy."

When I first visited the Hacienda Lauramarca, a few weeks after its expropriation, an old *campesino* named Mariano Mamani gave me a copy of a list of feudal obligations published in a Lima newspaper in 1931 when he and some other serfs had traveled to Lima to seek relief from the government. It is a good example of the kind of servitude

<sup>3</sup> Quoted in Richard Patch, "Indian Emergence in Cuzco," in *American Universities Field Staff Reports*, West Coast South America (vol. 5 no. 9), 1958.

prevailing in the sierra until the 1960s.<sup>4</sup>

. . . a) we performed obligatory service as *pongos* (unpaid household servants) to the master and his relatives; b) each month we were sent to Cuzco in groups of 30, where we were rented out to different homes without being paid a cent, eating only *coca* and scraps from the master's table; c) an equal number of us were sent every 40 days to the malaria-ridden valley of Marcapata to work the master's hacienda there, being paid 20 cents a day; d) we performed the farm labor of the hacienda and pastured the master's animals, paying double the value of any animal that should die by sickness or accident; e) carrying the hacienda's produce to the cities of Cuzco and Sicuani, using our own pack animals on journeys of 10, 15, and 20 days, being paid five cents for each ton of wool or potatoes delivered; f) the obligation to sell all our produce to the master at ridiculous prices, like eight cents for a sheep or 16 cents for a baby bull; g) at each annual *rodeo* (roundup) we had to deliver five percent of our animals to the master without payment; h) beyond these exactions and robberies there was the physical punishment for infractions of these rules, such as being hanged by our fingers from a rafter of the master's house and to be whipped.

The legal theory behind these obligations was payment in goods and services for the right to live on the master's land, stolen from the Indians over the past four centuries.

A second invasion of Lauramarca, this time by the rural police, came shortly after the delegation of Indians returned from Lima. Two peasants were killed and the Indians' herds confiscated after the Saldivar family and the prefect of Cuzco agreed to share the proceeds of the rent collection drive which greatly exceeded the value of the unpaid feudal dues. In the late 1930s the Saldivars brought the archbishop of Lima, Pedro Pascual Farfán, on a long, dusty trip to the

Hacienda Lauramarca to attempt a reconciliation with the Indians. It was Archbishop Farfán who, around that time, issued a widely quoted pastoral letter that said: "Poverty is the most certain road to eternal

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***"We don't know whether we will have a new life or just a new master, the government. . . ."***

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felicity. Only the state which succeeds in making the poor appreciate the spiritual treasures of poverty can solve its social problems." The attempt at reconciliation failed.

In 1952 the Hacienda Lauramarca was bought by a group of Argentine sheepmen who attempted a classic land enclosure movement to recover the pastures that had been invaded and occupied by the Indians for three decades. The majordomos would build fences by day and the Indians would tear them down by night and steal the pure-bred sheep that the Argentines had bought as breeding stock. When several Indians were arrested, a delegation of peasants traveled to Cuzco to seek help from the regional labor federation, which promptly assigned two lawyers to assist the Indians. In 1957 the labor federation organized the first peasant *sindicato* in the sierra among the serfs of Lauramarca. "The Argentines never made a profit on the hacienda," the last manager of Lauramarca told me. "Under the previous government, we went to Lima to ask that the hacienda be expropriated, but the old land reform agency refused." The formation of the *sindicato* at Lauramarca was the beginning of a series of uprisings in the sierra of central and southern Peru in the 1950s and 1960s of some 300,000 peasants in haciendas and Indian communities that brought both military repression and a series of reform measures, each bolder than the last, leading to the destruction of the agrarian feudalism of the past. The master is dead, yet no one knows what will come in his place.

<sup>4</sup>From "Las Exacciones del Gamonalismo i la Impunidad de sus Crímenes," in *El Peru*, August 1931. The sums quoted are 1931 equivalents in U.S. currency of Peruvian sols.

## Peasant Life in the Sierra

THE HOUSE of Sixto Flores Yucra is at the top of a remote valley more than 13,000 feet high, very near the snow line, at the edge of the closed universe that for centuries was the Hacienda Lauramarca and on which Western culture still has made only a dim and fragmented impression. In Sixto's *ayllu*, or Indian community, more than 100 varieties of potato are grown; the area is one of the centers where the potato was domesticated in pre-Columbian America. The 30 *comuneros* rotate the tiny potato patches among themselves each year to ensure that no one permanently uses better or worse land than the rest, a practice dating from Inca times that has died out in most of the sierra.

I came to Sixto's house in July, the season of sunny days and frigid nights and brilliant skies, the season when potatoes are harvested and *chuño* is made. *Chuño* means potatoes that survive the early frosts, dug from the ground and spread out under the July moon to freeze, then crushed under the feet of the peasant and his family as the *chuño* melts in the afternoon sun; this is done several times until the potato is completely dehydrated, and all that is left is a small, bitter black ball that does not rot with time. In all the thatched adobe huts that follow the rusted glacial valleys down from the slopes of Mount Ausanccate, *chuño* is the main food for most of the year. "All our meals are potato or *chuño*, *chuño* or potato," Sixto told me one night over a bowl of potato soup. "Potatoes have a sweeter taste, but they can only be stored for half a year before they rot." In the field below his house, Sixto and his family harvest potatoes until nightfall, until the whole valley is suddenly bathed in amber light and then, just as suddenly, left in primeval darkness and cold. Light and warmth are precious commodities; the family works through the day intensely and with little talk. Sixto wears a bright red homespun vest with a high collar and a white felt hat; his wife Vicintina, whom he brought here over the mountains from the Vilcanota valley 15 years

ago, is a strong, bright-eyed woman with ashen feet, wearing the traditional black homespun skirt and embroidered red jacket and canopy hat, with sodden hands working swiftly, excavating and sorting potatoes, some for *chuño* and some for eating as they are, placing them in different striped bags of finely woven alpaca that are brought to the high sierra by the Indians who make them near the coast. "The potatoes are smaller this year because of the hail and the frost," Sixto said; the harvested potatoes were gathered in small piles and covered with straw, and a small cross was planted on top to keep witches from cursing the potatoes. He keeps a small flock of sheep and alpacas, but these animals are very rarely slaughtered. They are eaten when they die of sickness or old age, and their wool barely meets the family's needs for yarn to make their garments. Even the guinea pigs that scurry in the darkness of Sixto's hovel are cooked only on very special occasions.

Sixto inherited his father's house high in the valley, where there was enough space to pasture his small flock in relative freedom from the majordomos of the hacienda. Nevertheless, he cultivates three separate plots at different altitudes as insurance against his whole potato crop being destroyed by a single night's frost. The family lives in a compound of four adobe huts with a cold mountain stream running through the interior patio. The main structure is a cooking house that is filled with smoke at mealtimes, since there is no chimney. Sixto's precious guinea pigs flee and scream on the earthen floor beneath the old hand loom on which the family's clothing is woven, and among the primitive farm tools and grinding stones and the brightly colored plastic pails and basins bought at the Sunday market in Ocongate.

For the evening meal the family is ranged along one wall, whispering curtly in Quechua, a man and four children waiting to be fed in near-darkness as Sixto's wife and mother-in-law fuss and bend over clay pots in a corner next to the small fire fueled with the dried

dung of alpacas and sheep that is carefully stored in the yard. The fire glares when stirred, and throws a long shadow from the Incaic hand-plow, the *chaquitaccla*, hung upon the wall. After supper the family disperses to different houses to sleep, the two women and the little girl stretching out in the hovel where the potatoes and *chuño* are stored, while the eldest boy sleeps in a tiny, hive-like hut overlooking the corral to guard the animals and the newly harvested potatoes from theft. Thievery is a constant danger and obsession for the *campesino*. "The man in that house once stole sheep from me," Sixto once said as we crossed the *puna*. "When I strengthen my power in the cooperative I will send him to the *Sepa* (a penal colony in the jungle)." The mutual distrust of the *campesinos*, plus the desire of many to divide the land among themselves, have impeded the organization of a meaningful cooperative. Also, of the hacienda's 200,000 acres, all but one-fifth have been in the Indians' possession for many years. The attempt to fence off a separate pasture for the cooperative's new breeding cattle, like the enclosure movements of the past, has awakened old conflicts and temptations.

"The cooperative is a union of people into a single force," Sixto told me, repeating what the government cooperative "promoters" had told him, as we went to talk with *campesinos* among the 16 Indian communities of the hacienda.

With the cooperative there will be modern educational techniques, even a school that goes to the fifth grade. [None of the hacienda's seven schools—all built by the peasants themselves in recent years—go beyond the second grade.] With the cooperative we will have medical treatment. . . . With the cooperative social and economic differences will be removed. . . . We don't know if this is entirely true. . . . We have been deceived many times. . . . There is much mistrust among our people. . . . Many want to divide the land among themselves and not have a cooperative. . . . We don't know whether we will have a new life or just a

new master, the government, which has expropriated the hacienda to form the cooperative. Many of us do not know what will happen. Do you think we are doing the right thing?

This question is hard to answer. Of the roughly 60 countries in the world now carrying out different kinds of land reform programs, Peru has delayed longest and presents some of the most difficult problems. Its most numerous and depressed rural population lives in a highland region that is grotesquely scarce in productive land, scattered in the folds of remote mountain valleys and on the upper reaches of the *puna*, dwelling within or at the edge of great *latifundia* like the Hacienda Lauramarca. Recent history has shown that agrarian reform is one of the hardest and most complex tasks any society can undertake. Virtually all the great revolutionary movements of this century—in Russia, Mexico, China, Bolivia, Cuba, Algeria, Vietnam—have held aloft the banner of land reform. The many official efforts to settle the old issue of man-land relationships have in some cases crushed the power of the landlord and the merchant, but in most cases have done less at the cost of much bloodshed, economic dislocation, and official deception. On my own journeys through Latin America over the past decade, I have seen thousands of peasants in several republics for whom the new land reform laws have done little but give them an unnegotiable title to the miserable patch of hilly, acidic, eroded soil that the landlord once assigned in exchange for 120 days of unpaid work on the hacienda; that is, the peasant has been locked into subsistence agriculture with provision neither for expanded production nor for new land for his numerous sons. According to the government study *Aspectos Sociales y Financieros de un programa de Reforma Agraria* (summarized in the *Peruvian Times*, December 11, 1970), there are only 149,538 potential family farm units of land available to the agrarian reform for 852,000 eligible peasant families.

In what is probably the best book to date

on the world's postwar land reform movements, Doreen Warriner writes

... the recent measures in Persia have been successful, and are indeed unique, because the reform was started, and in the initial stage carried out, by a leader who believes in the peasants' power to manage their own affairs, and the affairs of their country. This belief nowadays is rare, and even rarer is the capacity to give it a practical form. . . . Before criticizing this belief, therefore, international experts would do well to look at Latin-American countries, where the sophisticated talk is so patently insincere and produces laws which allow so much exemption to landowners that the area distributed is whittled down to waste land, while officials safeguard their own position by inducing collective farming; or estates are purchased at prices above their market value and handed over to syndicates which cannot work them.<sup>5</sup>

This historical record of error and corruption has led me to believe that the only meaningful changes in rural society and the land tenure system have come from violent or threatened action by the peasants themselves. In other words, agrarian reform succeeds only after the *campesino* takes matters into his own hands, and thus conquers his own feudal state of mind.

#### What Hope in "Structural Reforms"?

THE GREAT QUESTION raised—and still to be answered—by the wave of "structural reforms" in Peru today is whether a country so corrupted and weakened by centuries of economic dependence on serfdom and slavery can become a just society. The new agrarian reform either will destroy the parasitism of the *mestizos* who have been feeding on the Indians for centuries, or it will quickly become a sad and lurid farce. The parasitic extraction of wealth from the Indian is such a great tradition even today that, traveling the length of the Peruvian sierra as my wife and I did last year in our jeep, one invariably

sees the best land—the rich, semitropical river bottoms where the Andes descend below 9,000 feet—still used to grow sugar cane for making *aguardiente* for sale to the Indians, meaning that the most lucrative use of the best land lies in keeping the Indian drunk. Politically, the Andean departments of Peru traditionally have been somewhat akin to the Solid South in the U.S., with heavy overrepresentation in Congress elected by less than one-fifth of the voting-age population, since the Indians cannot vote because of the literacy requirement. The small *mestizo* electorate is so intimately involved with the bureaucracy that roughly one of every three voters is a public employee and nearly all the rest have close relatives working for the government. The rural and small-town economy is of such low productivity that the bureaucracy has become the main route of advancement for young *mestizos*, who become schoolteachers, army officers, and agrarian reform bureaucrats.

"Many *hacendados* and sons of *hacendados* are returning to the government as functionaries implementing the agrarian reform," a young Peruvian anthropologist told me. "Many estate managers are staying on to administer the expropriated haciendas, so there has been little change in the traditional relations between *mestizos* and Indians." The proliferation of Peruvian universities over the past decade has glutted the job market with ill-trained lawyers and agronomists. The number of agronomists graduated each year doubled between 1961 and 1965, and the only employment open to these graduates is in the agrarian reform bureaucracy with very low pay; indeed, not to employ them would threaten the government with the opposition of a jobless white-collar proletariat in the towns of the sierra. They often feel degraded by being stranded among the Indians, the idea of a desk job in Lima being closer to their hearts, and generally they work with little energy or enthusiasm. While it is still far too early for final judgments, the land reform so far seems to benefit its own em-

<sup>5</sup> Doreen Warriner, *Land Reform in Principle and Practice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 135.

ployees more than the mass of peasants, and is threatened with strangulation by its own hands.

On a long reporting trip I made to Cuba a few years ago, I found that virtually every *casa grande* of every nationalized hacienda had been converted into a school for the symbolic and functional purposes of creating a new society. In Peru today most of the manor houses of the great haciendas are being inhabited by agrarian reform functionaries, and sometimes by army colonels as well. This may give added weight to a talk I had recently during a visit to Lima's Lurigancho prison with Hector Béjar, the lone surviving leader of the guerrilla insurrections of the mid-1960s. He is the lean, lithe, bespectacled son of an Ayacucho *hacendado*, born in the Andean area where he was to lead the most successful of the three guerrilla operations. "We of the Left must be more agile now that the military have become revolutionaries," Béjar said wryly.

We can expect more social conflict as the agrarian reform is applied. You cannot expect peasants already in possession of invaded lands they paid for with their blood also to pay for it with 20-year bonds. The government cannot force this kind of payment. The hacienda system remains intact, with agrarian reform bureaucrats replacing the old *hacendados* and *majordomos* in running the haciendas, now called cooperatives. What we are seeing is a so-called revolution of the middle class on the make, an alliance between military and civilian technicians of the middle class, mainly interested in better jobs for themselves.

Hundreds of Indians listened quietly on the ground outside a whitewashed adobe schoolhouse on a bright Saturday morning in an assembly called by government "promoters" sent by the Ministry of Agriculture to organize the cooperative at the Hacienda Lauramarca. The *campesinos*' bodies were wrapped in worn and dusty ponchos, crowned with floppy sheepskin hats, with wads of *coca* bulging in their jaws. They sat on the ground in phalanxes of passive and

mutated suspicion, listening almost inertly to the speeches in Quechua of the *mestizo* "promoters" ranged before them behind a row of schooldesks and a small lectern from which they took turns presiding. Among the "promoters" were three *señoritas*—an anthropologist, a social worker, and a home economics teacher—very pretty in dark glasses and flowing kerchiefs beneath broad-

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***"The Indian and his culture have always been Peru's great beauty and agony. . . ."***

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brimmed cowboy hats, wrapped in the kind of neo-Inca wool ponchos with animal designs sold to tourists in Cuzco, the "archeological capital of America." The men were cooperative organizers, veterinarians, and agronomists, recently contracted by the expanding land reform bureaucracy, many of them sons of small *hacendados* of the Cuzco region. Speaking in Quechua, the "promoters" told the Indians:

The Revolutionary government has decreed the agrarian reform to end your sufferings. Within the hacienda we have set aside 25 acres to build a new town. All will come to live there. There will be a cooperative store with low prices. The agrarian reform will buy pure-bred animals to improve your herds. The cooperative will buy all your products, and you will have trucks of your own. We will build you a dairy factory to process your milk, butter, and cheese, and there will be artificial insemination as well, and you can bring your weaving to sell through the cooperative. Yet remember there is a law giving a jail sentence to those who say false things to sabotage the agrarian reform. You should report these people to the proper authorities.

After three weeks of visiting and persuading the Indians to form a cooperative, the "promoters" left the Hacienda Lauramarca to form cooperatives elsewhere. Some of the more concerned "promoters" had urged the regional agrarian reform director in Cuzco that two or three staff members stay at the

hacienda for a year or so to help the cooperative through its initial period. However, the director said that Lima had assigned him too many cooperatives to organize, and that he needed all the "promoters" he could get to swarm over the haciendas of the region so he could report to Lima that his quota had been fulfilled. Consequently, the formation of the cooperative had changed very little at the Hacienda Lauramarca.

"The Indians still live in their hovels and tend their animals and are cheated by the merchants of Ocongate, who tell them the agrarian reform will take away their land and their animals and will make them work from dawn to dark," a young schoolteacher told me,

Then some students from the University of Cuzco came to the hacienda and told the peasants that the only real agrarian reform is with blood, that the land is theirs and they should not pay for it with government bonds. The Indians are very suspicious of paying dues to the cooperative. They actually had saved some money to buy the land, and were surprised that the agrarian reform would not be dividing the hacienda. The agrarian reform tells them the land and the animals are all theirs, but they are not sure this is true. They are so used to being cheated by the *mistis*, the *mestizo* merchants, and government officials they deal with, that they don't know what to believe. When the Indians go to town to apply for a birth certificate so they can register their children for school, the municipal secretary of Ocongate requires them to bring "gifts" of sheep and cheese and beer, besides paying a high fee, before he will issue the birth certificate. As it is, the municipal secretary is often drunk, and swears violently at the Indians, and more often than not gets the child's name wrong, so the boy or girl must carry the wrong name with him on identity papers and official records for the rest of his life.

Around the time the agrarian reform "promoters" left the Hacienda Lauramarca to form cooperatives elsewhere, a government-appointed manager moved into the manor house formerly occupied by the old administrator, and the new manager im-

mediately tangled with the Indians—as did the old one—over their invasion of the central pasture lands reserved for the hacienda. The new manager was pulled from his horse by some Indian women whom he found herding their sheep through an opening they had cut in the barbed-wire fence. After this happened, my friend Sixto Flores Yucra, president of the new cooperative, told me in a moment of confusion and despair that the only escape for the Indian is to become a *cholo*, to become as much a part of the *misti* power structure as he can.

The *comuneros*, who have been cutting the barbed wire must be made to understand that they are invading state property, that they are abusing the agrarian reform effort and creating obstacles. . . . I was stupid not to reenlist in the army 20 years ago. They taught me a little Spanish and to read a little, although I never went to school, and by now I could have become a sergeant or a prison guard.

## II

### Twilight of the Gods

There's something cursed, it seems to me, about a country where men have owned men as property. The stink of that corruption never escapes the soul, and it is the stink of future evil.

—BERNARD MALAMUD, *The Fixer*.

ACCORDING TO AN OLD PROVERB of the Peruvian sierra, "the Indian is the kind of beast that most resembles Man."

The Indian and his culture have always been Peru's great beauty and agony and main source of national identity. Yet the labyrinthine social and psychological depths of the Indian problem, raising complex issues of race, class, and property, are fully equal to those of the Negro question in the United States.<sup>6</sup> Through nearly all its history, the Peruvian economy has depended on various forms of involuntary servitude, dating back

<sup>6</sup> Under the new land reform program of the "Revolutionary government," Indians are now called *campesinos*, which is supposed to be more dignified.

to Inca times. For centuries in the colonial period, forced Indian labor worked the mines and haciendas of the sierra, while Negro slaves worked the great plantations of the coast in the kind of classic slave economy developed in the Caribbean and Brazil.

When Negro slavery was abolished in 1854, the coastal *hacendados* frenetically imported indentured Chinese coolies, under conditions resembling the outlawed slave trade, who were bossed in the fields and hunted as fugitives by freed black overseers. When international pressures forced an end to the coolie trade, recruiters from the coastal haciendas traveled among the Indian communities of the northern sierra, hiring Indians for their plantations with a small advance payment that trapped them into a permanent form of debt-servitude, and often paying local government officials a commission for each Indian recruited. The abolition of slavery had created a recurrent and critical labor shortage that led finally to the creation of a new native proletariat on these coastal plantations.

In the Andes the Spanish conquest pressed the former Inca empire into the European mercantile economy. Under the Incas all taxes were paid in labor, and money was unknown. After Pizarro captured and killed the Inca monarch Atahualpa in 1533, the customary peasant obligations to till the lands of the state and the Sun were transferred to Spanish Crown appointees called *ecomenderos* who, besides utilizing unpaid Indian labor, deranged the traditional economy by demanding tribute in gold and in produce not locally grown. At the same time the Inca draft labor quota for public works, known as the *mita*, was converted into mass mobilizations for forced labor in the colonial mines. The colonial bureaucracy was soon swollen with *mestizos*, mulattoes, and freed Negroes exacting more and more tribute from the Indians, who were also forced to buy a wide variety of luxury goods imported from Spain.

Shortly before he was captured and marched in chains to his execution before a grandstand full of Crown dignitaries in the

Plaza de Armas of Cuzco, the rebel Indian chieftain José Gabriel Túpac Amaru (1741–81), today the leading symbol of Peru's "Revolutionary government," wrote a letter to a high official to explain the great rebellion. Wealthy, Jesuit-educated, permitted by the Spaniards to ride a horse and to collect

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***"The traditional private bank was at the heart of a group or clan's business operations. . . ."***

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Indian tribute, Túpac Amaru wrote to the royal *visitador*:

This system has placed us near death, with its immense excesses. What these Castillians have bought for 2 or 3 pesos they force on us for 10 or 12; a cheap knife is sold for 10 times the real value. They force on us brooches, fancy hatpins, blue bath powder, cheap eyeglasses, rubber stamps, and other ridiculous things, as if we Indians used these Spanish fashions.<sup>7</sup>

Like Spain, Peru became a mercantile and

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<sup>7</sup> Both Cuzco and La Paz were besieged by Indian armies, and manor houses were burned to the ground in the great rebellion that struck such terror among the Spaniards as can only be measured by the horror of Túpac Amaru's execution. According to an eye-witness, "the performance closed with the rebel José Gabriel who (after seeing his whole family put to death) was taken to the center of the plaza. There the hangman cut out his tongue and, his shackles then removed, they placed him on the ground, tying each of his arms and legs to four different horses, which were sent galloping in four different directions, a spectacle never before seen in this city! I don't know whether the horses weren't very strong, or that the Indian in reality was made of iron, but the horses absolutely could not tear him apart, even after a long time pulling at him while suspended in the air, so that he looked like a spider. Then the *visitador* of the Crown, moved to compassion, so the unhappy man would not suffer more, ordered . . . that the hangman cut off his head. Then, beneath the gibbet, the arms and legs of the Indian and his wife were cut off and carried to the hill of Picchu, where they were burned to ashes and the ashes cast to the wind and into the little river that runs by there." Quoted in Bolesalo Lewin, *La Rebelión de Túpac Amaru* (Buenos Aires, 1957) pp. 475, 497.

bureaucratic society. It was modeled along the colonial principle that all traders and officials must be European Spaniards, and no overseas trade was permitted except with Spain. The same mercantile system was reproduced in miniature even in remote haciendas like Lauramarca, whose manor house was burned down in the Túpac Amaru rebellion, where the hacienda monopolized trade with its serfs, a practice later recreated among the new Indian proletariat on the coastal plantations.

The image of Túpac Amaru is everywhere in Peru today. His rebellion and martyrdom now have a kind of religious significance, and the "Revolutionary government" has adopted an imagined likeness of him as its official symbol. Although there are no extant portraits of Túpac Amaru, an extraordinary image of him has been created by the pop artists of the promotion department of the Ministry of Agriculture and spread about the country on billboards, in official pamphlets, and on signs at schools, factories, and at the entrance to expropriated haciendas where cooperatives have been formed by the government. It is a simple, black-and-white head with a high, broad-brimmed hat and a starched collar reminiscent of the dress of the Puritans of 17th-century New England; the image is symmetrical, save for a shadow on the left side of the face, which gives him a harsh, haunted, distant look. The shadow on his face stresses Túpac Amaru's Indian facial structure, yet his upper-class European dress makes him resemble one of the old *mestizo* landlords of the sierra.

These old cultural molds are proving an imposing obstacle to the revolutionary changes being attempted in Peru today. This was shown dramatically in January when 5 Indians were killed and 20 wounded in a clash with rural police near the town of Carhuaz in the scenic Andean valley of the Callejón de Huaylas, which was devastated by the May 1970 earthquake that killed some 50,000 persons and left hundreds of thousands of others homeless. Whole towns were

destroyed by the earthquake and then the avalanches of water and mud that descended into the Callejón when the crown of Mount Huascarán, the highest peak in the Peruvian Andes, collapsed and released the waters of an inland lake.

One of the most striking psychological phenomena in this havoc was the surviving *mestizo* townspeople's intense fear of the surrounding Indian population. They preferred to sleep on cold mountainsides and live without food for several days rather than seek refuge in Indian huts. The rising tensions between Indians and *mestizos* in the area was reflected in an editorial in *El Diario de Huaráz*, the newspaper of the departmental capital, entitled "Campesino Go Home," accusing the Indians of "causing a grave and permanent problem with the artificial presence of people [in Huaráz] who are not of the city but of the country. The influx stems from the handing out of food and this having finished there is nothing for you [Indians] to do in the city and therefore it is urged . . . that you go back to your homes and allow us to have a decorous life." The paper also attacked the *mestizos* who "have quickly left their homes to rent them to banking and state entities at prohibitive prices and have gone to live in tents."<sup>8</sup>

The official version of the January clash between Indians and police at the Hacienda San Antonio outside Carhuaz sounds like an episode from one of the classic novels of the Peruvian sierra. Among the Indian communities surrounding Carhuaz leaflets were circulated containing the text of the decree-law governing reconstruction of the earthquake zone, with a false article added granting immunity for invasion of lands. Shortly thereafter, Indians from five communities descended upon the Hacienda San Antonio, which was owned by relatives of the subprefect of Carhuaz. The subprefect sent police to the hacienda, who arrested the *comuneros'* leaders, upon which roughly 2,000 Indians surrounded Carhuaz, armed with sticks, ma-

<sup>8</sup> Quoted in the *Peruvian Times*, July 30, 1970, p. 4.

chetes, and old guns. The Indians then entered the town in three columns, occupying the city hall, the main plaza, and the police station and taking the subprefect's wife as hostage. The departmental prefect ordered police reinforcements sent from Huaraz to "impose order in the zone," resulting in 5 Indians dead, 20 wounded, and many more arrested on charges of "cattle-stealing, property damage, land invasion, violation of individual property . . . etc."

Shortly after the incident Monsignor Luis Bambaren, the tall Jesuit who is the auxiliary bishop assigned to Lima's squatter slums as well as a native of the earthquake zone, issued a statement in his role as president of the Bishops' Commission for Social Action which warned that the Carhuaz bloodshed is

a symptom of a deep malaise that summons us to reflect beyond these concrete facts to see more profound evils. . . . Good laws are not enough if an authentic revolutionary mystique does not exist at all levels of the public administration. Otherwise, frustration cannot be avoided in the face of incomplete execution of the laws or of deals contrary to justice that are made through conversion of family, friendship, or business interests.<sup>9</sup>

Padre Ricardo Antoncich, secretary of the Bishops' Commission, later explained:

The hopes of the dispossessed have been awakened, but these isolated events seem to show that distrust and disillusion are beginning to undermine this hope. I have seen a very bad situation in some rural zones where the agrarian reform has not been applied because of very complex difficulties. This is even more dramatic in the earthquake zone where practically all means of production have been destroyed. The commitment, moreover, is not to reconstruct the misery but to build a new society.

In a recent speech before 100,000 people

in the Plaza de Armas in Lima, President Velasco dealt with mounting complaints of this kind.

We understand [he said] that the old public administration is inadequate for the purposes of a government that wishes to transform rather than maintain the traditional system. This explains why many public servants at all levels are insensitive to the changes of the Revolution. Moreover, not understanding that Peru now lives in a new epoch, many of them frequently act as saboteurs of the Revolution. The Revolutionary government will have to correct this situation with energetic measures. But citizens should also insist on a new attitude and should not tolerate any more the insolence, unjustifiable slowness, and corruption of bad functionaries. . . . We understand very well that many believed in October 1968 that this was just another military coup. This involved the initial distrust and skepticism of some sectors of the people and the true surprise of some intellectuals, who could not believe that this would be a revolutionary process. Nevertheless, nobody can now reasonably remain in doubt.

#### Background: Native Compradors and Foreign Entrepreneurs

TO FULLY APPRECIATE the audacity of the reforms being undertaken by Peru's military rulers, no matter how flawed they may appear in their execution, one must have a much clearer idea of the peculiar concentrations of political and economic power that made Peru for most of its republican history the Land of the Interlocking Directorate. Its political history at times has seemed like that of a banana republic without bananas, and its successive economic policies a series of mindless scrambles for the next foreign loan, for which its export and customs revenues were regularly hocked as security.

The Peruvian ruling class, especially as it developed in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, was much less an oligarchy in the Greek sense of the word than a variant of the native *comprador* class<sup>10</sup> that arose in China

<sup>9</sup> See "Carhuaz: Sintoma de un Profundo Malestar," in *OIGA* (Lima: no. 409), February 5, 1971, p. 14.

<sup>10</sup> "The term 'comprador' (of Portuguese derivation) had become well-established in the pidgin

with the establishment of Western trading enclaves. Britain's financing of the Latin-American Wars of Independence made her the principal creditor of virtually every republic, and she soon became the dominant trading power in the area for the next century. Three large Peruvian bond flotations on the London market during the 1820s, equal to roughly five times the new republic's current revenues, made Peru Britain's third-largest debtor in Latin America within five years of winning independence; by 1875 Peru had borrowed more money in London than any of the other new nations.<sup>11</sup> This enormous debt was made possible by Peru's exports of guano, the nitrogen-rich bird droppings dug from the offshore islands in the cold Humboldt current for its remarkable fertilizing properties, which by the mid-1850s was Britain's biggest single import from Latin America, bringing Peru its greatest wealth since discovery of the silver mines in the 16th century.<sup>12</sup>

How the income from guano exports was used by Peru's rulers is a fascinating tale. In 1849, after payment of the British bonds had been in default for 23 years, the bondholders, backed by British diplomats and

the British navy, won an agreement that half the proceeds of the booming guano sales in Great Britain would be delivered in cash to the bondholders' agents. Since the stuff was sold abroad on monopoly consignment to foreign merchant houses, who inflated shipping and handling costs, the Peruvian government's income from the London guano sales was greatly reduced. As a result of furious public debate in Lima as to whether Peru was being swindled out of its guano revenues, the government began issuing guano export franchises to Peruvian businessmen, whose first impulse was to sell them to foreign merchant houses at a profit.<sup>13</sup> After this was officially prohibited, the same insiders launched a spectacular financial operation politely known as consolidation of the internal debt.

The government's internal debt largely consisted of old claims for property damages during the Wars of Independence; slaves drafted into the army; cattle and crops seized to feed troops; farms, buildings, and crops destroyed, etc. Friends of the government frantically combed the capitol's archives for old claims and forged other documents to exchange them for new government bonds that within three years swelled the public debt fivefold.<sup>14</sup> Such political scandal resulted that the new bondholders were afraid the government would fall and the next one would repudiate the debt; so the government

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English of the China coast to designate the 'general manager' who represented a foreign merchant in all his operations in China. . . . The compradors of foreign firms in the treaty ports soon became merchants in their own right." From John K. Fairbank, *The United States and China* (Viking, 1962), p. 167. Harold Isaacs adds in his classic *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution* (Atheneum, 1966), pp. 6-7: "Landlords sent their sons into the cities to join the lucrative business of compradoring. It was the rare comprador who was not also an absentee landlord. . . . Because they were unable to compete with the superior force and material technique of the foreigners, the old landlord-merchant class was transformed, in significant degree, into a class of brokers, money lenders, and speculators, with interests divided between town and country and directly tied to foreign interests."

<sup>11</sup> See W. M. Mathew, "The Imperialism of Free Trade: Peru, 1820-70" in *Economic History Review* (vol. 21 no. 3), December 1968, p. 563.

<sup>12</sup> The extraction of guano from the offshore islands was a messy business for which no free labor was available. When the first shipment of the stuff reached Southampton, England, the odor was so foul that the whole town reportedly took to the hills. The ammonia fumes produced by the bird

droppings sometimes shriveled the skin about the eyes of the workers and occasionally caused blindness. In 1853 the labor force extracting guano consisted of 600 Chinese coolies and roughly half as many slaves and prison convicts. Each worker had to deliver four tons of guano daily to the edge of a cliff. Between 1852 and 1854 some 60 coolies committed suicide by throwing themselves over the cliffs. According to a British consul in 1870, guards were posted at the cliffs of the guano islands to prevent coolies from killing themselves. See Watt Stewart, *Chinese Bondage in Peru* (Duke University Press, 1951), p. 98.

<sup>13</sup> Jonathan Levin's essay on "Peru in the Guano Age" in his *The Export Economies* (Harvard University Press, 1960) describes these shifts in detail.

<sup>14</sup> For a detailed account of these financial operations, see Jorge Basadre, *Historia de la Republica del Peru: 1822-1933* (Lima, 1969), 6th ed., vol. IV, pp. 19-40.

secretly negotiated a contract with two French banks to swap the new bonds for gold to be repaid out of proceeds from guano sales in France. When the terms of the contract were published, a revolution occurred in 1854 that ousted the government, freed the slaves, and abolished the hated *contribución de indigenas*, the Indian head tax that was the mainstay of the internal revenue system. An investigating commission later decided that half the new bonds were based on illegal or fraudulent claims, but the new government chose to pay off the French bankers to save Peru's international credit standing.

In this way Peru became, until the present military regime seized power in 1968, one of the most submissive fields of foreign business operations in Latin America. The guano boom financed a program of high-cost railroad construction in the Andes executed by an American, Henry Meiggs. The bubble lasted less than a decade, and was fabricated entirely of bonds. According to Meiggs's brother and partner, "you are probably aware that we take bonds for the work: The amount seems at first thought large, but if security amounts to anything, we have the whole of Peru, Boots & Breeches."<sup>15</sup> When the bubble burst, Meiggs was even authorized to issue his own paper money to pay off his workers, mostly Chileans and Chinese coolies; Indian labor was so despised that many thousands of foreign workers were imported to build railroads even in the high altitudes that were the Indians' native habitat.

<sup>15</sup> Letter from John G. Meiggs to E. P. Fabri, Lima, March 13, 1870, quoted in Watt Stewart, *Henry Meiggs, Yankee Pizarro* (Duke University Press, 1946). There are striking cultural parallels in the reluctance to create home industries and in the importation of skilled foreigners between Peru in the guano age, Venezuela in its present oil boom, and Spain in the 17th century as it was inundated with precious metals from America. In all three cases a tiny minority of the work force was involved in economic activity that flooded a poor, backward country with sudden wealth. Peru's railroad-building fever of a century ago is like Venezuela's highway-building of today. See Salvador de Madariaga's brilliant chapter on "Inflation without Enough Production to Absorb It," in his *The Rise of the Spanish-American Empire* (Free Press, 1965).

However, the government budget was so swollen by maintaining a large army, civilian bureaucracy and pension list, and by paying off a huge public debt that, even with its enormous guano revenues, the treasury was empty and railroad construction stopped.

By then the great mounds of guano sticking out of the sea were nearly exhausted. New hopes were raised from the booming

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***"An extraordinary series of regulations governing the day-to-day operations of the cooperatives . . . makes them flimsy semantic fig leaves for state farms."***

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nitrate industry in Peru's southern deserts, but these lands were soon lost in the disastrous War of the Pacific (1879-84) to Chilean armies that swarmed all over Peru, spurred on by Chinese coolies who served as a Fifth Column and mounted plantation rebellions in their vanguard. When the war was over, Peru and Bolivia had lost their nitrate lands—and Bolivia her entire seacoast—to Chilean and British nitrate financiers.

The guano boom left the Peruvian government in bankruptcy, but enriched many merchants and politicians in Lima, who plowed their profits into the sugar plantations and the nascent capitalism that formed the economic base of the Peruvian oligarchy. This oligarchy was not seriously threatened until the 1960s, when its economic and political power gave way under the impact of both the great peasant migrations from the sierra into Lima and the mushrooming of U.S. business investments in Peru, and the *coup de grace* was delivered by the present "Revolutionary government." Peru's financial prostration after the War of the Pacific, and its utter dependence on loans, led it to delegate its tax-collecting functions to a consortium of the five largest Lima banks, known as the *Caja de Depósitos y Consignaciones*, which for the next seven decades not only charged commissions for tax-collecting and indulged in fraudulent accounting practices,

but also lent out the government's money at high interest both to the public and to the government itself. The great appeal of the *Caja* for the government was that it made the Lima banks a sure source of more loans and intermediaries for foreign credit. During the stock market craze and commodity boom of the 1920s, the Peruvian foreign debt increased nearly tenfold, mainly through \$143 million in loans from New York banks which led to the appointment of an American in 1921 as administrator of Peruvian customs to guarantee the loans.<sup>16</sup>

One of the most notorious of all the escapades of the National City Bank of New York in Latin America during the twenties was the payment of a \$450,000 bribe to the son of dictator Augusto B. Leguía (1919–30) for “not interfering” with the floating of \$100 million in bond issues, which were sold at a handsome profit to American investors before Leguía was overthrown and the bonds went into default.<sup>17</sup> The overseas manager of the National City Bank reported in July 1927, shortly before the bonds were issued, that “Its [Peru's] principal sources of wealth, the mines and oil wells, are nearly all foreign-owned, and excepting for wages and taxes, no part of the value of their production remains in the country. . . . As a whole, I have no great faith in any material betterment of Peru's economic condition in the near future.”<sup>18</sup>

#### The Impermanence of Great Fortunes and Families

THE MOST STRIKING PHENOMENON about the Peruvian oligarchy during this century is the impermanence of the so-called great fortunes and families. Their economic ascendancy is nearly always truncated by two factors: their craven dependence on po-

litical favors and their degeneracy; i.e., incapacity to produce competent heirs. The French sociologist François Bourricaud may have had in mind the Prado family, which twice exercised the presidency in the three decades preceding 1962 and belonged to the inner circles for the rest of the time, when he observed that

these “empires” are much less centralized than they seem . . . and are often very badly managed. . . . The “empire” will defend itself, obtaining customs protection. In a short time the prices fixed by the “empire” are abnormally high, not only in comparison with foreign prices but also with internal competition, and it makes the wrong investments. The “empire” is nourished more by speculative than monopolistic profits. But when an adverse administrative decision comes, all is lost.<sup>19</sup>

During the second administration of President Manuel Prado (1939–45; 1956–62), the Prados' family bank, the Banco Popular, obtained a concession from the other banks belonging to the *Caja* to become the government's principal revenue-collecting agent, and remained so until the *Caja* was nationalized in 1963. However, even this was not enough to assure the prosperity of Peru's largest banking chain. When the “Revolutionary government” nationalized the nearly-bankrupt Banco Popular last year to prevent a takeover by the local subsidiary of the Chase Manhattan Bank, it found something approaching a Mafia-style operation of systematically using depositors' money for loans to politicians and businesses and to the head of the clan's homosexual partners. These unpaid loans were kept on the books as assets, and dividends on nonexistent profits were distributed among stockholders. The traditional private bank was at the heart of a group or clan's business operations, and its primary function was to finance expansion

<sup>16</sup> See James C. Carey, *Peru and the United States: 1900–62* (University of Notre Dame Press, 1964), pp. 71–72; also, Basadre, *op cit.*, vol. 13, p. 227.

<sup>17</sup> J. K. Galbraith, *The Great Crash* (Houghton Mifflin, 1955), pp. 186–87.

<sup>18</sup> Carey, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

<sup>19</sup> Bourricaud, *Poder y Sociedad en el Perú Contemporáneo* (Buenos Aires, 1967), p. 38. This excellent book has just appeared in English, entitled *Power and Society in Contemporary Peru* (Praeger, 1970).

of the group's own political and economic activities. When the military regime took over the Banco Popular last June, there were so many bad loans to the Prados' own businesses, many of which were themselves near bankruptcy, that the government found itself in a position to nationalize two television channels, a large newspaper, two textile mills, and Peru's largest cement factory, besides the Banco Popular's branches in neighboring Bolivia, which form that country's largest private bank.

When the 1969 land reform law was decreed, one of the immediate consequences was the bankruptcy of an important ally and business associate of the Prados, the House of Aspíllaga, one of the traditional families of the Peruvian oligarchy whose mansion was a great aristocratic center in Lima. The source of the Aspíllaga fortune was Cayaltí, a 20,000-acre sugar hacienda on the north coast, but the family branched off into banking, insurance, cement, electric power, a brewery, glass-making, and real estate. The Aspíllagas have long held directorships of the Sociedad Nacional Agraria and the Banco Popular. Shortly before the agrarian reform was decreed, Cayaltí was sold to a syndicate of Cuban exiles and the Aspíllagas obtained a \$3.5 million loan from the Banco Popular on which no payment was ever made.<sup>20</sup>

When I visited Cayaltí, once known as the jewel of Peru's coastal plantations and one of the few that were entirely owned by Peruvians,<sup>21</sup> there was a sign at the entrance that read: "Welcome If You Don't Make Trouble." The place was in acute decline and disarray, in contrast with the other, highly efficient sugar haciendas taken by the agrarian reform. The mill was reached by a

bumpy, dusty road, littered with dried scraps of sugar cane, that differed greatly from the modern internal road systems of the other haciendas. The great manor house looked across a garden and an empty swimming pool to the smokestacks of the mill that suffused the place with a strong smell of molasses.

The manager of the newly formed cooperative told me:

The place is in a mess. The mill has to be completely replaced. The workers' houses are hovels, built at the turn of the century. They are overcrowded because the owners didn't care who lived in them, and so the workers brought in their relatives from the sierra, giving Cayaltí a population of 19,000 supported by only 2,000 workers. The sons of Aspíllaga had no talent or appetite for the business. Many years ago they spent a lot of money on new machinery, and it turned out to be the wrong kind of equipment. There were strikes and social conflict, and they just didn't bother to come around anymore.

### III

#### **The Changes**

THE NEW AGRARIAN REFORM and the other radical measures decreed by the "Revolutionary government" are climaxing the swift and convulsive change that Peru has been experiencing in the postwar years. This process has embraced the rapid growth of towns, a flood of peasant migrants into the cities, the mushrooming of public education, the rise of a large middle class that dominates the government bureaucracy, the punching of penetration roads into remote mountains and jungles, and a series of peasant rebellions in the Andes of increasing frequency and violence that led to the guerrilla insurrections of the 1960s. In this process millions of Indians have become *cholos*, identifying with populist political movements and generating powerful pressures for reform.

<sup>20</sup> See *OIGA* (Lima: no. 348), October 31, 1969, p. 8. Also, Carlos Malpica, *Los Dueños del Peru* (Lima: Fondo de Cultura Popular), p. 11.

<sup>21</sup> See the agrarian reform pamphlet, *Del Latifundio a la Reforma Agraria*, for the government's version of foreign ownership of the great haciendas. Many owners created dummy corporations abroad to facilitate expatriation of profits.

The magnitude of this social epic is reflected in the recent educational statistics, which show that school enrollments doubled over the past decade and university attendance grew more than fourfold; indeed, between 1958 and 1966 the number of Peru-

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***"Cities like Lima "have outgrown their own means of livelihood. . . ."***

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vian universities increased from 5 to 34. Despite a tragically high dropout rate, incompetent teaching and backward curriculum, hundreds of thousands of peasant teenagers each year move into adobe hovels at the outskirts of provincial and departmental capitals to finish their primary and secondary studies, subsisting mainly on potatoes and *chuño* sent monthly by their families in remote villages and Indian communities.

Between the censuses of 1940 and 1961, 17 Peruvian cities doubled their populations, three of them growing more than tenfold. But the most dramatic instance of urbanization in Peru is the avalanchelike descent of peasants from the sierra into Lima, the classic primate city, which has tripled in size since 1940 to a population of about 2.5 million. Each day some 200 buses and from 1,000 to 1,500 trucks arrive from the Andes to La Parada, Lima's central marketplace and terminal, which is both the heart of the big city's underworld and the main sieve for the adaptation of new peasant migrants to city life. There are acres of *cholo* cobblers in blue work-aprons, sitting on rustic stools behind foot-powered sewing machines, waiting all day for a pair of shoes. Swirling crowds of peddlers and porters, fresh from the sierra, hustle for a dollar a day—far more than the going wage for unskilled labor in most provincial towns—wandering through the great market in rubber-tire sandals. La Parada is also where *barriada* land

invasions of the desert hills surrounding Lima are organized by migrants trying to escape from the teeming, reeking *callejón* slums of the center city. There have been more than 100 such invasions of vacant urban land over the past 20 years,<sup>22</sup> the invaders inevitably carrying red-and-white Peruvian flags, answering with their slingshots the teargas assaults of riot police sent to evict them and to burn the gaunt shacks of straw matting and bamboo poles built on the desert hillsides overnight. Within two or three years, the shacks undergo a remarkable

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<sup>22</sup> The great American anthropologist Richard Patch wrote a pioneer report in 1955 on "The City of God," one of the earliest and largest of the Lima land invasions, organized by a lame worker named Alejandro López: "Don Alejandro worked mainly with four labor unions: of taxi drivers, domestic servants, hotel workers and brick workers. He hired hydrologists to locate land near Lima with underground water that could be tapped with wells, geologists to study the clay and sand, locating materials which would be suitable for eventual brick- and glass-making. At last he decided on a vast tract of pampa lying between the Atocongo and Ica highways with abundant water and useful construction materials. The land belonged to the Government which used it infrequently for military exercises. Don Alejandro then formally petitioned the Government to sell the land to his association for a reasonable price, but his petition was not so much as acknowledged. He was approached by political interests hostile to the Government who offered their help, but Sr. López refused, preferring to keep his project out of the political arena. At last it was apparent that the Government had no intention of even recognizing his hopes, and he determined to occupy the land. So on Christmas Eve (deliberately chosen for its religious significance) between 6,000 and 8,000 persons responded to his call, carrying the materials for their huts on their backs. From this material they built an estimated 3,000 "houses" during the night, scattered over many square miles of the desert. The Government was stupefied when it learned of what had taken place, and gave the squatters three days to remove themselves. However, by this time the newspapers had published so much about La Ciudad de Dios that it became a matter of great public interest. . . . Popular opinion soon forced the Government to capitulate." From Patch, "The City of God," Institute of Current World Affairs newsletter RWP-7, 1955. Also see Patch's *La Parada, Lima's Market: A study of Class and Assimilation*, American Universities Field Staff, West Coast South America Series, vol. 14, nos. 1-3.

transformation, from straw to adobe to brick construction, financed by the savings of workers earning less than three dollars daily.

According to John Turner of the Harvard-M.I.T. Joint Center for Urban Studies,

let us imagine we are looking down on Lima. Looking back 25 years we see a smallish and quite compact city of some 600,000 people. Looking forward 25 years we see a sprawling metropolis of some 6 million inhabitants. Barring world catastrophe, Lima will have grown 1,000 percent or more in less than a modern man's lifetime and this will be typical of the majority of major cities in the urbanizing countries. Let us now look at the area that will have grown during those 50 years. Based on simple extrapolation of growth trends from 1940 to the present, by 1990 three-quarters of the population of the entire city—4.5 million people—would be living in areas originally settled by squatters—in *barriadas* or *ex-barriadas*.<sup>23</sup>

In this way the urban population of Latin America has been growing at two or three times the rural growth rates, with the marginal populations in the squatter slums increasing at three to four times the general urban rate.<sup>24</sup> With such cities as Lima leading the way, the worldwide rate of urbanization between 1950 and 1960 was twice that of the preceeding 50 years.<sup>25</sup> Moreover, the present torrent of Latin-American urbanization differs basically from that of Europe a century ago, when the rate of industrial employment was much higher and the peasant migration rates were much lower. This growth has strained government budgets with enormous demands for schools, streets, hospitals, and electricity, and has hideously inflated the overhead costs of economic de-

velopment. *The Economist* not long ago voiced growing alarm that cities like Lima "have outgrown their own means of livelihood. . . . Urban growth has become pathological. It threatens to overlay and stunt the healthy elements of expansion."<sup>26</sup> Nevertheless, few Peruvians would disagree with the contention of their able foreign minister, one of the ideologues of the "Revolutionary government," that "the *barriadas*, a new phenomenon, are a symbol—despite their scars—of the process of liquidation of the feudal system in the Andean region."

#### The Progress of Land Reform

WITHIN MONTHS of the inauguration in July 1963 of President Fernando Belaunde Terry, a son of provincial aristocracy with immense showmanship and popular appeal, the Indian communities of the central sierra invaded two giant sheep ranches, each roughly the size of Rhode Island, of the U.S.-owned Cerro de Pasco Mining Corporation and the wealthy Fernandini family, which has important cotton, mining, and real estate interests elsewhere in Peru. Hungry for more pastures because of heavy demographic pressures on their communal lands, thousands of Indian families, sounding cornets and carrying red-and-white Peruvian flags, cut the wire fences of these great haciendas and descended upon their upland pastures to build precarious huts. Some came on horseback behind women who formed the forward phalanx, marching with swaddled infants on their backs, casting stones with slingshots at police assault troops with punishing accuracy. President Belaunde, who was elected on a promise of land reform, traveled with his entire cabinet to the mountain town of Junin and, with great ceremony, signed a pact with Indian community leaders that promised them new lands under a sweeping agrarian reform if they would stop the invasions. To keep his word in the face of pro-

<sup>23</sup> See Turner, *Uncontrolled Urban Settlement*, paper given at United Nations Seminar on Urbanization, University of Pittsburgh, 1966. U.N. Document no. 67-44032, p. 43.

<sup>24</sup> See Richard M. Morse, "Recent Research on Urbanization in Latin America," in *Latin American Research Review*, Fall 1965, p. 56.

<sup>25</sup> See Kingsley Davis, "The Urbanization of the Human Population," in *Scientific American*, September 1965, p. 41.

<sup>26</sup> See "The Poor World's Cities," a survey, *The Economist*, December 6, 1969, p. 56.

tracted congressional debate over a new land reform statute, Belaunde borrowed \$5 million from the Chase Manhattan Bank at commercial interest rates to finance expropriation of the Fernandini estate, Hacienda Algolán.

Near Cuzco, meanwhile, a group of Indian *comuneros* led by a few Trotskyites attacked the Hacienda Ninabamba; the landlord and his son had submachine guns which they fired from the chimney and windows of the manor house, killing eight peasants and wounding 23 more; the incident caused the fall a few days later of the first of Belaunde's eight cabinets (in five years) under censure by an opposition parliament controlled by landlord interests. In January 1964 several hundred peasants invaded the bottomland of the Hacienda Onocora near the town of Sicuani, where the pasture land and an old flour mill were disputed in a battle between *comuneros* and police that left 17 dead and 30 wounded, leading to a suspension of constitutional guarantees in the southern sierra and a police roundup of "communist agitators." One of those arrested later told me, "The *sindicatos* we organized could not be stopped. I went to Sicuani to tell them not to take rash actions, but the *comuneros* would not listen and kept on seizing hacienda lands all over the province."

It was under President Belaunde's rule that, in 1964, Peru's first general land reform law was finally passed by a Congress frightened by the wave of peasant rebellions and land invasions in the sierra. The 1964 law broke new ground by providing for payment for expropriated lands in bonds instead of cash, but otherwise tried to bestride, blunderingly, the great peasant clamor for land and the demands for protection of powerful landlord interests. Few events of the 1960s did more to discredit the parliamentary system than the deals made by the political parties in control of Congress to create in the 1964 law huge procedural obstacles and exemptions preventing the expropriation of large haciendas—for which, in any

case, the land reform agency was systematically starved of funds. At the same time, the 1964 law aggravated Peru's *minifundio* problem by promiscuously granting provisional titles to hacienda serfs for the marginal lands they had occupied for centuries, without either expanding these tiny subsistence plots into more productive units or providing financial or technical support to improve them.

The new and more radical land reform law of the "Revolutionary government" was drafted mainly by technicians who had worked with the 1964 law for five years, and retained many of its key provisions. The main differences are the streamlining of expropriation procedures, elimination of escape clauses, creation of a minimum family-farm unit (7.5 acres), and granting export priorities to cooperatives formed by agrarian reform beneficiaries. The biggest difference, of course, is the will and authority of a military regime to carry out an ambitious expropriation program aimed at eliminating all old-style *latifundios* by 1975.

#### Land Reform on the Coast

ON THE DAY OF General Velasco's speech proclaiming the new land reform law, the "Revolutionary government" moved to expropriate the great coastal sugar mills and haciendas, or "agroindustrial complexes," that had been specifically exempted from expropriation under the old law.

The most important of these "agroindustrial complexes" is Casa Grande, the largest sugar hacienda in all South America and the biggest agricultural estate in Peru, with 260,000 acres in the rich Chicama Valley on the Pacific Coast and another million acres in cattle and timber lands in the northern sierra and along the semitropical eastern slopes of the Andes. Casa Grande today is an ocean of tall, golden-green stalks of sugar cane, with small clearings for sleepy towns that once were Indian communities, long ago de-

prived of their lands, with such names as Ascope, Santiago de Cao, and Paiján, centers of the great Chimú culture of pre-Inca times.

For irrigation, there are 159 small dams operated electronically from a central switch board. The irrigated fields spread westward for nearly 30 miles from the Pan-American highway to the foothills of the Andes, where the Chicama River begins to form its broad flood plain, the biggest of the 50-odd river valleys producing occasional green gashes of fertility along Peru's 2,000-mile desert coast. Among these dense masses of sugar cane runs an excellent system of asphalt roads, better than any public highway in Peru, built for large trailer trucks bringing cane from the fields to the towering mill that belches smoke day and night, forming the center of this little world, built right next to the master's house that is shaded by huge trees a century old.

The mill is the greatest modern monument of the valley, built more than a half-century ago by the German owners of Casa Grande, the Gildermeister family. It took German engineers four years to install the new machinery after the Gildermeisters merged with a Bremen consortium that financed it, beginning operations just in time to cash in on the post-World War I boom in sugar prices. The insatiable appetite of the huge mill for more and more cane, plus the powerful financial backing of the Gildermeisters that enabled them to benefit from the boom-and-bust cycles of the sugar industry when smaller enterprises failed, turned Casa Grande into the center of an efficient and constantly expanding economic machine. In this way some 2,500 families lost their farms to the three great haciendas of the Chicama Valley, Casa Grande and Laredo, owned by the Gildermeisters, and Cartavio, owned by W. R. Grace & Co. of the United States. In the meantime the valley became one of the main industrial centers of Peru, with 100,000 workers concentrated there, turning the mill centers into virtual cities with administrative

offices, churches, a hospital, primary and secondary schools, bank branches, stores, and later movie houses, all surrounded by the densely packed workers' dwelling compounds.

To the tensions created by the swallowing-up of hundreds of small haciendas by the great estates and the sudden creation of a large rural proletariat, another development at Casa Grande was added that disturbed the life of the region even more. Between 1917 and 1920 the Gildermeisters came to the aid of the financially desperate government in Lima with loans totaling (British) £ 244,000, and obtained a permit to build their own port through which they could export sugar and import consumer goods duty-free. They established a huge supermarket, or "bazaar," on the hacienda which made Casa Grande the dominant commercial establishment in the region, ruining local merchants in the city of Trujillo thanks to price advantages derived from the Gildermeisters' having their own ships, railroad, and duty-free port.

Business activity practically ceased in the small towns of the valley, and the Chamber of Commerce of Trujillo repeatedly protested in vain to the government against the "scandalously ruinous" practices of unfair competition by the bazaar at Casa Grande.<sup>27</sup> The result was a political alliance against the power of the Gildermeisters between the dispossessed landowners of the Chicama Valley, the urban middle class, and the new sugar proletariat on the great haciendas, a pattern repeated throughout northern Peru. This led to the formation of Latin America's first "multi-class" political party, APRA (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance), the only mass movement in Peruvian history,

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<sup>27</sup> For an excellent account of the growth of Casa Grande and its historical consequences, see Peter Klaren's *La Formación de las Haciendas Azucareras y los Orígenes del APRA*, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Peru-Problema no. 5, Lima, 1970.

which has drifted steadily to the Right over the past three decades, yet remains Peru's strongest political party.<sup>28</sup> The leadership of both APRA and the Peruvian military officer corps come from the provincial *mestizo* middle class, yet an alliance between the two has always been blocked by the blood feud resulting from a 1932 APRA uprising in Trujillo in which 11 army officers were taken hostage and killed, and later hundreds of APRA followers were taken to the pre-Incaic ruins of Chan-chan in the desert outside Trujillo and shot by army firing squads.

In the years that followed, the political mobilization of the provincial *mestizos* would increasingly curtail the power of the coastal oligarchy, yet the feud between APRA and the army would leave the traditional ruling class plenty of room for maneuver. In 1948 the sugar and cotton barons could still induce a general to seize power, end exchange controls, devalue the currency to enlarge their exports, and crack down on the APRA unions on their plantations. Nevertheless, although the bitterness between APRA and the army continues, the larger social pressures involved were bringing this age to an end.

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<sup>28</sup> In roughly two decades of clandestine and semi-clandestine activity that followed the 1932 Trujillo uprising, APRA developed the characteristics of both a tightly disciplined political party and a kind of quasi-religious Masonic cult, with its own passwords, ritual, and litany and all moral and political authority vested in its leader, Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, who frightened Peru's traditional ruling class with the potential voting power of the provincial *mestizos*. Peter Klaren astutely wrote of "the growing inclination of Haya (as a student leader in 1921) to place political convenience and personal aggrandizement above ideological conviction. . . . Haya does not appear to have been an especially original thinker but, instead, has talent to join, adapt and popularize the ideas of others." Today, at 76, he is a toothless old man, still the most loved and hated figure in Peruvian politics, who can still be seen giving lectures at night to workers at APRA's Casa del Pueblo in downtown Lima, which resembles one of the big settlement houses on New York's Lower East Side in the early decades of this century. He has never fulfilled his presidential ambitions, but he has wrecked many governments, and could wreck this one as well.

On a visit to Casa Grande a few months after it was expropriated by the agrarian reform, I chatted with an old field foreman who recalled the days early in this century when the expansion of Casa Grande was gathering momentum, when there were some 13,000 workers instead of the present automation-reduced payroll of 5,000.

At 4:30 each morning there was a big lineup in the plaza between the mill and the church [he told me]. The *patrón*, Gildermeister, was there himself, on horseback, as were the field bosses, and the peons were massed like foot-soldiers in a huge military formation, assigned for the day to this field or that, carefully counted so that just enough lunches would be sent to the fields at mid-day. The *patrón* was capable of showing up at the mill at crazy hours, at midnight or three in the morning, and would stand at the gate and personally beat up a worker if he found him stealing. Now the workers have begun to steal automobile and tractor parts from the workshops and plumbing fixtures from the mill. Since the agrarian reform took over, the new manager and his agronomists don't go out on horseback to inspect the fields. They go in jeeps, and they don't go deep into the cane. At night the new agronomists drive the hacienda's jeeps into the city of Trujillo to go to the movies. Before the agrarian reform it was impossible to take these jeeps outside the hacienda.

The agrarian reform, however, brought a number of important symbolic changes. An old sign was soon torn down that bore a Franciscan motto in Latin, "*Tace, Ora et Labora*" ("Be Silent, Pray and Work") that for nearly a century was seen above the old clock at the entrance to the mill; in its place was painted a likeness of Túpac Amaru and a famous slogan in Quechua: "*Ama Sua, Ama Llulla, Ama Kella*" ("Don't Steal, Don't Loaf, Don't Lie"). Shortly thereafter, a bulldozer demolished the high wall that separated the living quarters of the foreign technicians from those of the Peruvian workers, to great fanfare and applause. This was the idea of a severe-looking army intelligence

colonel with a high-pitched voice who was serving as a kind of political commissar overseeing the operations of the three big sugar haciendas in the Trujillo area that were seized from U.S. and German interests. Each of the expropriated haciendas had such an army overseer, reporting directly to the chief of army intelligence in Lima, who also serves as chairman of the National Agrarian Reform Council. The colonel, a graduate of the U.S. army intelligence school in Baltimore, complained to me of

the low cultural level of those forming the organizing committees of the new cooperatives. We are trying hard to help them along, and we are working without a political banner. The new military man is one who thinks and has social feeling. This is a product of the revolution. We can no longer be indifferent to the problems of Peru and the deception of her politicians. We had left things to these corrupt civilians long enough.

Casa Grande and the other principal sugar haciendas of the north coast were expropriated within a few days of General Velasco's June 1969 speech proclaiming the agrarian reform. Since these "agroindustrial complexes" had been specifically exempted from expropriation, after skillful political maneuvering by the sugar interests, under previous agrarian reform legislation, the immediate seizure of the big sugar estates by the military regime showed that the "Revolutionary government really meant business."

At the 13,000-acre Hacienda Tumañ, owned by the aristocratic descendants of Presidents Manuel Pardo (1876-79) and José Pardo (1904-08 and 1915-19), and given to the family by Congress after the elder Pardo was assassinated on the Senate floor, the group of Ministry of Agriculture officials sent to take over the hacienda were met by Tumañ's young manager, Juan Pardo Aramburu, who blocked their path and said, "I am sure that President Velasco does not know what he has done in decreeing the agrarian reform law. He has been listening to a group of civilians acting behind the

scenes. Also, why must he begin with Tumañ, which is the country's fourth-biggest taxpayer?" One of the land reform officials replied:

I understand that your words are purely subjective, due to the expropriation of your hacienda. But I want to tell you that I think President Velasco knows just what he's doing. Wasn't his message to the nation on the purpose of the agrarian reform sufficiently clear? Apart from the social purpose, which is to give the land to those who work it, and the economic purpose, which is to redistribute agricultural incomes so as to expand the national consumers' demand for Peruvian products, the agrarian reform also intends to prevent the economic and political monopoly characterized by the existence of an agrarian oligarchy. (Quoted in *OIGA* [Lima: no. 331], July 4, 1969, p. 44.)

The owner of Tumañ was forcibly removed from the hacienda. Within two weeks after Peru's new land reform law was decreed, Fidel Castro gave his endorsement: "Our judgment of this law is that it is in reality a radical measure that, if executed fully, can be described as revolutionary. . . . If in Peru a true revolution develops, it does not matter that those who promoted it are a group of military leaders."<sup>29</sup>

#### The New Workers' Cooperatives

THE CONVERSION of Peru's great agricultural estates into workers' cooperatives—instead of dividing the land among individual peasants—reflects an effort to preserve economies of scale and thus avoid the production declines and food shortages that have plagued most land reforms in this century. The cooperative formula in Peru draws upon the Christian Democratic ideal of communal property, the Marxist principle of collectivized agriculture, and a romantic notion of the ancient Andean traditions of the

<sup>29</sup> From *The Economist para América Latina* (London), July 23, 1969, p. 10.

*ayllu*, or Indian community, espoused by many Peruvian writers in this century. The idea of turning the big sugar haciendas into cooperatives was proposed by Belaunde in the 1956 election campaign, but it was first formulated nearly three decades before by the arch-enemy of both Belaunde and the

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***"The feud between APRA and the army would leave the traditional ruling class plenty of room to maneuver."***

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generals and colonels who ousted him, Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, who wrote in his fundamental work, *El Antiimperialismo y el APRA*: "The belligerent strength of the middle classes must be used in the benefit of national liberation. They should join in defense of the anti-imperialist State. This supposes a new economic structuring, based on partial or progressive state comptrollership, and especially in the organization of a vast cooperative system."<sup>30</sup> When I asked an army colonel recently about the embarrassing paternity of the military regime's pet project, he replied:

It's true that APRA has been talking about this for decades. But when the time came for action, they always sold out to the oligarchy. When the 1964 agrarian reform law was being debated in Congress, they made a deal with the landlord interests to exempt the big sugar haciendas from expropriation. So what counts is not who talks about agrarian reform, but who carries it out.

Nevertheless, the success of the new sugar cooperatives, and indeed of the entire process of accelerated change, is being jeopardized by the failure of Peru's military rulers and APRA, still the country's strongest political party, to reach the understanding that the situation obviously demands. While the "Revolutionary government" firmly exercises political power, APRA just as firmly controls

the *sindicatos* at the sugar haciendas and is in an excellent position to either support or sabotage the agrarian reform. Ever-mindful of this, the "Revolutionary government" repeatedly jailed APRA union leaders under a new "decree-law" providing summary imprisonment for "sabotaging the agrarian reform." The military's fear that turning the sugar plantations into cooperatives might simply mean handing control of these huge enterprises over to the local APRA political machine has led the "Revolutionary government" to fashion an extraordinary series of regulations governing the day-to-day operations of the cooperatives, which makes them flimsy semantic fig leaves for state farms.

The new rules prohibit membership in any of the governing bodies of the cooperatives to all persons who have exercised leadership in any political party, or who have benefited from special leave from their jobs while holding union office, a feature of both Peruvian labor law and most union contracts. Moreover, the administrative councils and general assemblies of the cooperatives are packed with white-collar and technical employees, and government representatives will control the finances of the new cooperatives until the expropriation bonds are paid off over a 20-year period. To make sure things run smoothly, the army colonels at each hacienda report directly to the chief of army intelligence in Lima, with frequent consultations with the 11 Intelligence colonels forming the COAP (Committee of Advisers to the Presidency) in the Presidential Palace that plans and oversees the execution of the reform program of the "Revolutionary government." The increasing control of the agrarian reform program by the military intelligence apparatus was consummated March 31 with the appointment of General Enrique Valdés Angulo, chief of army intelligence, as Minister of Agriculture.

This supervision has not been able to prevent the agrarian reform bureaucracy from miring itself in an increasing number of local conflicts. I spent five weeks writing portions

<sup>30</sup> Third ed. (Lima: 1970), p. 113.

of this article in the town of Quillabamba at the edge of the Amazon basin in southern Peru, which had been the scene of the La Convención Valley peasant uprisings led by Hugo Blanco in the early 1960s and the short-lived 1965 guerrilla uprising led by Luis de la Puente Uceda.<sup>31</sup> As a result of the peasant uprisings, Peru's first agrarian reform law was specifically decreed in 1963 by an interim military regime in order to expropriate land in the La Convención Valley. Seven years later, titles to the land were finally being distributed, and the local agrarian reform director proudly invited me to a ceremony in the village of Quelluno, deep in the valley, where the land titles were being handed out. In many parts of the valley, peasants were refusing to accept their titles because the plots of land granted them were too small and infertile, usually consisting of the tiny hillside subsistence plots they had always occupied.

At the ceremony in Quelluno a progovernment peasant leader, who had moved into the manor house of the hacienda after it was expropriated and set himself up as a coffee-buyer there, made an impassioned speech in Quechua, urging his audience to "denounce the counterrevolutionary enemies of the agrarian reform. The *campesinos* want arms to defend our agrarian reform." After this speech ended, six peasants announced that they refused to receive their land titles, and they were immediately arrested. When I interviewed them 20 minutes later in the local police station, one of them said:

We stood up at the meeting to ask why we were getting just 10 or 15 acres on a steep hillside while some of our neighbors had between 200 and 500 acres each. We asked why there was no equality, since land is in abundance in some places and the rules say nobody can have more than 75 acres. We want more land, the land of those who have

too much. The director of the agrarian reform said we could ask questions.

A good deal of class conflict has been generated by the coffee-growers' marketing cooperatives that were formed to take advantage of export priorities granted by law to producers' cooperatives. In practice, the cooperatives are dominated by merchants and richer *campesinos* who buy coffee from peasants desperately in need of cash and resell it to the cooperative at the higher price that is paid after several months. A young priest working in the valley, who is a specialist in cooperative education, told me:

Cooperatives imposed from above cannot function because they do not educate. The main problem is that there is not enough qualified personnel to keep accounts in order and to teach illiterate people who have been cheated all their lives how to trust each other. Savings-and-loan cooperatives in Peru have been in trouble because of bad loans. Consumers' cooperatives are plagued by bad purchases and the difficulty of finding honest, competent employees. The government has decided to form cooperatives first and educate its members later. Perhaps this is unavoidable under the circumstances, but it creates great problems.

It is a striking and irrefutable fact that, despite these difficulties, the agrarian reform has generated remarkably little disorder or economic dislocation in nearly two years of accelerated land expropriations and the establishment of a new form of economic organization. Production has risen on the sugar haciendas because the agrarian reform coincided with the end of a two-year drought in the area, and the Nixon administration last year granted Peru a large raise in its U.S. sugar quota, at double the world price, in an effort to wind down the crisis generated by Peru's seizure of the Standard Oil installations at Talara a few days after the "Revolutionary government" took power. The military intelligence system has closely controlled the functioning of the expropriated haciendas, yet has been wise enough to yield

<sup>31</sup> See my earlier reports from the valley, "Letter from Peru," *Commentary*, June 1964, and "Peru's Misfired Guerrilla Campaign," *The Reporter*, January 26, 1967.

when faced with a serious confrontation with the rank-and-file workers. Nevertheless, there has been a nasty series of crises and conflicts that point to serious problems in the future.

My visit to Cayaltí came shortly after the entire hacienda had gone on strike in support of the workers' *sindicato* against the cooperative, despite the government's arguments that unions are no longer necessary because the haciendas now belong to the workers' cooperatives. The government has been trying to break the unions, most of them controlled by APRA, by ending checkoff of union dues and special leave for union leaders and by requiring that the workers address all petitions to the cooperative as individuals and not through the *sindicato*. The strike at Cayaltí occurred when Antenor Vazquez, the recently elected secretary-general of the *sindicato*, was expelled from the cooperative for refusing to return to work after his *licencia sindical* was cancelled.

"The cooperative is still in diapers, but our *sindicato* has a long history, and it was the only thing we had to defend ourselves for many years," Vazquez, a stocky, bronze-faced man, told me as we talked in the midst of a large group of workers in a corner of a barren union hall, furnished with only a few benches and a blasting TV set.

When the order came ending *licencia sindical*, I went to Lima and was granted an audience with President Velasco, who was very cordial but said he had nothing to do with cooperatives. He asked me to give his greetings to the workers, which moved me very much. While I was away the administrator of the hacienda sent a letter to my house expelling me from the cooperative. My son received it and my wife cried, because it said we would have to leave Cayaltí, along with two other union leaders. We called a *sindicato* meeting and decided to strike, giving three days' notice. The new administrators of Cayaltí didn't believe we would strike, but the whole place was shut down. The departmental prefect called us to his office in the city of Chiclayo to discuss the strike, and

had us arrested in his office when a decision came from a labor judge declaring the strike illegal. But I had written already to President Velasco, and Velasco had sent Col. Manuel Segarra of the COAP to settle the strike by talking with the *sindicato* and cooperative leaders. We agreed that things would stay as they were until a new cooperative law is decreed.

Why do workers strike against their own cooperative? Because they don't have real powers to govern it. There are no union members on the Administrative Council. I am now proposing that the Administrative Council and the General Assembly of the cooperative automatically include the *sindicato* with voice but not vote. Our workers are not able to discuss things with people with university degrees. The engineers know technology and know how to talk while we have many illiterates. We don't have enough education to be managers. Absolutely not. But our sons will be managers of Cayaltí.

#### IV

#### *The Brave Bulls*

THE FACE OF General Juan Velasco Alvarado is the face of thousands of men who sit behind small, linoleum-covered desks at army barracks throughout Latin America. There is nothing in the earlier career of President Velasco that differs from that of the great mass of *mestizo* officers climbing the steps of the military bureaucracy; some who have known General Velasco throughout his army career say there has never been anything special about him to make him stand out as a reformer or revolutionary. The successful army officer is an ingrained bureaucrat. Since in Latin America there are few wars and always far too few troop commands for the number of officers seeking them, so superfluous diplomatic posts and staff jobs with fancy titles and no real purpose have to be invented, along with early retirement at full pay, to placate this important political constituency.

In an early presidential speech, Velasco said "we military men are not beginning now

to learn about Peru; we have learned and explored it throughout our careers, from frontier to frontier." Yet, quite typically of the officer corps, only 5 of Velasco's 35 years in the army were spent in the provinces, and none of them in the sierra, Peru's most depressed and populous region. He is a shy, passionate, moon-faced man who makes great displays of courtliness to the endless stream of visitors to his office in the Presidential Palace, though he prefers the language and customs of an army barracks. He sweats and fidgets profusely during his televised speeches, making them a droning agony both for the speaker and his audience, despite the soaring prose prepared for him by an excellent team of civilian speechwriters. General Velasco became president because he was senior commanding officer of the army when the army executed an "institutional" coup d'état on October 3, 1968—three months before his scheduled retirement—to make him the visible head and main spokesman of what journalists call the "Peruvian Military Revolution."

Velasco's biography is revealing, in view of the transformations undergone by the Peruvian military in recent decades. He was born in 1909 in the northern coastal city of Piura, at a time when Chinese coolie labor in the nearby cotton plantations was being replaced by Indians recruited in the sierra. Near Piura a Standard Oil subsidiary, the International Petroleum Co. (IPC), was building new installations—with segregated housing for foreign and Peruvian personnel—to which Velasco was to send army troops in order to nationalize it within a week of assuming the presidency, causing the worst crisis in the history of U.S.-Peruvian relations.

Velasco's father was a poor sanitary inspector in a suburb of Piura, but even this miserable job was subject to political pressures and he was fired after one of the many changes of government in the early 1930s. A high school classmate told me that young Velasco "had only one suit and one pair of

shoes. He was clean but withdrawn, friendly but intimate with nobody, with a large collection of sports clippings and a great will to survive. He studied much, but had poor grades." One of his teachers at the Colegio San Miguel in Piura, Hildebrando Castro Pozo, later became famous as a leader of the *indigenista* movement in Peruvian politics and letters that romanticized Indian communal traditions and agitated for social reform. When Velasco finished high school he could not enter Chorillos, Peru's military academy because he lacked the money to buy a uniform and a sword. One classmate said Velasco entered the army as a private and saved enough from his meager salary—plus tips from running errands and shining shoes—to enter Chorillos the following year.

1930, the year he entered Chorillos, a *zambo*<sup>32</sup> colonel from Piura, Luis Miguel Sanchez Cerro, led a provincial rebellion that ousted the 11-year Leguía dictatorship and launched Peru into a new era of conflict, enlivened by recently imported Marxist and fascist social theories. 1932, Velasco's third year at Chorillos, the bloody APRA uprising occurred in Trujillo and the slaughter of the 11 army officers taken hostage there was to engender hatreds that have never been erased. In 1933, Velasco's last year at Chorillos, Sanchez Cerro was assassinated, allegedly by an *Aprista*, making way for another six years of military dictatorship. Velasco's first important post on the bureaucratic ladder of the army was director of Chorillos from 1950 to 1953 under the violently anti-APRA dictatorship of General Manuel Odría (1948–56). One of Velasco's main tasks as head of Chorillos was to instill in the cadets a fervent fear and hatred of APRA, and Velasco had to be especially convincing in this role because he was married to the clever and beautiful daughter of an APRA leader from Piura. In 1950 a new command school for senior officers called CAEM (*Centro de Altos Estudios Militares*) was founded to engage generals and colonels

<sup>32</sup> A racial mixture of Indian and Negro stock.

in a year of full-time study of Peru's social and economic problems. In future years CAEM would serve as a meeting ground between some of Peru's ablest officers and the leftist politicians and intellectuals who lectured there. Both this ideological *aggiornamento* of the Peruvian military and its hatred

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***"The government has been trying to break the unions, most of them controlled by APRA. . . ."***

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of APRA prepared the ground for the coup d'état of October 1968.

Military life as an agency of social mobility is as old as armies themselves. This social dynamism is reflected in the biographies of President Velasco and many other Peruvian military leaders, the army being the image, roughly speaking, of modern Peruvian society in that the officers are *mestizos*, the sergeants are *cholos* and the privates are Indians. Most army officers come from middle class *mestizo* families of provincial towns, and stand somewhat uncomfortably apart both from the great mass of Indians and *cholos* beneath them and families of whiter skin that form the traditional landholding and commercial oligarchy. Of Peru's generals serving in the period 1955-65, 56 percent were born either in the sierra or the Amazon region, while 94 percent of the directors of Peru's largest corporations in the same period were born in Lima or elsewhere on the coast.<sup>33</sup> The impact of the army officer corps on the profits and practices of these corporate directorates since 1968 is now a matter of historical record. Since the Wars of Independence, many men of low social origins have risen to positions of power in Peru, especially through the army. But never before have the provinces descended in mass upon the capital to transform the nation's social structure, nor has the provincial

middle class ever before fused with such great effect its pretensions of nationalism and social reform.

One of the curious things about the "institutional" military coup of 1968 that created the "Revolutionary government" is that it was plotted and executed by a small elite of army Intelligence and Ranger officers who had played key roles in suppression of the 1965-66 guerrilla uprising. As far as I could determine, none of the other branches of the armed forces were directly involved, although there had been coup rumors for several weeks. The navy and air force had no choice but to fall in line when confronted with the *fait accompli*. The new regime moved quickly to consolidate its military and popular support. It brought high-ranking officers from the navy and air force into cabinet and other high posts and, six days after the coup, seized IPC's Talara refinery, thus ending by fiat 50 years of angry litigation and recrimination—after the agrarian reform, the most popular measure taken by the "Revolutionary government."

Several months later, one of the Peruvian army's leading counterinsurgency specialists, a cultivated officer with a law degree who personally ushered the once-popular President Belaunde out of the Presidential Palace in Lima at 5 A.M. on October 3, 1968, received me in his office in the Palace, where he was serving in the brain trust of 11 Intelligence colonels that guides the reform movement in Peru today.

There is an international conspiracy to overthrow this government [he told me]. We are accused abroad of being Communists because we are not operating in a constitutional democratic system and want profound changes. It is true that army officers were forbidden to read Marx and Mao Tse-tung before, and now they are not. I first studied Marxism in France during the 1950s while taking courses at a French army counterinsurgency school. In 1962, after returning to Peru, I was sent to La Convención Valley near Cuzco when the peasants rebelled under Hugo Blanco. Another young colonel

<sup>33</sup> See Luigi R. Einaudi, *The Peruvian Military: A Summary Political Analysis*, RAND corporation, May 1969, p. 6.

was sent to the central sierra to talk with the Indian communities that had invaded the great sheep ranches to obtain land. I realized how deep the injustices were and how explosive they could be if they continued. Most of the *hacendados* had fled La Convención, and Peru's first land reform law was decreed in 1963 specifically to divide the land in the valley and end forced labor. We came to realize that the whole nation needed the same treatment if we were to survive in peace. So far we have changed things without bloodshed.

#### Cause, Kind, and Progress of the Military Coup

THE REAL CAUSES of the military coup are more complex. The Belaunde regime was probably the most progressive to date in Peruvian history, and during its five years in office, both per capita income and school enrollments increased by 50 percent, agrarian reform was begun, Peru's wretched highway system underwent a huge expansion, and the oligarchic private banks were stripped of their tax-collecting functions and their control of the Central Bank. A handsome architect with a bold program of social reform, Belaunde was supported by the military in the 1963 election after the army had stopped the counting of ballots and seized power the year before, when it appeared that Haya de la Torre and APRA would win the 1962 election by a narrow margin. Because of his military backing and the anti-APRA fervor in his own *Acción Popular* party and among his Christian Democratic allies, Belaunde was unable to form a parliamentary alliance with APRA, which joined in an "impossible" pact of its own with the right-wing forces of ex-dictator Manuel Odría that had persecuted APRA for many years.

Belaunde's reform program was faced from the beginning with a hostile congressional majority; parliamentary votes of censure forced some 20 cabinet changes in five years. The histrionic architect quickly lost the will to fight; shortly after his inauguration Haya de la Torre, now a toothless old man, contemptuously called Belaunde a

*señorito*—a spoiled son of the aristocracy. The long political stalemate was complicated by a series of contraband scandals involving prominent military officers and politicians and by a financial crisis leading to a 50 percent devaluation of the Peruvian sol in 1967. This caused both Belaunde's party and his Christian Democratic allies to split in half, forcing the greatly weakened government to reach an understanding with APRA that cleared the way for what would have been an easy victory for Haya de la Torre in the presidential elections set for 1969. At this point the military made its move.

A few days after the coup, army troops surrounded the vacant building of Congress in downtown Lima and removed a large quantity of documents, including a list of high-ranking officers implicated in the contraband scandals that had shaken the Belaunde regime. Among those involved were the navy minister, the naval intelligence chief, and the director of the PIP (Peru's FBI). The navy minister and the PIP director were forced to resign, but the naval intelligence chief survived to head a "moralization" purge of the Finance Ministry and the Central Bank that deprived Peru of some of its best economists.<sup>34</sup> Two weeks after the documents were removed from Congress, a press conference was called by the new interior and police minister, General Armando Artola, a bald, beefy, blustering cavalry officer in dark glasses who was chief of Army Intelligence during the 1965–66 guerrilla insurrection. The son of a cabinet minister in Odría's military dictatorship, Artola announced at his press conference a new "moralization" campaign to purify official life, and denounced the "golden bureaucracy" in the dissolved Congress that included flagrant payroll padding and globe-trotting at government expense. (When last May's earthquake

<sup>34</sup> When the chairman of the congressional committee that investigated the contraband scandal attempted to publish a book last year disclosing his findings, the printing shop was surrounded by army intelligence agents and the entire edition carted off.

occurred, a large expedition of military officers was in Mexico City at government expense to watch Peru play in the World Cup soccer matches. Ostensibly heading the delegation was General Artola himself; but when the earthquake broke he could not be located in Mexico and finally was traced to a penthouse suite at the Hotel Lido in Miami Beach.)

Six months after the coup, the magazine *Caretas*, which had relentlessly exposed the contraband scandals in the Belaunde regime, reported and commented on a new "decree-law" enabling the government to summarily purge army generals who were out of line politically, as well as one of the four unpublicized pay raises that the military had received since taking power. The whole issue of *Caretas* was confiscated and its independent editor, Enrique Zileri Gibson, deported from the country. The *Caretas* article had criticized the army pay raises as being "inelegant, unjust, and politically negative in view of the recent extension of the salary freeze of other public employees for economy reasons."

Otherwise the "Revolutionary government" has been able to muzzle and intimidate the Peruvian press quite thoroughly. Two of the Lima dailies have been taken over outright, and the rest have been so cowed by a stringent new press law and close supervision by the Interior Ministry that they refrain from reporting stories that might embarrass the government, like the killings at Carhuaz or the strikes at the expropriated sugar haciendas. The most notorious case was the expropriation of the tabloid *Expreso*, owned by Belaunde's ex-finance minister, which was turned into a workers' cooperative with a government-appointed manager; the leftist intellectuals who now edit *Expreso* each assigned themselves three or four salaries drawn in the name of relatives, and have turned the paper into a servile official organ.

Last November, when *Caretas* sharply criticized economic policy and accused the "Revolutionary government" of censoring

the mails, citing as an example Artola's reading aloud of intercepted letters at a press conference, the magazine was attacked from three sides: its offices in downtown Lima were taken over by 15 government tax investigators, and Zileri, who had been allowed to return from his 1969 exile, was accused of obscenity and "crime against press freedom" by the Interior Ministry and the attorney general. Although the government did not refute the charges of mail censorship, Zileri was found guilty, fined a month's salary, and given a six-month suspended sentence subject to "good behavior."

These abuses, however, should not becloud some of the extraordinary changes that the social conscience of the military has undergone in recent years. In the late 1950s, politicians began to talk of a "Nasserist" trend in the armed forces, suggesting a movement akin to the militant lower-middle-class Egyptian officers who in 1952 overthrew King Farouk and set up a reformist regime trumpeting a new "Arab socialism." In 1958 the Peruvian army began to strengthen its intelligence apparatus to deal with the wave of strikes and street disturbances that, in 1956, followed the end of an eight-year military dictatorship and the resumption thereafter of free trade union activity. The general who directed these intelligence operations for the next four years told me recently: "The army was getting tired of being called in to put down the revolts of starving peasants. We were worried about Communism, and we wanted to know who else was behind these uprisings. But we began to tell the landlords and politicians that this dirty work was no longer for us."

Over the past decade, the Peruvian army has come to be known as one of the most professional in Latin America. Part of this, undoubtedly, is due to the sharp competition among the 3,500 officers to fill the few top positions (160 colonelcies and 39 generalships) available to those rising from the junior ranks. This in turn has led to an emphasis on advanced study and merit as a key

to promotion, with Peru having, for example, sent more military personnel to study in the United States than any other hemispheric republic save Brazil, which has an army roughly three times its size.<sup>35</sup> The close relationship with the U.S. military establishment has generated, not surprisingly, an unusually strong love-hate syndrome among Peruvian officers, which is intensified by their dependence on U.S. handouts and bargain sales of surplus military equipment. "Although the surplus equipment we have been receiving from the United States may be obsolete by the standards of your army," a ranking cabinet officer said in an interview, "they are instruments of modernization for us, and require a kind of industrial organization that Peruvians have never built before. This has made us drastically update the curriculum of our military academies, making the army the most modern national institution that Peru has today."

The transformation of the Peruvian military from a provincial constabulary to an insurgent force challenging U.S. policy in Latin America probably would have been impossible without an increasingly intimate dialogue with leftist intellectuals, such as took place at the CAEM between high army officers and the leaders of the mini-parties of Peru's "Little Left" who today serve as advisers to the "Revolutionary government." Shortly after the 1968 coup, the military began implementing a national development plan drafted at CAEM and submitted to Belaunde in 1965.<sup>36</sup> The continuing dialogue between the military and leftist intellectuals gained momentum after Velasco's speech proclaiming the new agrarian reform.

Around this time, members of a tiny Marxist party involved in the 1965-66 guerrilla uprising visited the Palace to talk with a group of colonels to offer their support. Ac-

cording to one of those present, a spokesman for the visitors said, "We Marxists support your struggle for Peru's national independence, even if it is nothing more than that, because we know it will carry you outside

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***"The 'Revolutionary government' has been able to muzzle and intimidate the Peruvian press quite thoroughly."***

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the capitalist system." One of the colonels replied:

Our decision to fight for national independence is irreversible. We are not socialists. But we would not reject such a solution if it were revealed to be absolutely necessary. We will not, however, allow this process of change to be controlled by Marxists in view of the experience of other socialist societies in depriving personal liberty. We don't plan to persecute Marxists, but we are men of Christian philosophy.

Peru's "Revolutionary government" follows the pattern of many military dictatorships of incorporating into their entourage many mini-parties of the Right or Left while denying any role to the larger parties dislodged by the military coup. This only partially explains the profound and wide-spread indifference of the great majority of Peruvians that I observed during seven months of traveling through the country, to the apparently radical changes in their society being decreed from above by the "Revolutionary government." This indifference is all the more striking to a journalist who, on previous trips to Cuba, Guatemala, Santo Domingo, Venezuela and most recently Chile, has seen many thousands of people engaged in passionate conflict when such changes were in the air. This widespread passivity may be just another instance of the limited political participation that always has been an ingrained feature of Peruvian society. It was only in 1931 that Peru had its first real general election, and there were only 300,000 voters that

<sup>35</sup> See Robert P. Case, "El entrenamiento de los militares latinoamericanos en los Estados Unidos," in *Aportes* (Paris: no. 6), October 1967, p. 55.

<sup>36</sup> "Los Planes del 'CAEM' Comienzan a Dar Frutos," in *OIGA* (Lima: no. 298), November 8, 1968, p. 11.

year in a population of roughly 5 million. The electorate grew fivefold over the next three decades, but the literacy requirement kept it to roughly one-fourth the voting-age population, and the election results were often vetoed by military coups. As *Caretas* observed in 1968,

Some said recently when the October 3 coup occurred: "It had to happen!" This to us is nonsense. The people learn from their own experience, and those who aspire to guide the people should ponder well what they say. To suppose that only the military can solve our problems is to condemn all civilians eternally to the status of children, and to argue that in practice democracy is worthless. . . . If our brief democratic experiences have led to disaster it has been because of the truly exasperating lack of precisely this democratic experience. Military coups do not suppress this evil, but nourish its cause.<sup>37</sup>

For all the overwhelming popular approval that accompanied the decreeing of the agrarian reform or the nationalization of IPC, the military regime has been increasingly aware that it is operating in a political void. Its political rallies have had the ring of a packaged spectacle. In his speech last October at Lima's Plaza de Armas in observance of the military's second anniversary in power, Velasco admitted before one of those huge packaged crowds that "it has not been possible during this first stage to articulate an organized and massive popular support for the Revolution, nor to resolve completely the fundamental problem of the effective participation of the people in the revolutionary process."

A brilliant Peruvian general later told me:

One of our greatest defects is the military habit of ordering and expecting to be blindly obeyed. This just doesn't happen in society at large. We deeply want to transfer power to the people, but we have not been able to find a way of doing this. To call elections without first carrying out our structural re-

forms, without first putting real power in the people's hands through the agrarian reform and the Industrial Community, would just bring us back to the political farces of the past without any real improvement in Peruvian society. We admit that our greatest political problem is to give a real role to the people in the process that is going on right now.<sup>38</sup>

#### Audacious New Industrial Laws

THIS POLITICAL ISOLATION, however, has not inhibited the military from undertaking some original social experiments. The most striking of these is the total reorganization of Peruvian manufacturing production units into Industrial Communities, providing for gradual transfer of ownership and executive control to the workers. The two industrial laws decreed in late 1970 are among the most audacious pieces of economic legislation in Latin-American history.

The General Law of Industries (1) reserves all basic, heavy industry for the public sector;<sup>39</sup> (2) gives factories a series of state-controlled tax and credit incentives for growth along planned lines; (3) distributes among workers 10 percent of net profits before taxes; (4) creates the Industrial Community, composed of all the firm's employees, including the old management; (5) devotes 15 percent of annual profits to the gradual acquisition of half the company's stock by the employees joined together in the Indus-

<sup>38</sup> François Bourricaud analyzes the problem this way: "In the first place, the Junta has committed itself to a process of accelerated change that the military itself wants to control; in this respect, the present Peruvian experience looks like a *voluntarist* policy of modernization. Second, this process is carried out with a minimum of political mobilization. Finally, the course chosen by the military for the movement seems each day more alien to what the society would pursue if the aspirations of its principal groups were taken into account." From "Los militares peruanos manos a la obra," *Mundo Nuevo* (Paris: no. 54), December 1970, p. 4.

<sup>39</sup> This includes iron, steel, chemicals, petrochemicals, fertilizers, cement, shipbuilding, and machine tools.

<sup>37</sup> *Caretas* (Lima: no. 382), October 14, 1968, p. 25.

trial Community; (6) provides progressive participation by the workers in management decisions as their stock ownership increases; (7) requires wholly-owned subsidiaries of foreign corporations to contract with the state fixing a term, after recovery of investment and a reasonable profit, for which foreign ownership would be reduced to one-third. Foreign interests in partnership with Peruvian capital can keep up to 49 percent.

Explaining these innovations to a meeting of business executives last November, Velasco stressed that "we know that this will be a painful, slow and difficult labor. . . . Until the beginning of the Nationalist revolution, Peru was subjected to the double and paralyzing pressure of underdevelopment and imperialism." He defined imperialism as "the domination exercised by foreign capital and technology over a society with an incipient and embryonic economy," adding that

the Revolutionary government considers that the final source of wealth is labor. . . . The revolutionary laws in the industrial sector establish the participation of labor in the profits, management, and ownership of businesses. In pauperized countries like Peru, where the immense majority of people cannot save, to reject this point of view and to maintain that savings and not labor is the generator of wealth means indefinitely sustaining the poverty and backwardness of the great marginal social sectors and, therefore, to condemn the country as a whole to eternal underdevelopment.

The new industrial laws—taken together with the agrarian reform and the other new statutes governing the main sectors of fishmeal and mining as well as the "salami tactics" being used to nationalize gradually the private banks—bring into clear focus the effort to reorganize the Peruvian economy along statist and nationalist lines. The basic industries will be in state hands, and thus principal exports will be marketed abroad by government corporations. Agriculture and manufacturing will be concentrated in co-operative-type organizations subject to state

fiscal and credit control, while artisan crafts and petty commerce would remain largely in private hands to absorb the great mass of underemployed at the fringes of the economy.

"It is an old story for the economy to be divided in state, cooperative, and private sectors," observed one of Peru's leading sociologists. "It comes essentially from two related sources: Christian Democracy and the Spanish fascists." This, however, may prove a shallow judgment. One of the generals responsible for passage of the Industrial Law told me recently that

in decreeing this statute we knew we were taking a great risk. An initial draft of the law, that was pretty bad, was published by the Ministry of Industries for public discussion. After that we went through four more drafts in four months of intensive work on the law. The fate of the Industrial Community is now in the hands of the people: the workers, union leaders, factory managers and owners. If they work together constructively, the Industrial Community will be a success. After all, it is in the interests of everyone to work with greater discipline and efficiency to maximize profits for all. If they don't work together, the old owner may find it more convenient to sell his remaining half to the Industrial Community. Then the system would change from co-management to worker management.

None of these implications have been lost on Peru's business executives. New investment has dried up almost completely over the past two years despite assurance from the military that there is an important role for private enterprise in Peru's "New Industrial Society." To appreciate the staggering obstacles to the achievement of this goal, it might be well to look at the structure of the Peruvian industrial sector, which is similar to that of most developing countries. According to the 1963 manufacturing census, 82 percent of the 23,308 factories in Peru had fewer than five workers. Of the rest, two-thirds were located in Lima, mainly clothing and textile factories with imported second-hand machinery owned by Italians and East Euro-

pean Jews,<sup>40</sup> and food-processing plants in the process of rapid absorption by large U.S. corporations, as they are in the rest of Latin America. Under past governments' import-substitution policies, scores of other factories produce foreign-patented consumer goods under expensive royalty arrangements. Nevertheless, the manufacturing sector has contributed spectacularly in recent decades to Peru's economic growth, increasing its product at an annual average of 9.3 percent between 1950 and 1967 and its blue-collar work force at nearly the same rate.<sup>41</sup> This is quite a contribution to an economy with chronically high unemployment aggravated by rapid urbanization and a population explosion that generates massive pressures on the job market each year.

As expected, Ford and General Motors and the First National City Bank have withdrawn from Peru, and local businessmen have not only been shy of making new investments of their own money but also of accepting easy credit from the government. Their complaint against the new Industrial Law is less of sharing profits with their workers than of giving up executive control of their own businesses. Under the new law, the

embryonic Industrial Communities have been organized and registered within 60 days of the decree. Some industrialists have left the country, but others have gone along philosophically, as reflected in this joke told by a leading Jewish businessman at the end of the executives' meeting addressed last November by General Velasco:

A king had summoned his people and showed them a donkey, ordering them to teach it how to talk. If they did not, many people would be killed. The people did not know what to do until a rabbi spoke up, asking the people to leave things in his hands; he would solve the problem. The rabbi went to the king and said: "Your majesty, I will teach your donkey to talk, and even give speeches, when I finish. I pledge my life as security. But, Your Majesty, if it takes a human being four or five years to learn to speak correctly, it should take your illustrious burro roughly 15 years. Then, there will be some expenses of feeding him and for my full-time work, etc. If you will sign this contract, Your Majesty. . . ." When the rabbi told the elders of the town of his contract, they said: "You're crazy! They'll kill you!" "That may be true," the rabbi answered. "But I see it this way: In 15 years the king could die. In 15 years the donkey could die. Or perhaps in 15 years the burro might even learn how to talk."<sup>42</sup>

This wait-and-see attitude might well be advisable for many other people. Like Mexico during the 1930s, Peru today is going through a period of extraordinary social and economic reorganization to achieve greater social justice. While these changes may be subject to retraction or modification later on, the social pressures that impelled them have influenced many governments and seem to be a permanent part of the Peruvian scene. In response to such pressures Peru's educational expenditures, for example, increased tenfold between 1955 and 1965,

<sup>40</sup> "Today the larger textile firms are still almost entirely owned and managed by foreigners. Some of them are Peruvian citizens but not fully Peruvian in a cultural sense. Their legal status had led to the impression that the textile industry is 'national.' It is true, and important, that a smaller percentage of profits from textile mills are exported than from oil or mining industries. However, the wealthier Peruvian businessmen reputedly deposit money abroad as readily as do foreigners working in Peru. The essential fact at this point is that there were virtually no Peruvian entrepreneurs, managers, or engineers in the Peruvian textile industry. Only today are foreign-owned firms hiring a few Peruvian engineers and managers in this field, and at lower wages than their foreign predecessors received, because of pressure from the government to 'nationalize' their labor force and management. Ironically, it is the ostensibly 'national' firms who eagerly 'pirate' away the foreign technicians from the explicitly foreign-owned companies." From David Chaplin, *The Peruvian Industrial Labor Force* (Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 100.  
<sup>41</sup> Banco Central de Reserva del Peru, *Cuentas Nacionales del Peru, 1950-67*, pp. 8, 30.

<sup>42</sup> Quoted in *Caretas* (no. 426), December 1, 1970, p. 12D. This was the issue of *Caretas* that led to the government court action against its editor for "obscenity" and "violation of press freedom."

from 13 to 29 percent of the government budget, while public spending as a whole leaped from 11 to 20 percent of GNP.<sup>43</sup> The important thing about the present "Revolutionary government" is that it attempts innovative solutions to the old problems of foreign domination and economic inequality that undoubtedly will leave some lasting benefits for the Peruvian people—as well as the disillusion of some failed experiments. It would be ideal if these reforms were carried out with the kind of massive popular support enjoyed by the Mexican Revolution, but this is not the case.

On the other hand, the economic dislocations proceeding from the changes decreed by the "Revolutionary government" have been cushioned by a boom in export commodities that in 1970 brought Peru's foreign exchange earnings above the \$1 billion mark for the first time. Roughly 85 percent of these earnings were in minerals and fishmeal, which under new legislation are being marketed abroad by state corporations. It is in this critical field of negotiating better terms of trade with the "metropolitan powers" that Peru, along with the other principal commodity-exporting nations of the Third World, is making some of its most dramatic moves. The great problem of these countries, as always, is to find or train enough competent managers, bureaucrats, negotiators, and technicians to fully develop and implement these policies, and to obtain enough capital and technology to bring these economic activities under their own control.

This issue of a nation's control of its own economy has recently been made an even more urgent question for most countries by the extraordinary growth of what has become known as the multinational corporation. According to Robert Heilbroner,

71 of the top 126 [U.S.] industrial corporations averaged one-third of their employ-

ment abroad. . . . In 1966, the U.S. exported \$43 billion of goods and services to various parts of the world. In the same year, the value of United States overseas production—that is, of goods and services made in U.S.-owned factories or establishments

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***"The important thing about the present 'Revolutionary government' is that it attempts innovative solutions to the old problems of foreign domination and economic inequality. . . ."***

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abroad—came to \$110 billion. . . . For all the talk (and the reality) of imperialist domination, most of the underdeveloped nations want domestic foreign investment, European and/or American, for a variety of reasons. The multinationals pay higher wages, keep more honest books, pay more taxes, and provide more managerial know-how and training than do local industries. Moreover, they usually provide better social services for their workers, and certainly provide fancy career opportunities for a favored few of the elite. They are, in addition, a main channel through which technology, developed in the West, can filter into backward nations. To be sure, the corporations typically send home more profits than the capital that they originally introduce into the "host" country; but meanwhile that capital grows, providing jobs, improving productivity, and often contributing to export earnings.<sup>44</sup>

As in the rest of the world, the most dramatic expansion in Peru of the multinational corporations during the 1960s has been in the manufacturing industries. The profits are very high, often averaging 20 percent annually, allowing a corporation to recover its original investment in less than five years.<sup>45</sup>

<sup>43</sup> This data is analyzed in Shane J. Hunt, *Distribution, Growth and Government Economic Behavior in Peru*, Discussion Paper no. 7, Development Research Project, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University.

<sup>44</sup> Robert L. Heilbroner, "The Multinational Corporation and the Nation-State," *New York Review of Books*, February 11, 1971.

<sup>45</sup> According to a 1963 *Business Week* survey of "Multinational Companies," "it's common for a corporation to get 20 percent of its total earnings

Even so, the corporate contribution to the host economy consists largely of organizational skills and technology, since the multinationals more often than not borrow from local banks to finance the establishment of new plants,<sup>46</sup> and purchase machinery from the parent company at inflated prices. Until drastic measures were taken by the "Revolutionary government," the Peruvian automobile industry consisted of 13 foreign-owned assembly plants producing 17,000 vehicles a year at roughly twice the U.S. retail price.

Take the case of General Motors del Perú. In GM's first year of assembling cars in Peru the company grossed three times its initial investment of \$5 million, with its local payroll and purchases amounting to 15 percent of sales, while its customs duties were halved as an incentive to assemble rather than import cars.<sup>47</sup> Both General Motors and Ford, the local industry's two largest producers, closed their Peru operations as the military regime reduced the number of auto assembly plants from 13 to 6, ordered the remaining companies to produce 70 percent of their components in Peru and, under the new Industrial Law, gave all foreign corporations

the choice of taking local majority partners or leaving the country.

#### Drastic Measures—the Example of Cuajone

THESE DRASTIC if not desperate measures represent an effort by Peru and many other countries to influence the terms of their integration into the world economy. There is no doubt but that investments by large foreign corporations increase both the scale and quality of economic activity. Yet they do so with profit margins that in overall terms seem like economic banditry, and greatly diminish the powers of national decision over the often conflicting priorities of consumer demand and capital accumulation. The multinational corporations are to the political economy of Latin America today what the "trusts" were to that of the United States at the beginning of this century—with the key difference that at least in the U.S. the great corporations generated a providential capital accumulation within its national frontiers. The drain of capital from the poorer countries to the richer ones, as recorded in U.S. Commerce Department statistics, is astounding. Between 1950 and 1965 U.S. private companies invested \$297 million in Peru and during the same period withdrew \$628 million in dividends, interest, and other remittances, while dollar accounts of Peruvians in the United States tripled.<sup>48</sup> *The Economist* estimated the drain of capital from Latin America by mutual funds alone at \$450 million annually, equal to all World Bank loans to the region through 1968 and half the area's balance of payments deficit.<sup>49</sup> This is why the "Revolutionary government" last May decreed one of the world's tightest exchange control systems. While countries like Peru must fight the erosion of their export earnings by this dollar drain, they badly need the organizational and technical skills of the great foreign cor-

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from foreign operations. For some the figure runs to 50 percent and more. . . . In industry after industry, U.S. companies found that their overseas earnings were soaring and that their return on investments abroad was frequently much higher than in the U.S." See *Business Week*, April 20, 1963, p. 63.

<sup>46</sup> According to U.S. Commerce Department statistics, local borrowing by manufacturing affiliates of U.S. corporations in Latin America in 1968 was triple the new funds obtained from U.S. sources, curtailing the already scarce local credit available to national users. The proportion of local borrowing has risen sharply under pressure from Washington to reduce its balance of payments problem. Since the figure given for "U.S. sources" includes money borrowed abroad by parent companies to finance its overseas affiliates, the real proportion of local borrowing is even higher than official statistics would indicate. See R. David Belli, "Sources and Uses of Funds of Foreign Affiliates of U.S. Firms, 1967-68," in *Survey of Current Business*, November 1970, p. 14.

<sup>47</sup> See the figures given to the Lima press by GM's Peru manager, quoted in Carlos Malpica, *El Mito de la Ayuda Exterior* (Lima, 1967), pp. 121-24.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 81, 97.

<sup>49</sup> *The Economist para América Latina*, October 15, 1969, p. 8.

porations. Peru's finance minister told an audience of American businessmen in March that Peru will need \$700 million in foreign investment by 1975.

The great example of this problem is Cuajone, which will be one of the world's largest copper mines, that lies nearly 12,000 feet high in the desert mountains of southern Peru. Cuajone is a giant open-pit mine containing 470 million tons of ore, capable of yielding 140,000 tons a year of near-pure "blister" copper. It will cost roughly \$355 million to bring Cuajone into production, a sum equal to all accumulated U.S. investment in Peru through 1956 and nearly twice all American investment since then. This enormous investment means 200-ton trucks and giant steamshovels able to remove the 200 million tons of earth that cover the ore deposit, \$50 million to build railways and tunnels—including one tunnel 10 miles long—leading from the mine to a new concentrating plant as well as \$28 million for two new towns. Cuajone will also be one of the world's most automated mines, with computers used for such varied tasks as evaluating exploration data, calculating ore reserves, production scheduling, and complex investment analysis. Seen for the near future are automated rotary drills with digitized recording of data for computer calculation, elimination of draftsmen by computer-plotters, and conversing with computers in conventional language.<sup>50</sup>

One of the most revolutionary things about Cuajone is the contract between the "Revolutionary government" and the U.S.-owned Southern Peru Copper Corporation to develop the mine.<sup>51</sup> It was signed in December 1969, after a critical phase of what can only be called a continuing poker game for tremendous stakes between U.S. and Peruvian interests. Southern Peru Copper was formed

in the early 1950s to exploit the neighboring Toquepala mine, and exercised options on Cuajone and Quellavico, the other two unexploited deposits in what should become the world's biggest copper-mining complex. The Belaunde regime had lined up roughly \$700 million in new investment to bring several untapped copper deposits into production. When Belaunde was ousted, the mining companies held back on their investments and resisted polite pressures to go ahead until the leftist-nationalist Minister of Mines General Jorge Fernandez Maldonado delivered the companies an ultimatum: develop all unexploited concessions, or the mines would revert to the state. Within three months the Cuajone contract was signed, despite furious protests by leftist supporters of the "Revolutionary government" who urged exploitation of the mine by the state itself.

The Cuajone contract, if fulfilled, will be a major breakthrough in the relations between nations producing and consuming raw materials. The pressures for better terms of trade for producing companies have been strongest in copper and oil, and have left the consuming nations in a bad mood. Nevertheless, not only does the new Cuajone contract submit the foreign mining enterprise to the highest degree of state control and taxation ever imposed in Peru, but it gives the state the option to refine and market the copper abroad, making the arrangement appear more like the "service contracts" now becoming popular in the oil industry.<sup>52</sup> Despite the enormity of the investment needed to bring Cuajone into production, the contract will be valid only "during the period required for the recuperation of the investment, which may not exceed 10 years counted as from the date of the start of mining exploitation operations." Again, if Southern Peru does not arrange financing for

<sup>50</sup> See "Special Cuajone Supplement," *Peruvian Times* (Lima), January 29, 1971, which prints an English translation of the Cuajone contract.

<sup>51</sup> A consortium controlled by American Smelting and Refining Co., also including Cerro Corp., Phelps Dodge, and Newmont Mining.

<sup>52</sup> Service contracts are a departure from the traditional territorial concession to mining or oil companies in that, instead of enjoying legal title to an area for a given period, the companies are merely enfranchised to look for and extract oil in exchange for a minority share of the production.

the entire \$350 million investment by June 1971, the concession will revert to the state.

That an American company in Peru will swallow such tough terms to retain a mining concession marks a new era in economic relations; but there is more to it than that. Peru, Chile, Zambia, and the Congo together produce 72 percent of the world's export copper, a demand nearly doubled between 1960 and 1967 under the artificial stimulus of the Vietnam war. Since Zambia and the Congo recently nationalized their copper deposits and Chile is clearly about to do so, Peru is the last major supplying country open to direct operations by foreign companies. According to an American writer,

1969 was a frightening year for the great international copper companies. With nationalization in Zambia and an agreement for nationalization of Anaconda in Chile, plus the insecurity about the direction of change in Peru, most companies had to be most cautious in planning investments for the 1970's. . . . Thus the biggest companies are reorienting their investment programs toward "secure" geographic regions—plus great new copper discoveries in the U.S. and Canada. There is also a growing flow of funds toward Australia, the Philippines, Mexico, India, Spain, and Yugoslavia. And not only the traditional U.S. and British companies are moving their money into these "secure" areas; the more aggressive Japanese and European companies are doing the same.<sup>53</sup>

So the copper companies in Peru may simply be stalling for time, while political conditions turn to their advantage and new sources of supply are developed.

The poker game over Cuajone could involve the very survival of the "Revolutionary government." The game runs this way: since the \$215 million Toquepala project of the 1950s and the even larger U.S. copper concessions in Chile could not have been brought into production without huge loans

from the U.S. government, it is extremely doubtful that Southern Peru will find the \$350 million financing assets as required before the June 1971 deadline. President Nixon could just as well have been alluding to Peru, or the severe restrictions imposed last December on foreign companies by the five na-

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***"The great trouble with military regimes, even reformist ones, is that they provide no long-term political solution."***

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tions of the new Andean Common Market, as well as the present jockeying over compensation for the U.S. copper companies in Chile, when he said last February in his "State of the World" message:

The 1970 election of a Socialist President [in Chile] may have profound implications not only for its people but for the Inter-American system as well. The Government's legitimacy is not in question, but its ideology is likely to influence its actions. . . . We do not seek confrontations with any government. But those which display unrelenting hostility cannot expect our assistance. . . . Many governmental disputes flow from pressures against foreign private investment. Such investment plays a constructive role in development, for no government or public agency has the vast resources required for even basic development goals. It is clearly for each country to decide its conditions for foreign investment, just as it is for each investor to decide what conditions provide adequate security and incentives. The challenge for governments and investors is to develop new approaches which satisfy the needs of both. We ask only that our citizens be treated fairly in accordance with international law.

The copper companies could deal a severe blow to the military regime by throwing the Cuajone concession back in the government's lap. Before the contract was signed, the Peruvians approached the Russians for

<sup>53</sup> Theodore H. Moran, "Chile y el mercado del cobre: 'dependencia' y 'independencia' en la década del 70," in *Panorama Económico* (Santiago: no. 255), July 1970.

help to exploit Cuajone themselves. According to the progovernment magazine *OIGA*, "the U.S.S.R. would be glad to lend the machinery for the exploitation of Cuajone by the state, but not the money needed for salaries and purchases on the local market. These are the same conditions required by the United States for operations of this nature. For the Russians, it is not a question of aiding a country trying to end its dependence, but a business deal like any other."<sup>54</sup> When pressed further by the Peruvians, the Russians said they should talk to the Americans if they wanted better terms.

If southern Peru fails to get the money needed to finance Cuajone and the concession reverts to the state, it could find itself losing the Toquepala concession as well. The "Revolutionary government" could argue that Cuajone and Toquepala are essentially part of the same mining complex, and that the exploitation of these deposits has been blocked by international pressures that both threaten national development and jeopardize Peru's capacity to pay the \$650 million in servicing of hard-currency loans that fall due between 1971 and 1974. Since the development of Toquepala was financed by a \$100 million loan from the U.S. Export-Import Bank, this could lead Peru into a confrontation with the Nixon administration much more dramatic and significant than that of expelling IPC from Peru. If this possibility is considered remote by some, they should bear in mind the view recently conveyed to me by one of Peru's leading generals:

The Nixon administration has played its cards very intelligently in trying to diminish tensions over the nationalization of IPC. In fact, we would have preferred that Nixon apply the Hickenlooper amendment [cutting off all aid funds] so we could use it as a reason to radicalize our revolutionary process.

#### What of the Future?

AT THIS STAGE, one cannot make conclusive judgments about this process. Evidently, the future of the so-called Peruvian Military Revolution will be determined in part by the success or failure of other commodity-producing nations in dealing, jointly or separately, with the major industrial powers. Beyond that, Peru's painful struggle with the economic and psychological burdens of feudalism and mercantilism and foreign domination will depend on how much political support the "Revolutionary government" can muster in the next year or two. The great trouble with military regimes, even reformist ones, is that they provide no long-term *political* solution. In most cases where the military seizes power, it truncates a nation's normal institutional growth and makes the army the leading political party, a situation that does not generate popular support except in the rarest cases. Peru's military regime will have to take drastic steps to become one of these exceptions. The main political parties have survived in weakened form, and are free to applaud but not to oppose, and the same goes for the press and the general condition of political liberty under the present regime.

It has welcomed the support of the weak Moscow-line Communists, but has met a mixed reaction among the ten or so other Marxist groups in Peru, which count for little anyway. Although the economy is being reorganized along statist lines, a socialist revolution seems out of the question in Peru because the military cannot indefinitely remain a ruling party, and because it would impose immediate and intolerable sacrifices on the rising middle class of Lima, the classic Latin-American "primate city," where population, wealth, and political power are heavily concentrated. Indeed, the army officers' corps comprises leading members of this middle class and would probably be among the first to oppose such measures as abolition of private schools, one of the main

<sup>54</sup> *OIGA* (no. 349), November 7, 1969, p. 35.

pillars of class distinctions in Latin America, which Fidel Castro abolished in 1961 in one of the most decisive blows he dealt his middle-class political opposition. Nevertheless, to continue its present reforms the military will have to deal ruthlessly with both intractable social problems and its own traditional fear of mass political mobilization. Otherwise, the "Revolutionary government" can become increasingly repressive in coming years, with enervating slogans of "revolution" blaring over loudspeakers while the people are subjected to increasingly barren and restricted lives.

Like the leaders of the great majority of

developing nations, Peru's rulers are torn between the conflicting needs of tighter organizational control and the cultivation of the people. Success in achieving greater sovereignty and distributive justice, however, will depend less on financing than on finding local substitutes for the two key instruments of the multinational corporations: organization and technology. Whether the Peruvian people, and especially Peruvian bureaucrats, can run complex, automated mines and make a sweeping agrarian reform both economically productive and socially just, is the key to this extraordinary but still-undefined process of change. It may be Peru's last chance.

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WHAT PRICE WOMEN'S "EQUALITY"? (continued from page 266)

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therefore, the age should be lowered uniformly to 18. From another point of view, only young men are given the privilege or benefit of disaffirming an obligation between 18 and 20, therefore, the age should be raised uniformly to 20. Which will it be?

As Paul Freund of the Harvard Law School has pointed out,

The truth is that a motto of four words—"The Equal Rights Amendment"—however noble in purpose, is hopelessly inept to resolve all the diverse issues of classification by sex in the laws. When a proposal leaves the mind so unsatisfied regarding its effect on ordinary, obvious, recurring relationships, a more specific and concrete approach is clearly called for.

Many legal discriminations against women do exist. To help remove them, "specific bills for specific ills" are needed. What is more, we should not ignore the safeguards for equal treatment under law now given *all persons* under the 14th Amendment.

As Mary D. Keyserling, former director of the Women's Bureau, U.S. Department of Labor, has stated,

The inequality of women does not arise out of constitutional defect—but rather out of economic, social, political and legislative default. . . . Our challenge is of working for new and better laws where necessary, the improvement and modification of old laws, and effective enforcement of the good ones now on the books.



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